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SIR LYMAN DUFF AND THE
CONSTITUTION
By GERALD LEDAIN,

Q.C.*

1.

General
Sir Lyman Poore Duff, who was on the Supreme Court of Canada for
almost thirty-eight years, during the last ten of which he was Chief Justice,1
is generally considered to have been one of Canada's greatest judges. There are
many who would say that he was the greatest; there are others who would contend that his stature is rivalled, and even surpassed, in some respects, by that of
the late Mr. Justice Ivan Cleveland Rand, who was a member of the Supreme
Court for a shorter period,2 but whose thinking made a profound impression,
particularly in the field of public law. Although there was almost twenty years'
difference in their ages, and Rand's career on the Court began as Duff's drew to a
close, there was apparently a strong bond of attraction and mutual respect
between them. Both had a thorough commitment to the life of the mind and a
powerful and highly cultivated intellect enriched by reading and reflection on a
wide range of subjects extending far beyond the law.
It is my purpose on this occasion to speak of Duff rather than Rand, but in
any attempt to estimate the significance of Duff's work in constitutional law one
is inevitably drawn, in attempting to place it in a contemporary focus, to the
commentary, express and implied, in the work of Rand. For despite the obvious
respect which Rand had for the ability and judicial work of Duff, there can be no
doubt that their emphasis in constitutional matters was essentially different. It
is difficult and dangerous to try to express this difference in simple terms. There
has been some tendency in recent years to somewhat over-simplified characterization of judicial results in terms of liberal and conservative, pro-government
and pro-individual, active and passive, as well as a rather ingenuous attempt to
show inconsistency by juxtaposing results which flow out of essentially different
areas and considerations. And there has been an increasing tendency to count
the results in one direction or another, rather than to evaluate the relative signifi* Gerald LeDain, Q.C., Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School, York
University.
2 The late Mr. Justice Rand was born on April 27, 1884. He was appointed to the
Court of British Columbia in 1904, and on September 27, 1906, to the Supreme Court
of Canada. He was appointed Chief Justice of Canada on March 17, 1933, and he
retired from from the Court on January 7, 1944. He died on April 26, 1955, at the
age of 90. For biographical detail and insights see the memoir in this issue by Mr.
Kenneth Campbell (assisted by Professor Brian Bucknall), entitled The Right Honourable Sir Lyman Poore Duff, P.C., G.C.M.G.: The Man As I Knew Him. See also
R. Gosse, Random Thoughts of a Wood-Be JudicialBiographer (1969), 19 U. of T.L.J.

597; and the memorial tributes of Rand, O'Leary and Wright in (1955), 33 Can. Bar
Rev. 1113, 1118, and 1123.
2 The late Mr. Justice Rand was born on April 27, 1884. He was appointed to the
Supreme Court of Canada on April 22, 1943, less than a year before Chief Justice Duff
retired, and he retired from the Court on April 27, 1959.
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cance of particular cases. This whole process, which depends on quantification
of grossly over-simplified characterization, masks the essential complexity and
subtlety of the judicial process. No doubt its purpose is to expose what appear to
be the dominant trends, in terms of value preference, in the work of particular
judges and courts; but the method does not do justice to the hard professional
task of considering the implications for the shape of the law while attempting to
do justice in the instant case.
In perhaps no other field are the implications of decisions for the general
shape of the law as important as they are in constitutional law. For here the
courts are concerned with the legal framework within which all other activity
must be conducted, and with the organic, working relationship between the
various branches of government. Any major adjustment in that framework, any
essential shift in the distribution of power that determines that relationship at
any given time, can have profound long-run implications for the welfare of the
state and the individual. It is with this class of larger questions that judicial
statesmanship must concern itself in constitutional law while attempting to arrive
at sound conclusions in particular cases.
It is with this general perspective that one may venture a comparison of the
essential concerns and tendencies behind the work of Duff and Rand. Basically,
Duff was chiefly concerned with the necessary limits of federal power in the
interests of the authority that must be conceded to the provincial governments if
they were to be able to discharge their own constitutional responsibilities, and
perhaps equally important, remain reconciled to the constitution. This was the
chief concern of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in relation to which
he played a unique role. Rand, on the other hand, while respectful of the lines
which Duff and the Judicial Committee felt it necessary to draw, sought a more
dynamic relationship between the two spheres of power that would take more
realistic account of functional necessities. This of course, reflects only one aspect
of the constitutional work of Rand, and in particular his commentary on the
trade and commerce power. But it is this aspect of his work that affords some
basis for contrasting his thinking with that of Duff. The major difference, of
course, in the position and vantage point of the two men is that while Duff passed
his entire judicial career under the shadow of the Judicial Committee of the
Privy Council, which had the final word in constitutional matters, Rand was, for
about ten years, a member of the Supreme Court of Canada after it had become
a final court of appeal able to strike out in new directions. He worked within
the general expectation that the Supreme Court, with power of final decision,
would impart some of the vitality to federal power that had been denied by the
general tendency of the Judicial Committee's decisions. That he welcomed this
opportunity is reflected in the following passage from his judgment in the
3
OntarioFarmProductsMarketing reference:
The powers of this Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction are no less in scope than

those formerly exercised in relation to Canada by the Judicial Committee. From
time to time the Committee has modified the language used by it in the attribution of
legislation to the various heads of ss. 91 and 92, and in its general interpretative
formulations, and that incident of judicial power must, now, in the same manner and
3In the Matter of a Reference Respecting The Farm Products Marketing Act,
R.S.O. 1950, c. 131, as amended, [1957] S.C.R. 198 at 212-13.

1974]

Duff and the Constitution

with the same authority, wherever deemed necessary, be exercised in revising or
restating those formulations that have come down to us. This is a function inseparable from constitutional decision. It involves no departure from the basic principles
of jurisdictional distribution; it is rather a refinement of interpretation in application
to the particularized and evolving features and aspects of matters which the intensive

and extensive expansion of the life of the country inevitably presents.

Despite this declaration of purpose, however, and the broad sweep of some
of Rand's statements, it was not given to him to make much fundamental impact
on the general distribution of power that Duff had helped to shape. His
judgments were more intimations of what might be. The constitutional realities
which Duff recognized in attempting to strike the necessary, if not altogether
satisfactory, balance between federal and provincial power are still very dominant. The judgments of Rand show that he himself was conscious of them, and
that they make it difficult to move very far from the essential positions on which
Duff settled.
Duff's judicial career spanned the crucial period of Canada's development.
It included the two world wars and the great depression, and the period in which
Canada evolved to independent status in the world community. It also covered
the years in which the Canadian constitution was given its essential shape by
judicial decision. The question of Duff's influence on this process resolves itself
very substantially into the question of his influence on the Judicial Committee.
This impact is difficult to estimate. It is partly to be inferred from explicit references to his work by the Judicial Committee and partly from a comparison of his
judgments and theirs. But the full extent of his influence on the thinking of the
various members who composed the Judicial Committee from time to time can
not be estimated because of the Judicial Committee's tradition of the single
judgment, which concealed the differences of opinion among its members and
the part which Duff's thinking may have played in such differences. It is clear,
however that Duff enjoyed great respect in the Judicial Committee and that he
had, for a Canadian judge, a unique relationship to it.
Before Duff, Chief Justices of the Supreme Court had been invited to sit
from time to time with the Judicial Committee. The tradition appears to have
begun, at least in constitutional cases, with Sir Henry Strong around 1898, and
it continued with Sir Henri Elzear Taschereau. But Duff appears to have been
the first puisne judge of the Supreme Court to be invited to participate in the
work of the Judicial Committee. Beginning in 1919 he regularly sat as a member
of the Judicial Committee on Canadian appeals each summer during the 1920's.
These were generally appeals from the decisions of provincial courts of appeal.
This gave him an opportunity to have a voice in constitutional cases which had
not come before him as a judge of the Supreme Court. From time to time he
delivered the judgment of the Judicial Committee. The most important was
probably the judgment in the Reciprocal Insurers case4 in which the Judicial
Committee rejected the criminal law power as a basis for federal control of the
insurance business. Since Duff could only sit on those cases which were heard
in the summer, he was unable to participate in several important cases during the
1920's which came from provincial courts of appeal at other times of the year.
4 A.-G. Ont. v. ,ReciprocalInsurers, [1924] A.C. 328.
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5
Probably the most important of these were the Fort Frances
and Snider6
cases in which the "emergency" concept of the general power was elaborated.
Duff does not appear to have sat with the Judicial Committee in constitutional
cases during the 1930's. It was impossible for him to make his trips to England
during the Second World War, but after his retirement from the Supreme Court
of Canada in January 1944 he sat on several constitutional appeals with the
Judicial Committee, notably the Japanese Canadianscase 7 in the summer of
1947, in which the emergency doctrine of general power was re-affirmed after
it had been seriously questioned a year earlier in the CanadaTemperance case. 8

Thus Duff was associated with the Judicial Commitee for over twenty-five
years, a period during which its composition and dominating personalities
changed many times. But his most important association was probably with
Viscount Haldane, who was the dominant member of the Judicial Committee
when Duff began to sit with it in 1919. Duff is believed to have enjoyed close
intellectual relations with Haldane, and his own judgments give evidence that
he was in broad sympathy with Haldane's general approach to the interpretation
of the constitution. Haldane showed his confidence by inviting Duff to render the
judgment of the Judicial Committee in several cases in the early 1920's.
It is tempting to see Duff's role in relation to the Judicial Committee as
essentially one of summing up and giving forceful expression to the implications
of the decisions of the higher tribunal. By common agreement he had a masterly
capacity for summing up the law in a particular area, and many of his summations were adopted by the Judicial Committee, often with laudatory references.
Certainly Duff's exposition from time to time of the effect of the Judicial Committee's decisions served to impart added authority to them and to reinforce
their general tendency. But there is also reason to conclude that he made a positive contribution to the rationale of many of those decisions, and that his own
thinking had an important influence on the result. Duff was much more than an
echo of the Judicial Committee's voice on provincial rights. He made his own
distinctive contribution to the development of the general position that resulted
on this question.
Sir Lyman Duff must be ranked as one of the judicial architects of the Canadian constitution, and in particular, of the inclination towards provincial jurisdiction that was gradually imparted to it. Indeed, one cannot help but wonder
what might have been the result in the Judicial Committee had Duff lent the
weight of his intellectual authority to a different view in some of the important
cases. Would it have made it more difficult for the Judicial Committee to follow
the path it did? During the critical period there were two essentially different
points of view in the Supreme Court of Canada concerning the balance of federal
and provincial power. They were reflected in the approach of Mr. Justice (later
Chief Justice) Anglin, who, on the whole, emphasized concern for the constitutional requirements of the federal government, and in the approach of Duff,
5 Fort FrancesPulp & Power Co. Ltd. v. ManitobaFree Press Co., [1923] A.C. 695.
o Toronto Electric Commissioners v. Snider, [1925] A.C. 396.
7

Co-operative Committee on Japanese Canadiansv. A.-G. Can., [1947] A.C. 87.

8 A.-G. Ont. v. Canada Temperance Federation, [1946] A.C. 193.

19741

Duff and the Constitution

who, as we have said, tended to emphasize concern for provincial rights. Had
Duff thrown his weight on the side of federal power would the result in the
Judicial Committee have been different?
2.

The Background of Judicial Decisions when Duff Came to the Supreme
Court of Canada

When Duff came to the Supreme Court of Canada in 1906, after only two
years as a member of the Supreme Court of British Columbia, the broad lines of
interpretation of some of the important areas of jurisdiction under the constitution had already been laid down by decisions of the Judicial Committee. In the
quarter of a century or so before he came to the Court there had been several
leading decisions which were to exert a powerful influence on his thinking with
respect to the general shape of the constitution. Before Viscount Haldane there
had been a Sir Montague Smith era and a Lord Watson era. Both were relatively
short but very influential. The two important decisions in the Montague Smith
era were the Russell case 9 and the Parsonscase. 10 One concerned the general
power and the other the trade and commerce power l z of the federal Parliament. The important judgment in the Lord Watson era was the Local Prohibition case,'1 in which a caution was expressed concerning the general power.
In the Parsonscase and the Local Prohibitioncase we see the foundation of
Duff's general approach to the main heads of federal jurisdiction. He was also to
lay great stress over the years on the unreported decision of the Judicial Committee in the McCarthy Act case,14 which, he contended, seriously qualified the
significance of their decision in Russell.
In the Russell case the general power was affirmed as the basis for federal
legislation that could have rested on the criminal law power: the prohibition with
penal consequences of the sale of intoxicating liquor. In effect, it was the criminal
law expression of the general power that the Judicial Committee affirmed. The
case is not so significant, as some have suggested, as indicating the possible
application of the general power to matters which ordinarily fall within provincial jurisdiction as it is in indicating the true relationship between the introduc-

9 Russell
10

v. The Queen (1882), 7 App. Cas. 829.

Citizens Insurance Co. v. Parsons (1881-82), 7 App. Cas. 96.

11 The general power of the Parliament of Canada, or the "Peace, Order and Good
Government clause, as it is often referred to, is conferred by the introductory words
of section 91 of the British North America Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Victoria, c. 3 (U.K.)
as follows: "It shall be lawful for the Queen, by and with the Advice and Consent
of the Senate and House of Commons, to make Laws for the Peace, Order and good
Government of Canada, in relation to all Matters not coming within the Classes of
Subjects by this Act assigned exclusively to the Legislatures of the Provinces; and for
greater certainty, but not so as to restrict the Generality of the foregoing Terms of this
Section, it is hereby declared that (notwithstanding anything in this Act) the exclusive
Legislative Authority of the Parliament of Canada extends to all Matters coming within
the Classes of Subjects next herein-after enumerated: that is to say...."
12
Head 2 of Section 91 of the B.N.A. Act, which reads "The Regulation of Trade
and Commerce."
13 A.-G. Ont. v. A.-G. Can., [1896] A.C. 348.

14For judicial references to the reasons for this decision, which declared the
Dominion Liquor License Act, 1883, 46 Victoria, c. 30 (Can.) invalid, see Laskin's
CanadianConstitutionalLaw ed. A. Abel, (4th ed. Toronto: Carswell Co., 1973) at 130.
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tory grant of power and the specific heads of federal jurisdiction in section 91
of the B.N.A. Act. The implication of Sir Montague Smith's judgment in the
Russell case was that the specific heads of jurisdiction in section 91 were to be
seen as merely examples of the general grant of power in the introductory clause.
This was an insight that would have made an enormous difference to the possible
shape of federal power had it been applied in later decisions. Instead, the Judicial Committee recoiled from the implications of this view and set about separating the general power from the specific heads of jurisdiction and imposing very
strict limits on the application of the former. The view of the general power
implied in the Russell case would have permitted the federal Parliament to
determine the extent of its legislative jurisdiction, much as the American Congress has determined the extent of its reach under the commerce power. Its
application would have involved a gradual transfer of power from the provinces
to the federal government, as one matter after another inevitably assumed, in
the complexity and interdependent relationships of modem life, a national as
opposed to a local interest and importance.
It was Lord Watson in the Local Prohibition case who suggested the
caution with which the general power should be allowed to be a basis for federal
legislation. The particular language that he used, although much emphasized
over the years, is relatively unimportant. What is important is that he perceived
that provincial jurisdiction could gradually be swallowed up if it were relatively
easy to invoke the general power. As he put it, such an application of the general
power would "practically destroy the autonomy of the provinces". 15 The implications, as he expressed them, weighed heavily with later judges such as Duff
and Haldane:
...
If it were once conceded that the Parliament of Canada has authority to make
laws applicable to the whole Dominion, in relation to matters which in each province
are substantially of local or private interest, upon the assumption that these matters
also concern the peace, order and good government of the Dominion, there is hardly
a subject enumerated in s. 92 upon which it might not legislate, to the exclusion of
the provincial legislatures. 16

Of course, the issue is precisely whether a matter has ceased to be one of
local concern and has become one of national concern. Lord Watson's caution
reflects the fact that there are many matters of local concern which are inevitably
matters of national concern as well. When is the aspect of national concern to
be treated as dominant? Said Lord Watson:
... Their Lordships do not doubt that some matters, in their origin local and provincial, might attain such dimensions as to affect the body politic of the Dominion,
and to justify the Canadian Parliament in passing laws for their regulation or
abolition in the interests of the Dominion. But great caution must be observed in
distinguishing between that which is local and provincial, and therefore within the
jurisdiction of the provincial legislatures, and that which has ceased to be merely
local or provincial, and has become a matter of national concern, in such sense as
to bring it within the jurisdiction of the Parliament of Canada.17

In the Parsonscase the Judicial Committee had to deal with the contention
that the apparently unrestricted scope of federal jurisdiction to regulate trade
15, [1896] A.C. 348 at 361.
10 Id. at 360-61.
17 Id. at 361.

1974]

Duff and the Constitution

and commerce was an obstacle to provincial legislation which imposed statutory
conditions on fire insurance policies issued by companies carrying on business
in the province. The issue could have been avoided by holding, as the majority
in the Supreme Court of Canada did, that the regulation of contracts of insurance
was not regulation of trade or commerce, but the Judicial Committee chose to
confront the issue directly. It was clear to them that some room had to be left,
as a practical matter, for provincial regulation of local activity that would have
to be characterized as trade and commerce. The choice was between recognition
of overlapping or partially concurrent jurisdictions (with federal paramountcy
in case of conflict) and mutually exclusive ones. The aspect doctrine, which was
not fully appreciated until later, could have permitted the first solution, as it
did in the case of liquor prohibition in reconciling the Russell and Local Prohibition cases. But where the constitution intended concurrent jurisdiction it had
expressly provided for it, as in section 95 of the BNA Act. In sections 91 and 92
it had emphasized the mutually exclusive character of federal and provincial
power, although the courts were often to observe that clear-cut lines of demarcation were impossible in practice. For example, in the Montreal Street Railway
case,18 it was said: "It has, no doubt, been many times decided by this Board
that the two sections 91 and 92 are not mutually exclusive, that the provisions
may overlap, and that where the legislation of the Dominion Parliament comes
into conflict with that of a provincial Legislature over a field of jurisdiction
common to both the former must prevail"; and again in the Parsons case
itself:1 9 "But it must have been foreseen that this sharp and definite distinction
had not been and could not be attained, and that some of the classes of subjects
assigned to the provincial legislatures unavoidably ran into and were embraced
by some of the enumerated classes of subjects in sect. 91 .. ." Nevertheless, the

essential assumption on which the Judicial Committee proceeded in the Parsons
case is reflected in the following passage:
... It could not have been the intention that a conflict should exist; and, in order to
prevent such a result, the two sections must be read together, and the language of
one interpreted, and, where necessary, modified, by that of the other. In this way it
may, in most cases, be found possible to arrive at a reasonable and practical construction of the language of the sections, so as to reconcile the respective powers they
contain, and give effect to all of them. 20

The Judicial Committee proceeded on the assumption that a provincial
power to regulate the contracts of a company within the province would be
incompatible with a general and unqualified federal power to regulate trade and
commerce. It found justification for placing a limitation on the federal power in
the fact that specific provision had been made in section 91 for the regulation of
various aspects of trade and commerce which would have otherwise been comprehended in a plenary commerce power. Indeed, in assessing the full scope of
federal power to deal effectively with trade and commerce under the Canadian
constitution one must not lose sight of these specific heads of commercial significance, including extra-provincial transportation and communications, banking,
and other matters which, under the American Constitution have been derived by
18 City of Montreal v. Montreal Street Railway, [1912] A.C. 333 at 343.

19 (1881-82), 7 App. Cas. 96 at 107-108.
201d. at 109.
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implication from the general commerce power. The Judicial Committee concluded that the intention in section 91(2) of the B.N.A. Act was to provide for
regulation of trade and commerce of national and general, rather than local,
concern, including "political arrangements in regard to trade requiring the
sanction of parliament", "regulation of trade in matters of interprovincial concern", and possibly "general regulation of trade affecting the whole dominion",
but not "power to regulate by legislation the contracts of a particular business or
trade such as the business of fire insurance in a single province.12 1 This was the
beginning of a substantial denial of scope to the federal trade and commerce
power, eventually summed up by Duff in the Natural Products Marketing
case2 as "the regulation of particular trades or occupations or of a particular
kind of business such as the insurance business in the provinces, or the regulation
of trade in particular commodities or classes of commodities in so far as it is
local in the provincial sense..."
Duff was to return time after time over the years to the words and general
reasoning of the Parsons case. He shared the conviction expressed by the
Judicial Committee in that case that "the legislature could not have intended that
the powers exclusively assigned to the provincial legislature should be absorbed
in those given to the dominion parliament". 23 The process of judicial qualification of the federal trade and commerce power was one that began before Duff
came to the Supreme Court of Canada but it was one which he pursued and to
which he gave final definition.
3.

The Doctrine of Necessarily Incidental Power

The doctrine of ancillary or necessarily incidental power, with its corollary
of the "unoccupied field", which was a prominent aspect of Duff's general conception of the relationship between the federal and provincial spheres of jurisdiction, had also emerged before he came to the Court. The distinction between
exclusive federal jurisdiction and ancillary or necessarily incidental power in an
area in which provincial legislation may validly operate in the absence of conflicting federal legislation appears to have been first suggested by the Judicial
Committee in the Voluntary Assignments case24 in the following terms:
.. It appears to their Lordships that such provisions as are found in the enactment
in question, relating as they do to assignments purely voluntary, do not infringe on
the exclusive legislative power conferred upon the Dominion Parliament They
would observe that a system of bankruptcy legislation may frequently require various
ancillary provisions for the purpose of preventing the scheme of the Act from being
defeated. It may be necessary for this purpose to deal with the effect of executions
and other matters which would otherwise be within the legislative competence of the
provincial legislature. Their Lordships do not doubt that it would be open to the
Dominion Parliament to deal with such matters as part of a bankruptcy law, and the
provincial legislature would doubtless be then precluded from interfering with this
legislation inasmuch as such interference would affect the bankruptcy law of the
Dominion Parliament. But it does not follow that such subjects, as might properly

21Id. at 113.
22
Reference re The Natural Products Marketing Act, 1934, and Its Amending Act,
1935, [1936] S.C.R. 398 at 410.
23 (1881-82), 7 App. Cas. 96 at 108.
24 A.-G. Ont. v. A. G. Can., [1894] A.C. 189 at 200-201.
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be treated as ancillary to such a law and therefore within the powers of the Dominion
Parliament, are excluded from the legislative authority of the provincial legislature
when there is no bankruptcy or insolvency legislation of the Dominion Parliament in
existence.

Further reference was made in the Local Prohibitioncase to this power of "the
Parliament of Canada to deal with matters local or private in those cases
where such legislation is necessarily incidental to the exercise of the powers conferred upon it by the enumerative heads of clause 91."25 Later in the Grand
Trunk Railway case26 the notion of "ancillary" power was applied to support
federal legislation prohibiting railways under federal jurisdiction from contracting out of liability for damages caused by personal injury to their employees.
Thus began to emerge the distinction between the scope which should be
assigned to the exclusive power of Parliament in a given field - a scope which
precludes the application of any provincial legislation even in the absence of
conflicting federal legislation - and those ancillary or necessarily incidental
powers which may have to be conceded to Parliament in a given case to permit
the effective exercise of its exclusive power. In the field covered by such ancillary
power general provincial legislation may have application in the absence of conflicting federal legislation. It was this aspect of the doctrine of ancillary or
necessarily incidental power that appealed particularly to Duff as a means of
constitutional flexibility, and it was the one that he tended to emphasize in his
statements of the doctrine.27 It must be observed, however, that the doctrine
was rarely given actual application by him in favour of either federal or provincial legislation. His references to it may be assumed, however, to have had their
influence on assumptions concerning the valid application of certain provincial
legislation to enterprises or activities within federal jurisdiction.
The doctrine of necessarily incidental power, in its application to federal
jurisdiction, was considered by Duff in 1910 in the Montreal Street Railway
case,2 8 which was probably the most important of the constitutional decisions
rendered by him in the first few years after his appointment to the Court. It is
important for our purposes not so much for the issue involved, although that was
important enough - federal power to regulate a provincial railway in respect
of the conditions of through traffic to be carried with a federal line - but
because it revealed the essential lines of Duff's constitutional philosophy. It is
also of particular interest as showing the contrasting outlook of Anglin, which
was to be a feature of several important decisions, including Board of Commerce29 and Eastern Termina. 30
In the MontrealStreet Railway case the issue was how much reach was to
be given to necessarily incidental power to overcome the problems of divided
25,

[1896] A.C. 348 at 360.

26 Grand Trunk Railway Company of Canadav. A.-G. Can., [1907] A.C. 65 at 68.
27

See for example, Reference re Waters and Water-Powers, [1929] S.C.R. 200 at
213-214.
2
8Montreal Street Ry. Co. v. City of Montreal (1910), 43 S.C.R. 197.

29 The Board of Commerce Act and the Combines and Fair Prices Act of 1919'

(1920), 60 S.C.R. 456.
80
The King v. Eastern Terminal Elevator Co., [1925] S.C.R. 434.
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jurisdiction. The issue was one of fact in the particular case - the necessity of
federal power to order a provincial railway to enter into a through traffic agreement with a railway under federal jurisdiction - but it was also one of the longrun implications for provincial jurisdiction of a broad and generous application
of the concept of necessarily incidental power in favour of federal legislation.
There was a good case for necessity on the facts of the particular case. If the
federal Parliament was to have an effective jurisdiction with respect to through
traffic over connecting federal and provincial lines it must have the power to
regulate the provincial line. The case for necessity was persuasively asserted by
Anglin. We see here, as later in the Eastern Terminal and Board of Commerce
cases in which these two judges also came to different conclusions, Anglin's
keen and imaginative interest in the facts of the particular case and his ability
to reconstruct the dynamic and inter-related nature of the activity for which a
single, over-riding jurisdiction was claimed. While not indifferent to the facts
of the particular case, nor to the inconvenience and possible frustration of policy
arising from the division of jurisdiction, Duff appears to have been more concerned with the long-run implications for the distribution of power of conceding
the federal claim. For at bottom the issue was the extent to which necessarily
incidental power, based on a showing of "reasonable necessity", was to be available to overcome the problems of divided jurisdiction and to convert divided
jurisdiction into what would be effectively plenary or fully concurrent jurisdiction. Here was a device of constitutional flexibility of enormous potential. It was
Duff's conclusion that, useful as the notion of necessarily incidental power was in
introducing a measure of flexibility into the relations of federal and provincial
power, it could not be permitted to perform the radical office of converting
mutually exclusive power into fully concurrent or overlapping power. In the
Montreal Street Railway case the power claimed for the federal government
would involve the assumption of a substantial regulatory jurisdiction with
respect to the provincial railway. In Duff's view, it went beyond what could
reasonably be permitted if the distribution of jurisdiction with respect to extraprovincial and intra-provincial railway undertakings was to have any meaning.
In this case Duff revealed his essential attitude towards the problems
created by divided jurisdiction. The solution lay not in constitutional distortion
to accommodate one or other of the two orders of government but in cooperation
between them. The courts must remain the final judges in each case of the necessity of ancillary power, and there was not a sufficient necessity to support a
substantial extension of jurisdiction so long as such inter-governmental cooperation was possible. The fundamental consideration that led Duff to this conclusion
is reflected in the following passage. 31
. .. Then it is argued that there must be found vested in one single authority the
power to legislate wholly with regard to through traffic. But division of legislative
authority is the principle of the "British North America Act", and if the doctrine of
necessarily incidental powers is to be extended to all cases in which inconvenience
arises from such a division that is the end of the federal character of the Union.
That is not the true solution; the true solution lies as Lord Herschell said in the
FisheriesCase... in the exercise of good sense by the legislatures concerned.

In this case, as in others, such as Eastern Terminal, Board of Commerce,
31 (1910), 43 S.C.R. 197 at 232.
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and NaturalProductsMarketing,Duff rejected the notion, of which Anglin was
an exponent, that there must be effective power in one legislature or another,
whether federal or provincial, to pursue a particular legislative purpose. Some
legislative purposes could only be effectivey pursued by inter-governmental cooperation. Duff stressed the need for the policy which came to be known as
"cooperative federalism". In his reference to the possibility of a "joint board" he
may be said to have anticipated the device of constitutional flexibility by which
one legislature, in a field of divided jurisdiction, may confer administrative power
on the agency of another in order that a uniform policy and regulation may be
applied to a common problem without the waste of administrative duplication.
The recognition by the courts of this device, 32 virtually indistinguishable in its
essence from a delegation of legislative jurisdiction, is a vindication of Duff's
insistence that the problem of divided jurisdiction could be effectively dealt with
by governmental cooperation. It was Anglin's view that the posibility of effective
cooperation was too uncertain to justify the denial of necessarily incidental
power as the solution to the problems of divided jurisdiction. In Duff's view,
where the power sought represented a substantial assumption of the other legislature's jurisdiction the courts should not acknowledge necessity, at least until
the possibilities of cooperation had been exhausted. It was this view that the
Judicial Committee chose to adopt in language that closely reflected Duff's
reasoning.
A further consideration in Duff's rejection of the concept of necessarily
incidental power as a means of overcoming the difficulties of divided jurisdiction
was the existence of the federal declaratory power to bring a necessary facility
situated wholly within a province under plenary federal jurisdiction by declaring
it to be a work for the general advantage of Canada. He saw this power not only
as a means of acquiring a necessary jurisdiction to pursue an important legislative purpose that might otherwise be frustrated by the limitations of federal
power, but as indicating the extent to which the Constitution contemplated a
power in Parliament to enlarge its legislative jurisdiction by unilateral initiative.
He suggested this as a possible solution, failing inter-governmental cooperation,
in both the MontrealStreet Railway and Eastern Terminalcases. Of course, this
exceptional power would only be available where the necessary object of federal
regulation could be considered to be a "work". It offered a solution to the problems in the MontrealStreet Railway and Eastern Terminal cases, but it was not
a solution to the problems of divided jurisdiction in such fields as restraint of
trade and other forms of natural products marketing.
It was Anglin's view that the declaratory power, where it was available, was
not a satisfactory solution to a particular problem of divided jurisdiction, since
it was excessive, going far beyond the requirements of the case. For the solution
of a specific problem Parliament was obliged to assume a plenary jurisdiction
over a necessary work. It was apparently Duff's view that if the necessity was
such as to justify the assumption of a substantial area of what would ordinarily
be provincial jurisdiction, then it should be achieved, as far as possible, by the
declaratory power rather than by the application of the notion of necessarily
3

2 P.E.I. Potato Marketing Board v. H. B. Willis Inc., [1952] 2 S.C.R. 392; Coughlin
v. Ontario Highway Transport Board, [1968] S.C.R. 569.
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incidental power. The inference is that he thought this assertion of federal jurisdiction over a particular work for particular reasons of necessity or national
,interest, where that necessity or interest, as well as the implications of the
assumption of jurisdiction for federal-provincial relations, could be debated and
judged in the political forum, was to be preferred to a judicial distortion of the
distribution of jurisdiction, with serious implications beyond the particular case,
in order to accommodate federal necessity.
Thus we see, as early as 1910, in the Montreal Street Railway case, the
clear outline of Duff's general approach to the problem of divided jurisdiction,
which has been the central problem of judicial interpretation under the Canadian
constitution: divided jurisdiction in certain key areas of activity such as transportation and marketing is for better or for worse a fundamental feature of the
Canadian constitution; while there may be some flexibility and over-lapping in
the interpretation and application of the two spheres of jurisdiction through the
doctrine of ancillary or necessarily incidental power, this doctrine must not be
used to undermine the essential nature of the distribution of power and to
convert divided jurisdiction by a gradual process of federal assertion into what
is substantially plenary jurisdiction; that practical problems remaining after a
reasonable or restrained application of this doctrine must be settled by intergovernmental cooperation; that failing such cooperation the federal government
has its remedy, where something that can be considered a work is involved, in
a declaration for the general advantage of Canada.
While Duff did not apply the doctrine of ancillary or necessarily incidental
power in favour of federal legislation in the field of transportation (or, as we
shall see, in the field of marketing), he referred to it on several occasions as
permitting the application of provincial legislation to federal enterprises in the
absence of conflicting federal legislation. He saw the doctrine as particularly
applicable to matters of employer-employee relations in enterprises falling
within exclusive federal jurisdiction, such as the extra-provincial transportation
and communications undertakings contemplated by section 92(10) of the B.N.A.
Act. He sat on the Judicial Committee in Workmen's Compensation Board v.
C.P.R.33 when it held that a provincial Workmen's Compensation Act validly
applied to a shipping enterprise within federal jurisdiction. This decision was
in accordance with the view that federal enterprises were subject to provincial
laws of general application when these did not relate to matters falling strictly
within exclusive federal jurisdiction with respect to such enterprises. It was a
recognition of the fact that federal enterprises have to operate within a general
context of law, and that it is up to Parliament to determine the extent to which it
finds it necessary to legislate with respect to that context insofar as it affects such
enterprises. It is an approach that assigns reasonable limits to the scope of
exclusive federal jurisdiction so as to avoid unnecessary preclusion or inhibition
ss Workmen's Compensation Board v. C.P.R., [1920] A.C. 184. See also McColl v.
C.P.R., [1923] A.C. 126, in which Duff delivered the judgment of the Judicial Committee, and Sincennes-McNaughton Lines v. Bruneau, [19241 S.C.R. 168 at 173, in
which he re-affirmed the basis on which provincial workmen's compensation legislation
applied to extra-provincial transportation undertakings "so long as the Dominion does
not in exercise of the authority mentioned enact legislation which conflicts with and
overrides that of the province."
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of provincial jurisdiction and the creation of a legal vacuum around such enterprises. In the workmen's compensation example, Parliament is free to enact
workmen's compensation legislation with respect to federal enterprises as an
exercise of ancillary or necessarily incidental power, but until it does so, provincial workmen's compensation legislation applies to them.
In the Hours of Labour34 reference Duff expressed the opinion that the
same principle applied to legislation respecting hours of labour in extra-provincial undertakings within federal jurisdiction; general provincial legislation on
this matter could validly apply to such undertakings in the absence of conflicting
federal legislation. But this view has since been rejected by the Supreme Court
of Canada. In Commission du Salaire Minimum v. Bell Telephone Company of
Canada35 the issue was whether the Minimum Wage Act of Quebec which had
been in force for some twenty-five years during which there had been no federal
minimum wage legislation for extra-provincial undertakings validly applied to
the Bell Telephone Company. The Supreme Court held that it did not. It held
that the fixing of wages, like the fixing of rates was a "vital part of the operation
of an interprovincial undertaking as a going concern", and as such, was within
exclusive federal jurisdiction. But the Court went further and expressed the
opinion that the whole field of "employer and employee relationships" (with the
presumed exception of workmen's compensation which had been the subject of
authoritative decision) was within exclusive federal jurisdiction, and it adopted
the following statement by Abbott J.in the Stevedoring case:36
. ..The right to strike and the right to bargain collectively are now generally recognized, and the determination of such matters as hours of work, rates of wages,
working conditions and the like, is in my opinion a vital part of the management of

any commercial or industrial undertaking. This being so, the power to regulate such

matters, in the case of undertakings which fall within the legislative authority of

Parliament lies with Parliament and not with the Provincial Legislatures.
Thus the conclusion in the Bell Telephone case would apply to provincial
legislation respecting hours of labour, child labour and other conditions of
employment in such undertakings. The constitution has been interpreted to have
the curious and inflexible result that while federal undertakings must be deemed
to be immune from such provincial legislation in the absence of federal legislation other nation-wide enterprises of comparable economic importance are
subject to it.
Apart from the merits of this view with respect to the field of labour relations, what is in issue here is a concept of the federal and provincial jurisdictions
that permits a flexible, working relationship between the two. The function of the
distinction between exclusive and necessarily incidental powers and the correlative concept of the "unoccupied field" is to introduce an element of working
concurrency into an attribution of power according to mutually exclusive categories. Its function is to avoid extending the pre-emptive or preclusive aspect of
s4 Reference in the Matter of Legislative Jurisdiction over Hours of Labour, [1925]

S.C.R.
505 at 511.
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Commission du Salaire minimum v. Bell Telephone Company of Canada, [1966]
S.C.R.3 767.
6Reference as to the Validity and Applicability of the Industrial Relations and
DisputesInvestigation Act, [1955] S.C.R. 529 at 592.
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federal jurisdiction beyond what is reasonably required for federal purposes. It
leaves the initiative and responsibility with Parliament to determine the necessary reach of its jurisdiction.
The doctrine of necessarily incidental power has been the subject of critical
comment as a "tortuous method of explaining the 'aspect doctrine'" and an
"unnecessary embellishment" of it.3 7 But its significance lies not simply in its
role as a basis or rationale of jurisdiction, but in its distinction between jurisdiction that is exclusive and that which is not. Similar results may well be achieved
by application of the aspect doctrine, but so long as the scope of exclusive federal
jurisdiction sets limits, regardless of federal legislative action, to the valid application of provincial legislation, the doctrine has its own distinctive and useful
function. It permits the setting of reasonable limits to the scope of exclusive
federal jurisdiction because of its preclusive effect, while at the same time permitting the extension of federal jurisdiction to what is reasonably necessary by
actual legislative initiative. A comparable approach has permitted flexibility in
the relationships between the American commerce power and state legislation.
The doctrine was never disavowed by the Judicial Committee, who indeed
re-affirmed it, albeit with recognition of the difficulties attending its application
in particular cases, as late as the Debt Adjustment case,38 in the following terms:
. .. Since 1894 it has been a settled proposition that, if a subject of legislation by the
province is only incidental or ancillary to one of the classes of subjects enumerated
in s. 91, and is properly within one of the subjects enumerated in s. 92, then legislation
by the province is competent unless and until the Dominion Parliament chooses to
occupy the field by legislation: Attorney-General for Ontario v. Attorney-General
for Canada ... (1894) A.C. 189.

37 Laskin, Peace, Order and Good Government Re-examined (1947), 25 Can. Bar.
Rev. 1054 at 1061. This critical passage on the doctrine of necessarily incidental power.
which was quoted in the third edition of Laskin, Canadian Constitutional Law (3d ed.
Toronto: Carswell Co., 1969) at 103, has been dropped in the fourth edition of this
work, supra, note 14 at 19-23, edited by Professor Albert S. Abel. In its place at 20-21
there is a quotation from the judgment of Laskin J.A. (as he then was) in Papp v. Papp
(1970), 1 O.R. 331 at 335-36 in which there is still a strong reservation concerning the
language in which the doctrine is expressed but an acknowledgment of its convenience in
indicating "situations in which the doctrine of exclusiveness of jurisdiction does not apply
but that there is rather a legislative field with gates of entry for both Dominion and Province ... ." There is also acknowledgment that the concept of implied or incidental power
received formal recognition as a valid and necessary constitutional doctrine in the American Constitution in the "Necessary-and-Proper Clause" of Article I, section 8, clause 18,
and in the express provision for authorization to deal with "Matters incidental to the execution of any power" in s. 51 (XXXIX) of the Australian Constitution. These doctrines
are obviously necessary, particularly under the American constitution, for giving sufficient
scope to general grants of power. In addition to the express provision for incidental
power there is a doctrine of "implied incidental powers" operative in Australian constitutional interpretation. See P. Lane, The Australian Federal System (Sydney: Law
Book Co., 1972) at 225 et seq. Cf. Howard, Australian Federal Constitutional Law
(2d ed. Melbourne: Law Book Co., 1972) at 17-18, quoting Dixon C. J. in Grannall v.
Marrickville Margarine Pty. Ltd. (1955), 93 C.L.R. 55 at 77 and in Wragg v. New
South Wales, (1953), 88 C.L.R. 353 at 386, concerning the general principle that every
grant of power carries authority to deal with matters that are ancillary or incidental to
the principal subject-matter.
a8 A.-G. Alta. v. A.-G. Can., [1943] A.C. 356 at 370.
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It has been suggested that in the Nykorak case 39 the doctrine was "punctured" or laid to rest by the Supreme Court of Canada. 40 In that case, the issue
was the validity of federal legislation providing, for purposes of determining
liability, that a member of the armed forces is a servant of the Crown. The action
was brought on behalf of the Crown for damages caused by the loss of services
of a member of the R.C.A.F. The Court held that legislation to declare the
nature of the relationship between the Crown and members of the armed forces
related to a matter within exclusive federal jurisdiction with respect to "Militia,
Military and Naval Service, and Defence" under section 91 (7) of the B.N.A.
Act. Locke J., with whom one other member of the Court concurred, said, "This
does not depend, in my view, upon any such ground as that to do this is necessarily incidental to the powers of Parliament under head 7; it is a direct dealing
with the matter within such powers." And Judson J., with whom three other
members of the Court concurred, said: "It is meaningless to support this legislation, as was done in the G.T.R. Co. case, on the ground that it is 'necessarily
incidental' to legislation in relation to an enumerated class of subject in s.91."
Is this a repudiation, at least impliedly, of the distinction between exclusive
and necessarily incidental power, or merely an emphatic assertion that the
matter in issue - the relationship, for purposes of liability, between the Crown
and a member of the armed forces - is so central to the federal concern and
responsibility under section 91(7) as to fall unquestionably within exclusive
federal jurisdiction under that head? Is the reference by Judson J. to the
Grand Trunk Railway case to be taken as a disapproval of the distinction
between exclusive and necessarily incidental power generally or merely disagreement with the conclusion in that case that federal legislation governing the
liability of a federal railway for injury suffered by its employees might be considered to rest on "ancillary" rather than exclusive federal power? Certainly,
there is a strong suggestion of general disapproval of the distinction between
exclusive and necessarily incidental power in Judson J.'s use of the word "meaningless". But in a case involving the validity of federal legislation (rather than
the possible application of provincial legislation), in which the distinction between the two kinds of power is not important, once there is a conclusion that
Parliament must be conceded to have jurisdiction with respect to the matter, one
would look for a more direct and elaborate discussion of the question as a basis
from which to conclude that there has been a general repudiation or abandonment by the court of such a long-established doctrine of interpretation.
Thus in the Stevedoring case, where the issue was the validity of the federal
labour relations statute and its application to the stevedoring operations of an
extra-provincial shipping enterprise, there was reference to the distinction between exclusive and necessarily incidental power but the Court as a whole did
not find it necessary to express its conclusion in favour of validity and valid
89

A.-G. Can. v. Mykorak (1962), 33 D.L.R. (2d) (S.C.C.) 373 at 375, 378.

40 In Laskin, Canadian Constitutional Law, 3d ed. revised, supra, note 37 at 104,

it is said: 'The 'ancillary' or 'necessarily incidental' doctrine was, at long last, effectively
punctured by Judson J. in the Supreme Court of Canada in A.-G. Can. v. Mykorak
...
." This statement is reproduced in Laskin's Canadian Constitutional Law, 4th ed.
(Professor Albert S. Abel), supra, note 37 at 22.
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application in terms of this distinction.41 On the other hand, in the Bell Telephone case, the issue of whether the provincial legislation had valid application
turned on the question of whether federal jurisdiction with respect to minimum
wage in extra-provincial undertakings was exclusive or not. No one denied that
Parliament had such jurisdiction. The fact that the court was at pains to affirm
and justify the exclusive character of such jurisdiction is indicative of implicit
recognition rather than rejection of the distinction between exclusive and necessarily incidental power and the correlative doctrine of the "unoccupied field."
It is submitted that the doctrine is a useful one which gives a necessary
flexibility to the constitution, and that it is an error to reject it or to fail to give
it application in appropriate cases. Duff's emphasis on this doctrine reflected his
own search for reasonably flexible constitutional relationships within the necessary and unavoidable limits imposed by the distribution of jurisdiction. His one
qualification was that the doctrine must not be used to destroy the essential
nature of that distribution. This would be the case where the doctrine is invoked,
not to justify legislation with respect to a truly ancillary matter lying outside the
main subject matter of the jurisdiction, but to assume substantially the other half
of a divided jurisdiction. He emphasized this distinction in the Montreal Street
Railway case by contrasting legislation of an ancillary nature in relation to
property and civil rights in an area in which Parliament has plenary jurisdiction,
such as banking, with legislation in an area of divided jurisdiction, such as transportation undertakings, in which neither half of the main subject-matter of the
divided jurisdiction can be considered as ancillary or necessarily incidental to
the other.
4.

The GeneralPower
In 1913, in the Insurance Reference case,42 Duff confronted the issue of
the application of the general power of Parliament to matters, which, though
having a local basis in the province, had attained a very marked degree of
national importance. The issue was federal authority to regulate the insurance
business by a system of licensing. The case was clearly one for consideration of
the concept, referred to by Lord Watson in the Local Prohibitioncase, "that
some matters, in their origin local and provincial, might attain such dimensions
as to affect the body politic of the Dominion, and to justify the Canadian
Parliament in passing laws for their regulation or abolition in the interests of the
Dominion." Was this not true of the insurance business? The specific federal
concern was protection of the public by ensuring that insurance companies
would remain solvent and able to meet their obligations. The Supreme Court of
Canada ruled, four to two, against the federal legislation. The dissenting judges,
41
In the Stevedoring case there was the distinction between exclusive and necessarily incidental power, as applied to the possible basis of the federal legislation, and
the distinction between an integral and necessarily incidental part of an enterprise, as
applied to the relationship between stevedoring and shipping. In neither case was the
distinction important once there was a conclusion that Parliament must have jurisdiction
with respect to labour relations in an extraprovincial shipping enterprise, and that
stevedoring was a necessary part of shipping.
42
In the Matter of Sections Four and Seventy of the Canadian 'Insurance Act,
1910' (1913), 48 S.C.R. 260.
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in contending that the insurance business justified the application of the general
power, referred to its magnitude in such terms as "enormous" and "colossal",
and stressed the public interest in adequate protection against financial failure.
Once again, Duff was concerned about the long-run implications of such an
application of the general power. He did not deny the relative importance of the
insurance business nor the concern behind the federal legislation, but he perceived that there would inevitably be many other businesses and comparable
concerns for which the argument in favour of the general power would have to
be held to be valid if it were conceded in this case. The result, as Lord Watson
hinted in the Local Prohibitioncase, would be that the federal Parliament could
gradually take over provincial jurisdiction in one important area after another.
One business, after another, as it assumed national significance, could on this
basis be brought under the general power. This would be the inevitable result
of business growth. Duff pointed out that there were many other cases in which
financial reliability was of the utmost importance and could be invoked to justify
federal jurisdiction. There were no foreseeable limits to the extent to which such
a case for the general power could be pushed. If insurance companies, why not
trust companies and later finance companies, and finally any category of
company whose business is national in scope and relatively important. He
concluded: 43
I do not think that the fact that the business of insurance has grown to great proportions affects the question in the least. The importance of some such provisions as
this Act contains may be conceded. The question is: On what ground can it be contended that this is a matter which because of its importance has ceased to be substantially of local interest? The matter of the solvency and honesty of persons assuming
fiduciary relations is at least as important as the matter of solvency of the insurance
companies. It would be difficult to argue that the qualifications of trustees and
executors and financial agents is a matter with which the Dominion could deal by a
uniform law applicable to the whole Dominion. The Act before us illustrates the
extremes to which people may be carried when acting upon the theory that because a
given matter is large and of great public importance it is for that reason a matter
which is not substantially local in each of the provinces.

In agreeing with the majority in the Supreme Court of Canada (which, in

this case, included Anglin), the Judicial Committee adopted the essential
reasoning of Duff.44
... No doubt the business of insurance is a very important one, which has attained
to great dimensions in Canada. But this is equally true of other highly important and
extensive forms of business in Canada which are to-day freely transacted under provincial authority. Where the British North America Act has taken such forms of
business out of provincial jurisdiction, as in the case of banking, it has done so by
express words which would have been unnecessary had the argument for the
Dominion Government addressed to the Board from the Bar been well founded.

In many ways the InsuranceReference case was the turning point for the
general power. It confronted the issue, apart from emergency, of a matter that
might be said to have changed from one of local concern to one of national
concern. It decided that mere growth and extent was not to be the criterion for
application of the general power. Clearly some more concrete, specific and
restrictive criterion had to be developed for the application of the general power
43 (1913), 48 S.C.R. 260 at 304.
44
A.-G. Can. v. A.-G. Alta., [1916] 1 A.C. 588 at 597.
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to matters which were originally or prima facie within provincial jurisdiction.
The criterion was the emergency doctrine developed by the Judicial Committee
in the Board of Commerce,45 Fort Frances46 and Snider47 cases. Duff did not
anticipate the development of this doctrine. In the Board of Commerce case the
issue was the validity of federal legislation which established machinery to
prevent post-war exploitation of scarcity in necessaries of life by hoarding and
unfair profits. (The legislation was also directed against combines in restraint of
trade.) It established a board to deal with the problem on a case-by-case basis,
determining what was unfair profit in the light of particular circumstances. The
Supreme Court of Canada divided equally, three to three, with Duff opposed to
the validity of the federal legislation and Anglin in favour of it. With respect to
the general power, Duff shrank from the implications of a precedent that would
permit such a far-reaching federal interference with the direction of business.
Although he did not formulate the emergency test there is a hint in what he said
that he would not like to see the application of the general power depend on a
concept of national necessity. He said: 48
In truth if this legislation can be sustained under the residuary clause, it is not
...

easy to put a limit to the extent to which Parliament through the instrumentality of
commissions (having a large discretion in assigning the limits of their own jurisdiction... ), may from time to time in the viscissitudes of national trade, times of high
prices, times of stagnation and low prices and so on, supersede the authority of the
provincial legislatures. I am not convinced that it is a proper application of the
reasoning to be found in the judgments on the subject of the drink legislation, to draw
from it conclusions which would justify Parliament in any conceivable circumstances
forcing upon a province a system of nationalization of industry.

This is one of the strongest hints in the judgments of Duff of a distrust and
dislike of government interference with business. There is reason to believe that
in economic and social matters he had a nineteenth century liberal outlook.49
This passage is suggestive evidence for those who contend that in these years
the courts were concerned with provincial autonomy more as a means of denying
the governmental power necessary for extensive and effective regulation of business than as a constitutional value essential to the preservation of Confederation.
Once again, the rationale which Duff offered for refusing to acknowledge
a dimension of national concern justifying the application of federal power was
to focus on and emphasize the essentially local aspect in each province of what
was, taken as a whole, national in scope. According to him a matter which from
a provincial point of view was one of property and civil rights did not acquire
the dimension which qualified it for application of the general power merely
because Parliament proposed to deal with it in a more or less uniform manner
throughout the country. He did not really address himself to the general dimensions of the concern with profiteering in necessaries of life. He concentrated on
45 In re The Board of Commerce Act, 1919, and the Combines and Fair Prices Act,
1919, [1922] 1 A.C. 191.
40 Fort FrancesPulp and Power Co. v. Manitoba Free Press, [1923] A.C. 695.
47 Toronto Electric Commissioners v. Snider, [1925] A.C. 396.
48 In Re The Board of Commerce Act and the Combines and Fair Practices Act

in 1919 (1920), 60 S.C.R. 456 at 513.
40 Cf. Rand, supra, note 1 at 1116-1117; and O'Leary, supra, note 1 at 1120.
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the immediate effects of the legislation in each province. On this point he said: 50
Nor do I think it matters in the least that the legislation is enacted with the view of
providing a remedy uniformly applicable to the whole of Canada in relation to a
situation of general importance to the Dominion. The ultimate social, economic or
political aims of the legislator cannot I think determine the category into which the
matters dealt with fall in order to determine the question whether the jurisdiction to
enact it is given by sec. 91 or see. 92. The immediate operation and effect of the
legislation, or the effect the legislation is calculated immediately to produce must
alone, I think, be considered. I repeat that if, tested by reference to such operation
and effect, the legislation does deal with matters which from a provincial point of
view are within the first fifteen heads of section 92, it is incompetent to the Dominion
unless it can be supported as ancillary to legislation under one of the enumerated
heads of section 91.

Here there is a confusion between the dimensions of concern, flowing from

the impact on the body politic as a whole -

which is what is reflected in Lord

Watson's dictum in the Local Prohibitioncase -

and the locus of the legisla-

tion's effects. Legislation to deal with a matter of national concern is bound to
have local effects. It is difficult to conceive of national legislation that does not
express itself in local effects. Duff's repeated insistence on the local effects was
an apparent evasion of the central issue for purposes of the general power whether the matter was one of national concern. But this apparent evasion
reflected Duff's essential insight that many matters of local concern, and suitable
for provincial regulation, might also be reasonably considered - at least in
their overall impact - matters of national importance or concern. In effect, as
the foregoing passage suggests, Duff did not apparently consider the concept of
national importance or concern a workable criterion for application of the
general power.
In the Judicial Committee, Lord Haldane introduced the concept of emergency as the test of the application of the general power, where the matter would
ordinarily be one which falls within provincial jurisdiction. The specific word
"emergency" does not appear in the judgment, but it is implicit in such expressions as "special conditions in wartime", "temporary purpose", "special circumstances, such as those of a great war", "normal circumstances"', "necessity in

highly exceptional circumstances", "an altogether exceptional situation",
"circumstances ... such as those of war and famine", "conditions so exceptional". The contention that there was a sufficient emergency was to be scrutinized with great care and the doctrine applied with great caution. Even the
emergency application of the general power was conceded with great reluctance.

It was to be a very special application of the aspect doctrine:5 '

•.. It has already been observed that circumstances are conceivable, such as those
of war or famine, when the peace, order and good Government of the Dominion
might be imperilled under conditions so exceptional that they require legislation of a
character in reality beyond anything provided for by the enumerated heads in either
s. 92 or s. 91 itself. Such a case, if it were to arise would have to be considered closely
before the conclusion could properly be reached that it was one which could not be
treated as falling under any of the heads enumerated. Still, it is a conceivable case,
and although great caution is required in referring to it, even in general terms, it
ought not, in the view their Lordships take of the British North America Act, read

50 (1920), 60 S.C.R. 456 at 509-510.
51, [19221 1 A.C. 191 at 200-201.
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as a whole, to be excluded from what is possible. For throughout the provisions of
that Act there is apparent the recognition that subjects which would normally belong
exclusively to a specifically assigned class of subject may, under different circumstances and in another aspect, assume a further significance. Such an aspect may
conceivably become of paramount importance, and of dimensions that give rise to
other aspects. This is a principle which, although recognized in earlier decisions,
such as that of Russell v. The Queen, both here and in the Courts of Canada, has
always been applied with reluctance, and its recognition as relevant can be justified
only after scrutiny sufficient to render it clear that the circumstances are abnormal.
In the case before them, however important it may seem to the Parliament of Canada
that some such policy as that adopted in the two Acts in question should be made
general throughout Canada, their Lordships do not find any evidence that the
standard of necessity referred to has been reached, or that the attainment of the end
sought is practicable, in view of the distribution of legislative powers enacted by the
Constitution Act, without the co-operation of the Provincial Legislatures.

There is a suggestion here that the emergency or over-riding national
necessity would not take the matter out of provincial jurisdiction but would
give it an aspect of national dimension or concern that would permit it to be
dealt with legislatively by the Parliament of Canada whose legislation in a case
of conflict would prevail over that of a province. It was the application of the
aspect doctrine to the federal and provincial general powers, illustrated in the
Russell and Local Prohibitioncases, that contained the enormous potential of
giving the federal Parliament a substantial amount of concurrent and ultimately
paramount power that would largely overcome the limitations and deficiencies
of its specific heads of jurisdiction. It was this that Watson, Haldane and Duff
saw and feared in its implications for the position of the provinces. But what
Haldane perceived was that there would have to be something much more
specific than the general expression of caution and reluctance expressed in the
judgments of Watson and Duff if the courts were to avoid continuing embarrassment in attempting to restrict the application of the general power, where the
matter involved was one which normally would fall within provincial jurisdiction. The emergency doctrine appears to have been suggested in the Board of
Commerce case by counsel for the province of Quebec, who are reported to
have said: "The Acts were not passed during the war and the suggested principle
that under abnormal conditions the general power of the Dominion may override
the specific powers under s. 92 can have no application".5 2 An emergency is a
state of affairs of limited duration, and it became a criterion of a valid exercise
of the general power in relation to matters normally within provincial jurisdiction whether the legislation was to be temporary or whether it was a general
and indefinite assumption of jurisdiction.
The emergency doctrine of the general power was further elaborated and
affirmed by Lord Haldane in the Fort Francesand Snider cases in terms which
made it plain that only an emergency presenting dangers to the national life
comparable in seriousness to that created by war would be sufficient. In the
FortFrancescase the post-war extension of federal war-time powers to regulate
the supply and price of newsprint had to be conceded. In the Snider case, federal
legislation providing machinery for the resolution of industrial conflict leading
to strike or lock-out was held, like the legislation dealing with combines and
hoarding and unfair profits in necessaries of life in the Board of Commerce case,
52 1d. at 193.
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not to be concerned with a sufficient case of national emergency. Extravagant
efforts were made to explain away the Russell case. There were strong hints that
the Judicial Committee subsequently had serious misgivings concerning it, and
that was the reason they chose not to give reasons for their decision in the
McCarthy Act case. There was finally the embarrassing hypothesis that the
decision of the Judicial Committee in the Russell case was based on a conclusion
"that the evil of intemperance at that time amounted in Canada to one so great
and so general that at least for the period it was a menace to the national life of
Canada so serious and pressing that the National Parliament was called on to
intervene to protect the nation from disaster".5 3 Lord Haldane added: 5 "An
epidemic of pestilence might conceivably have been regarded as analgous". 4
With respect to the federal legislation in the Snider case, designed to prevent or resolve paralysing industrial disputes, he concluded that the evidence
"does not prove any emergency putting the national life of Canada in unanticipated peril such as the Board which decided Russell v. The Queen.. .may be considered to have had before their minds". 55 This reasoning demonstrated that
even the emergency doctrine, unless it was to be unequivocally confined to war
or insurrection, was not to relieve the courts of embarrassment in their efforts
to justify a very restrictive application of the general power to matters that
would ordinarily fall within provincial jurisdiction. The effort to explain away
the Russell case was wholly unconvincing; in effect it was being treated as having
been wrongly decided, at least in so far as the general power was concerned.
What the Judicial Committee had decided is that there was something sufficiently
important at stake, in terms of provincial autonomy, for them not to be troubled
by the embarrassment of unconvincing reasoning. What they had decided is that
with matters normally within provincial jurisdiction there was no standard of
national necessity short of that presented by war itself on which it was safe to
rely for application of the general power if there was not to be an open door to
increasing federal assumption of jurisdiction over large areas that would otherwise be within provincial competence.
As indicated earlier, Duff did not participate in the FortFrancesand Snider
cases, but there is no reason to believe that he would have come to a different
conclusion than the Judicial Committee in either of them. The considerations
which commended themselves to him in the Board of Commerce case, and which
received the approval of the Judicial Committee, would in all probability have
appeared to him equally applicable to the federal legislation in the Snider case.
In both cases it was assumed that the problem envisaged could be dealt with by
the provinces within their respective territories, albeit not on a national scale
with uniform legislative treatment. But this assumption reveals the fact that the
extent of the division of legislative jurisdiction in the areas under consideration
in the Boardof Commerce and Snider cases was not fully considered and appreciated. It only became clear later that provincial labour law was of doubtful
application to enterprises under federal jurisdiction, even in the absence of
federal legislation. Gradually the courts were to move to the conclusion that
53,
54

[1925] A.C. 396 at 412.

1d.

55 Id.at 415-416.
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labour relations was of such vital concern to such enterprises that they must be
deemed to fall within exclusive federal jurisdiction. 56 Thus the ultimate extent
of the federal jurisdiction that would have to be asserted and conceded in labour
relations was not part of the perspective in the Snider case. Nor was the national
scope which the labour relations of many other large enterprises, not within
federal jurisdiction, would eventually assume. Nor was it realistic to suggest in
the Board of Commerce case, in view of the division of jurisdiction that had
already been recognized with respect to trade and commerce, that the provinces
could deal effectively with the kind of problem contemplated by the legislation
in that case.
After the Fort Francesand Snider cases it was left to Duff from time to
time to sum up the effect of the Judicial Committee's decisions concerning the
general power. He rejected the general power as a basis for federal jurisdiction
over grain elevators in the Eastern Terminals case, referring again to the
"fallacy" that the federal Parliament should be held to have the jurisdiction
"because no single province, nor, indeed, all the provinces acting together, could
put into effect such a sweeping scheme".5 7 He said:5 8
... The authority arises, it is said, under the residuary clause because of the necessary
limits of the provincial authority. This is precisely the view which was advanced in
the Board of Commerce Case and, indeed, is the view which was unsuccessfully put
forward in the Montreal Street Railway Case, where it was pointed out that in a
system involving a division of powers such as that set up by the British North
America Act, it may often be that subsidiary legislation by the provinces or by the
Dominion is required to give full effect to some beneficial and necessary scheme of
legislation not entirely within the powers of either.
In this he was opposed to Anglin, who asserted, as he had in the Montreal
Street Railway and Board of Commerce cases, that because the provinces could
not deal effectively with the matter under consideration it must necessarily fall
as a whole under federal jurisdiction. In the Eastern Terminals case, Anglin
indicated that, unlike Duff, he could not acquiesce in the narrow construction
which the Judicial Committee had placed on the general power, and, in particular, that he could not accept Lord Haldane's explanation of the Russell case.
He said: 59
In alluding to the Lemieux Act judgment I feel that I should respectfully take exception to the suggestion there made, that the Board which decided Russell v. The Queen
must be considered to have had before their minds an emergency putting the national
life of Canada in unanticipated peril.... I cannot find anything in the judgment
delivered by Sir Montague E. Smith in the Russell Case suggestive of such a view
having been entertained by the Judicial Committee. On the contrary, the whole tenor
of the judgment seems to me inconsistent with its having proceeded on that basis. I
should indeed be surprised if a body so well informed as their Lordships had countenanced such an aspersion on the fair name of Canada even though some hard driven
advocate had ventured to insinuate it in argument.
GO In the Matter of a Reference as to the Validity and Applicability of The Industrial Relations and Disputes Investigation Act, [1955] S.C.R. 529; Commission du
Salaire mimimum v. Bell Telephone Company of Canada, [1966] S.C.R. 767.
57, [1925] S.C.R. 434 at 448.
G81d.
59 Id. at 438.
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In this he was to be vindicated by the Judicial Committee itself some twenty
years later in the Canada Temperance case, where it was held that the Russell
case did not rest on the notion of emergency.
In fairness to Duff it must be said that his view of the Russell case was
based less on what was said by Haldane in the Snider case than on what he considered to be the implications of the liquor cases as a whole, and in particular
the unreported McCarthy Act decision: in rejecting, soon after Russell, a federal
scheme to regulate the liquor traffic by a system of licensing operating according
to local option in the provinces the Judicial Committee indicated that the federal
Parliament did not in its view have a true general power with respect to the
liquor traffic; it could deal with it by prohibitions of a criminal law nature, but it
could not do so by a licensing system that would make liquor available upon
certain conditions. In Duff's view the liquor cases - Russell, Hodge, McCarthy
Act, Local Prohibitionand ManitobaLicence Holders - reflected a constitutional anomaly. The so-called general power affirmed in the Russell case (which
he frequently observed was an unargued case in so far as the general power was
concerned) had to be seen not only in the light of the McCarthy Act decision
but also in the light of the Hodge case, which affirmed provincial power to
regulate the liquor traffic by a system of licensing within the province, and the
Local Prohibitionand ManitobaLicence Holders cases, which affirmed provincial power to prohibit the liquor traffic as a "local evil" in the province. Duff
asserted that no general principle could be drawn from the cases on the " 'drink'
legislation." In the result, it was his view that the liquor cases, taken as a whole,
called for a cautious rather than a bold approach to the application of the general
power.
After the Board of Commerce, Snider and Eastern Terminal cases, Duff
persisted in his rejection of the argument in favour of the general power based
on the convenience of a single, plenary power to deal effectively with problems
and legislative purposes that lay across the divisions of jurisdiction that in his
opinion were the inevitable consequence and characteristic mark of the federal
character of the Constitution. The maintenance of that character was essential
to provincial acceptance of the Constitution. The denial of a single national
power to deal uniformly with certain complex problems that transcended provincial boundaries was one of the prices that had to be paid for the other values of
a federal constitution. Moreover, none of the problems were beyond effective
legislative treatment through inter-governmental co-operation. Let the Dominion
approach the provinces as co-ordinate levels of government but let it not be
placed in the position by judicial doctrine to be able to expand its legislative
jurisdiction indefinitely on the basis of its own essentially unreviewable judgment
as to what national importance, national interest and national convenience might
require.
In the Aeronautics case 60 Duff held, with Rinfret and Lamont JJ., that the
primary jurisdiction with respect to aviation was provincial, and all members of
the Court agreed that intra-provincial flying was prima facie within provincial
6

o Reference re Regulation and Control of Aeronautics in Canada, [1930] S.C.R.
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jurisdiction. The Court was chiefly concerned, however, with the extent of
Parliament's plenary powers to implement a treaty covered by section 132 of
the B.N.A. Act, and in particular, whether they were exclusive or merely paramount. No one held that the federal Parliament had plenary jurisdiction with
respect to aerial navigation by virtue of the6general
power. Once again, Duff
1
rejected the argument based on convenience.
The argument that because the Dominion has authority to legislate in relation to this
subject, in several, it may be many, aspects, it therefore has authority to appropriate
the whole subject to itself, is one which in various forms has been often advanced;
and always rejected. It really amounts to this, that it would have been simpler and
more convenient if the subject had in terms been committed to exclusive jurisdiction
of the Dominion Parliament.

Certainly, a division of legislative jurisdiction (in the absence of a section
132 treaty) along extra-provincial and intra-provincial lines, as in the case of
other transportation undertakings, was a possible one for aeronautics. The Judicial Committee concentrated on section 132 of the B.N.A. Act, and their conclusion was that it gave the federal Parliament an exclusive plenary jurisdiction
with respect to the whole field of aerial navigation. They declined to express a
definitive opinion as to where jurisdiction would lie in the absence of international agreement, although they did express the view that it did not fall under
federal jurisdiction with respect to "Navigation and Shipping", nor under the
sections dealing with other forms of transportation. They considered that there
was some basis for federal jurisdiction under trade and commerce, postal services and defence. For the rest they appeared to hold, in a passage which later
caused some difficulty,
that it could be brought in under the general power. Lord
2
Sankey said: 6
•.. There may be a small portion of the field which is not by virtue of specific words
in the British North America Act vested in the Dominion; but neither is it vested by
specific words in the Provinces. As to that small portion it appears to the Board that
it must necessarily belong to the Dominion under its power to make laws for the
peace, order and good government of Canada. Further, their Lordships are influenced
by the facts that the subject of aerial navigation and the fulfilment of Canadian
obligations under s.132 are matters of national interest and importance; and that
aerial navigation is a class of subject which has attained such dimensions as to affect
the body politic of the Dominion.

The difficulty with this statement concerning the general power is that it is
not easily separated from what was said concerning section 132. Nor is it clear
from other statements in the judgment that the Judicial Committee was taking a
fresh view of the general power, uninhibited by the notion of emergency. After
quoting Lord Tomlin's second proposition in the Fisheries case, 63 which is
01 ld. at 685.
62 In re The Regulation and Control of Aeronautics in Canada, [1932] A.C. 54

at 77.

0

3 A.-G. Can. v. A.-G. B.C., [1930] A.C. 111 at 118: The general power of legislation conferred upon the Parliament of the Dominion by s. 91 at the Act in supplement
of the power to legislative upon the subjects expressly enumerated must be strictly
confined to such matters as are unquestionably of national interest and importance,
and must not trench on any of the subjects enumerated in s. 92, as within the scope
of provincial legislation, unless these matters have attained such dimensions as to affect
the body politic of the Dominion ....
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essentially in the same terms as Lord Watson's reference to the general power in
the Local Prohibitioncase, Lord Sankey referred to the caution expressed by
Lord Watson in that case, and to the FortFrancescase, and observed: 64
It is obvious, therefore, that there may be cases of emergency where the Dominion is
empowered to act for the whole. There may also be cases where the Dominion is
entitled to speak for the whole, and this not because of any judicial interpretation of
ss. 91 and 92, but by reason of the plain terms of s. 132, where Canada as a whole,
having undertaken an obligation, is given the power necessary and proper for performing that obligation.

It would appear, therefore, that there was no intention in the Aeronautics
case to break new ground concerning the general power, and that the issue of
federal jurisdiction was not considered seriously apart from the plenary power
conferred by section 132. It must be admitted, however, that there was a strong
hint that the Judicial Committee would have been prepared, if necessary, to find
an exclusive federal jurisdiction on the basis of the general power.
The Aeronautics case was notable for Lord Sankey's restatement of the
expectations concerning federal and provincial power that lay behind Confederation. It was a reminder that there were important federal, as well as provincial,
constitutional requirements. He said: 65
Inasmuch as the Act embodies a compromise under which the original Provinces
agreed to federate, it is important to keep in mind that the preservation of the rights
of minorities was a condition on which such minorities entered into the federation,
and the foundation upon which the whole structure was subsequently erected. The

process of interpretation as the years go on ought not to be allowed to dim or to
whittle down the provisions of the original contract upon which the federation was

founded, nor is it legitimate that any judicial construction of the provisions of ss. 91

and 92 should impose a new and different contract upon the federating bodies.
But while the Courts should be jealous in upholding the charter of the Provinces as

enacted in s. 92 it must no less be borne in mind that the real object of the Act was

to give the central Government those high functions and almost sovereign powers by
which uniformity of legislation might be secured on all questions which were of

common concern to all the Provinces as members of a constituent whole.
It may be fairly said that Duff remained faithful to the first concern, and
indeed, showed himself to be one of its most vigilant and vigorous judicial
spokesmen. He was clearly less sympathetic to the second. It was his view that
where the Constitution had intended federal power in the interests of legislative
uniformity it had expressly conferred such power as witness the specific matters
of commercial concern (many of which would otherwise have fallen within the
concept of property and civil rights) that are grouped together in section 91.
He felt reinforced in this conclusion by the terms of section 94 of the B.N.A.
Act, which makes express provision for federal legislation, operating with provincial consent, to introduce uniformity in the law relating to property and civil
rights in the common law provinces. Not only did section 94 show what the
Constitution contemplated as the additional federal power to further the purpose
of legislative uniformity, but in expressly excluding Quebec from its provisions
it served as a reminder of the supreme importance of safeguarding provincial
jurisdiction in respect of property and civil rights. As Duff put it in the Natural
64, [19321 A.C. 54 at 73.
6
5 Id. at 70.
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Products Marketing case,0 6 "Language could not be more plain or, indeed,
more explicit to declare that the subjects, Property and Civil Rights, are not
subjects assigned to the Parliament of Canada under the initial words of section
91."
The express grant of federal authority with respect to specific subjects of
commercial concern in section 91 had been used, it will be recalled, as an
argument for refusing an exclusive federal jurisdiction with respect to the insurance business in the Insurance Reference case. The importance of the insurance
business, including its relationship to commerce, was known and appreciated at
the time of Confederation, and the argument was that if it had been intended to
place insurance under exclusive federal jurisdiction express provision would
logically have been made for it, as in the case of banking. While this argument
applied to enterprises and activities that were well established and well-known
at the time of Confederation, what about those that did not develop until later?
Such were the cases of aeronautics and radio.
Duff did not sit in the Radio case. 67 There, a majority of the Supreme
Court, including Anglin, held that Parliament had jurisdiction under the general
power to deal with the subject of radio communication, and in particular, with
the regulation of radio frequencies. It was contended that only the federal
government could provide an effective regulation that could prevent interference
with an orderly use of radio frequencies. Taking a position similar to that which
he had adopted with respect to the general power in other cases, Anglin said
that his "reason for so concluding is largely that overwhelming convenience
08
under circumstances amounting to necessity - dictates that answer." The essential assumption of fact was that the effect of radio broadcasting could not be
confined within a province, and no province could deal effectively with the
problem of interference. The majority held that there was nothing "local or
private" about radio communication. Federal jurisdiction with respect to telegraphs was also suggested as a basis for control. Curiously, none of the members
of the Supreme Court suggested the federal power to implement international
agreements although that was a basis of the decision in the Judicial Committee.
Rinfret J., dissenting, rejected the argument based on convenience, adopting the
passage which has been quoted above from Duff's judgment in the Eastern
Terminal case: 69 "The other fallacy is... that the Dominion has such power
because no single province, nor, indeed, all the provinces acting together, could
put into effect such a sweeping scheme." One wonders if Duff would have gone
as far himself in a case in which, for technical reasons, it was difficult to find a
plausible basis for provincial jurisdiction. His own grasp of scientific matters
would have made him particularly able to appreciate these technical difficulties.
Yet clearly there were, and still are, important provincial interests to assert. In
the Judicial Committee counsel for the provinces conceded that the federal
Parliament had substantial jurisdiction with respect to radio communication by
60, [1936] S.C.R. 398 at 415-416.
OT In the Matter of a Reference As to the Jurisdiction of Parliament to
and Control Radio Communication, [1931] S.C.R. 541.
08 Id. at 545-546.
0 ld. at 561.
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virtue of specific heads in section 91; but were reported to have said: 70
"There are, however, parts of the subject which are wholly within the Provincial
power as to property and civil rights, for instance, the control of broadcasting
for educational purposes and as to programmes, especially as to the language
used." These matters were not dealt with by the Judicial Committee, which
concentrated on the technical aspects of radio communication as those which
were emphasized in the questions put by the reference. The issue of control over
content was not specifically raised. The Judicial Committee held that radio
communication fell within exclusive federal jurisdiction as an extra-provincial
undertaking, and more particularly as falling within the meaning of the word
"telegraphs", but it also held that Parliament had plenary jurisdiction, by virtue
of the general power, to implement the international convention concerning
radio communication to which Canada was a party. The extent to which the
Judicial Committee saw the general power as a basis for federal jurisdiction with
respect to aeronautics and radio, apart from the power to implement international agreements, is not altogether clear. Certainly, it is fair to say that a
reading of these decisions in the 1930s would not afford a basis for concluding
that they warranted a new readiness to concede the application of the general
power to matters which had traditionally been within provincial jurisdiction.
They certainly afforded no basis for concluding that the Judicial Committee had
rejected the emergency doctrine of the general power as applicable to such
cases. 71 To the extent that the general power was considered to be a basis for
federal jurisdiction in these cases, apart from the power of treaty implementation, both aeronautics and radio were new matters which could be said to be
inherently of national concern. They were not matters whose character was said
to have changed from one of local or provincial concern to one of national
concern.
It was against this background of judicial decision that Duff approached
the "Bennett New Deal" legislation with reference to the general power. This
legislation consisted of some eight statutes enacted by the Conservative government of R. B. Bennett to try to cope with problems created by the great
depression. Doubts were raised about their constitutionality, and soon after the
Liberal Government of Mackenzie King came into office in 1935 it referred
them to the Supreme Court of Canada for an opinion concerning their validity.72
The legislation dealt with weekly rest, minimum wage, hours of labour, natural
products marketing, unemployment insurance, compositions between farmers
70

In re Regulation and Control of Radio Communication in Canada, [1932] A.C.

304 at 307.
71

This is implicit in the Judicial Committee's approval, in the Labour Conventions

case, A.-G. Can. v. A.-G. Ont., [1937] A.C. 326 at 353, of Duff's review of the deci-

sions concerning the general power in the Natural Products Marketing case, including
his commentary on the effect of the Aeronautics and Radio cases, E1936] S.C.R. 398
at 425.

72 It is difficult to escape the conclusion that the new government was anxious to
put this legislation to the test. In the debate on the Natural Products Marketing Act,

the Liberal leader of the Opposition, Mr. MacKenzie King, had said: "I believe that
when this measure is properly studied it will be found that some of its provisions are
also contrary to the provisions of the British North America Act", Can. H. of C.
Debates, (April 19, 1934) at 2348-9.
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and creditors to avoid bankruptcy, and restraint of trade.73 The Federal Government invoked the general power as a basis of jurisdiction, among others, but
economic depression was held not to meet the requirement of Lord Haldane's
emergency doctrine. In fact, it was only in the Unemployment Insurance reference 74 that the case for national necessity appears to have been strongly argued
and seriously considered, and even there, counsel for the Dominion are reported
to have conceded that it was not "an emergency in the strict sense." 75 In the
Supreme Court, Rinfret 1. (as he then was), who voted with the majority against
the unemployment
insurance legislation, spoke as follows concerning the issue
76
of emergency:
In this particular matter, there is no evidence of an emergency amounting to national
peril; but, moreover and still more important, the statute is not meant to provide for
an emergency. It is not, on its face, intended to cope with a temporary national peril;
it is a permanent statute dealing with normal conditions of employment. There was
accordingly here no occasion, nor foundation, for the exercise of the residuary power.

The Judicial Committee seized on this characterization of the unemployment problem caused by the depression as reflecting the general opinion of the
Court. It said: 77
...A strong appeal, however, was made on the ground of the special importance of
unemployment insurance in Canada at the time of, and for some time previous to,
the passing of the Act. On this point it becomes unnecessary to do more than to refer
to the judgment of this Board in the reference on the three labour Acts, and to the
judgment of the Chief Justice in the National Products Marketing Act which, on this
matter, the Board have approved and adopted. It is sufficient to say that the present
Act does not purport to deal with any special emergency. It founds itself in the preamble on general world-wide conditions referred to in the Treaty of Peace: it is an
Act whose operation is intended to be permanent: and there is agreement between
all the members of the Supreme Court that it could not be supported upon the
suggested existence of any special emergency. Their Lordships find themselves
unable to differ from this view.

The responsibility for denying that the great depression was a sufficient
national emergency to justify the general power was placed upon the shoulders
of the Canadian tribunal. What this amounted to was that the emergency doctrine was given a further restrictive qualification: unless the legislation in
question was avowedly temporary in nature it could not be said to be intended
to meet an emergency. No legislation that related to matters ordinarily within
provincial legislation and was to operate indefinitely could be supported on the
general power.
The judgment of Duff to which reference was made was his summation of
78 The Weekly Rest in Industrial Undertaking Act, S.C. 1935, c. 14; The Minimum
Wages Act, S.C. 1935, c. 44; The Limitation of Hours of Work Act, S.C. 1935, c. 63;
The Natural Products Marketing Act, S.C. 1934, c. 57, as amended by S.C. 1935, c. 64;
The Employment and Social Insurance Act, S.C. 1935, c. 38; The Farmer's Creditors
Arrangement Act, S.C. 1934, c. 53, as amended by S.C. 1935, c. 20; An Act to Amend
the Criminal Code, S.C. 1935, c. 56, by the enactment of s. 498A; Dominion Trade and
Industry Act, 1935, S.C. 1935, c. 59.
74 A.-G. Can. v. A.-G. Ont., [1937] A.C. 355; Reference re The Employment and
Social Insurance Act, [1936] S.C.R. 427 at 451.
75, [1937] A.C. 355 at 358.
70, [1936] S.C.R. 427 at 451.
77A.-G. Can. v. A.-G. Ont., [1937] A.C. 355 at 365-366.
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the law concerning the general power, for purposes of all the statutes, in the
NaturalProductsMarketing case. This part of his judgment received the highest
accolade of the Judicial Committee, who said they hoped it would become the
"locus classicus" on the subject and set further argument to resty8 They hoped
it would establish the emergency doctrine once and for all. This was not to be
the case.
In his discussion of the general power, in the context of the natural products
marketing legislation but purportedly with reference to all the challenged legislation, Duff did not confront the issue of emergency or national necessity on the
facts. In fact, he seems to have taken little interest in this aspect of the case.
(In the Unemployment Insurance case where the argument in favour of necessity was most obvious and compelling he decided in favour of the federal legislation on a basis other than the general power). In this "locus classicus" there was
simply a review, with commentary, of the decisions of the Judicial Committee:
there was no attempt by Duff to formulate the criterion for application of the
general power. He simply concluded, in the light of the passages he quoted from
the decisions of the Judicial Committee, that the Natural Products Marketing
Act (and by implication, the other pieces of the "Bennett New Deal" legislation
to which the summary of the law was intended to apply) obviously did not meet
the test of exceptional necessity that would permit a matter ordinarily or formerly within provincial jurisdiction to be dealt with under the general power.
The clear implication of his judgment was that in his opinion nothing short of a
wartime kind of emergency would meet the test. Any other conditions would
have to be considered to be "normal" for purposes of the general power. This is
clearly to be inferred from his interpretation of the Board of Commerce case.70
...Nobody denied the existence of the evil. Nobody denied that it was general
throughout Canada. Nobody denied the importance of suppressing it. Nobody denied
that it prejudiced and seriously prejudiced the well being of the people of Canada as
a whole, or that in a loose, popular sense of words it "affected the body politic of
Canada." Nevertheless, it was held that these facts did not constitute a sufficient basis
for the exercise of jurisdiction by the Dominion Parliament under the introductory
clause in the manner attempted. The Board said that in special circumstances, such
as those of a great war, the interest of the Dominion in the matters might conceivably
become of such paramount and overriding importance as to lie outside the heads of
section 92 and not be covered by them. But it is, they held, quite another matter to
say that under normal circumstances, general Canadian policy can justify interference, on the scale of the statutes then in controversy, with the property and civil
rights of the inhabitants of the provinces.

Duff refused to see in the language of the Judicial Committee in the Aeronautics case, which has been quoted above, any departure from the emergency
doctrine of the general power, in so far as matters normally within provincial
jurisdiction were concerned. The passage of his judgment on this point shows
how confident he was that he knew the mind of the Judicial Committee on this
question and the importance which he attached to his restatements of Judicial
Committee doctrine.8 0
On behalf of the Dominion it is argued that the judgment in the Aeronautics case
See, supra, note 71.
[1936] S.C.R. 398 at 422-423.
80 Id. at 425.
78
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*.. constitutes a new point of departure. The effect of that judgment, it seems to be

argued, is that if, in the broadest sense of the words, the matters dealt with are
matters of "national concern" matters which "affect the body politic of the
Dominion," jurisdiction arises under the introductory clause. One sentence is quoted
from the judgment in the Aeronautics case ... which we will not reproduce because
we do not think their Lordships can have intended in that sentence to promulgate a
canon of construction for sections 91 and 92. We see nothing in the judgment in the
Aeronautics case... to indicate that their Lordships intended to detract from the
judicial authority of the decisions in the Combines case ... and Snider's case...
Their Lordships did not demur. In the Labour Conventions case they re-

ferred, in the context of a discussion of the power to implement treaties, to what
had been said in the Aeronautics case concerning the general power
as follows: "I
The Aeronautics case ... concerned legislation to perform obligations imposed
by a treaty between the Empire and foreign countries. Sec. 132, therefore, clearly
applied, and but for a remark at the end of the judgment, which in view of the stated
ground of the decision was clearly obiter, the case could not be said to be an authority
on the matter now under discussion.
...

Clearly the matter under discussion was whether there was an exclusive
federal power to implement treaties on the basis of the general power - an
indication that the Judicial Committee considered that what was said concerning the general power in the Aeronauticscase was with reference to treaty impleof
mentation. Then in the course of expressing their approval of Duffs summary
82
the law on the general power they re-emphasized the emergency doctrine:

It is only necessary to call attention to the phrases in the various cases, "abnormal
circumstances", "exceptional conditions", "standard of necessity" (Board of Commerce case.. .), "some extraordinary peril to the national life of Canada," "highly
exceptional," "epidemic of pestilence" (Snider's case ... ), to show how far the
present case is from the conditions which may override the normal distribution of
powers in ss. 91 and 92.

Following these cases nothing significant was said about the general power
for about a decade. Then in the Canada Temperance8 3 case in 1946, the
Judicial Committee, when called upon to repudiate its decision in the Russell
case, held that it had been correctly decided, and that the Canada Temperance
Act had been held to be valid on the basis of the general power, quite apart from
any question of emergency. Viscount Simon not only rejected the notion of
national emergency as the ground for application of the general power in the
Russell case, but he seemed to reject it generally as a limiting criterion for its
application. He returned to a statement of the test in terms reminiscent of those
used by Lord Watson in the Local Prohibitioncase:
...

the true test must be found in the real subject matter of the legislation: if it is

such that it goes beyond local or provincial concern or interests and must from its
inherent nature be the concern of the Dominion as a whole (as, for example, in the
Aeronauticscase.. . and the Radio case... ), then it will fall within the competence
of the Dominion Parliament as a matter affecting the peace, order and good governtouch on matters specially reserved
ment of Canada, though it may
84 in another aspect
to the provincial legislatures.
81, [1937] A.C. 326 at 351.

Id. at 353.
3 A.-G. Ont. v. Canada Temperance Federation, [1946] A.C. 193.
84 Id. at 205.
82
8
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Yet, having rejected the notion of emergency as the explanation of the
Russell case, the Judicial Committee proceeded with examples that would meet
the test of emergency or a valid criminal law concern: 85
... War and pestilence, no doubt, are instances: so, too, may be the drink or drug
traffic, or the carrying of arms. In Russell v. The Queen ... , Sir Montague Smith
gave as an instance of valid Dominion legislation a law which prohibited or restricted
the sale or exposure of cattle having a contagious disease.

The Judicial Committee attempted to distinguish between emergency as the
as the constitutional justification of legisoccasion of legislation and emergency
86
lation in the following passage:
..True it is that an emergency may be the occasion which calls for the legislation,
but it is the nature of the legislation itself, and not the existence of emergency, that
must determine whether it is valid or not.

But surely, where emergency exists, it is the emergency which gives the
matter its dimension of national concern or interest. That the notion of emergency was not to be rejected as one possible constitutional justification for the
exercise of the general power, where the circumstances permitted, was clearly
indicated by the Judicial Committee less than a year later in the Japanese
Canadianscase, 87 when the validity of federal war-time legislation in relation to
matters which would otherwise fall within provincial jurisdiction was once again
affirmed on the basis of the emergency doctrine of the general power, in accordance with the decision in the Fort Francescase. Duff sat on the Judicial Committee in the Japanese Canadianscase. It may reasonably be assumed that he
exerted his influence to see that the references to the general power were couched
in terms which were not in any way inconsistent with the line of cases prior to
the decision in the Canada Temperance case. Lord Wright said: 88
On certain general matters of principle there is not, since the decision in Fort Frances
Pulp & Power Co. v. ManitobaFreePressCo... . , any room for dispute. Under the
British North America Act property and civil rights in the several Provinces are
committed to the Provincial legislatures, but the Parliament of the Dominion in a
sufficiently great emergency, such as that arising out of war, has power to deal
adequately with that emergency for the safety of the Dominion as a whole.

At the same time, the Judicial Committee indicated that there would be
considerable judicial reluctance to challenge a declaration by Parliament that
a national emergency of some kind existed.
The Judicial Committee reverted in the Empress Hotel case8 9 in 1949 to
an expression of the caution with which the general power must be applied to
matters which have at one time been under provincial jurisdiction. It quoted at
length from what was said by Lord Watson in this respect in the Local Prohibition case. (This, it will be recalled, was the passage which Duff had taken as his
point of departure in the Insurance Reference case.) Shortly thereafter, in the
85 Id. at 205-206.
86 1d. at 206.
87 Co-operative Committee on Japanese Canadians v. A.-G. Can., [1947] A.C. 87.
88
1d. at 101.
89 Canadian Pacific Railway Company v. A.-G. B.C. and A.-G. Can., [1950] A.C.
122 at 138-141.
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Margarine case, 90 the Judicial Committee commented directly on what had
been said with respect to the general power in the Canada Temperance case.
"This passage must, however, be considered," Lord Morton said, "with the
words used by Lord Atkin when delivering the judgment of the Board in the
Labour Conventions case," 9 1 and he thereupon quoted in full the passage in
which the judgment of the Judicial Committee had adopted what was said by
Duff concerning the general power in the NaturalProductsMarketing case. This
appears to have been the Judicial Committee's last pronouncement on the
general power. In it they removed any doubt that in their view Duff's summation
in the Natural Products Marketing case still expressed the law concerning the
application of the general power to matters ordinarily within provincial jurisdiction, unimpaired by what had been said in the CanadaTemperance case.
Despite these indications by the Judicial Committee after the CanadaTemperance case that it was not to be understood as having rejected the criterion of
emergency or exceptional necessity as the test of whether the general power
could be applied to matters which would ordinarily fall within provincial jurisdiction, the Supreme Court of Canada subsequently indicated in two cases that
it intended to base further application of the general power on the test formulated by Viscount Simon in the Canada Temperance case. In the Johannesson
case 92 in 1952, when it was no longer possible to base federal jurisdiction with
respect to aeronautics on the power to implement treaties within the meaning of
section 132 of the B.N.A. Act, the Supreme Court held that Parliament had a
plenary jurisdiction with respect to this subject by virtue of the general power.
It based itself for the most part on what was said concerning the general power
in the Aeronautics case and on Viscount Simon's mention of aeronautics in the
Canada Temperance case as a matter which "must from its inherent nature be
the concern of the Dominion as a whole. '93 Emphasis must be placed on the
word "inherent" in this formulation. The decision in respect of aeronautics did
not involve the application of the general power to a matter assumed to have
been originally under provincial jurisdiction but claimed to have changed in
relative importance and concern so as to take it out of such jurisdiction and
place it under the general power.
This was true as well of the Supreme Court's decision in the Munro case,94
in which Viscount Simon's statement on the general power was reaffirmed as
the formulation of the law which the Court would follow. There the matter of the
development of the National Capital Region to enhance the seat of the Government of Canada was held to be one which was inherently of national concern.
There was no question in this conclusion of it ever having been otherwise. The
case did not involve a pretended change in the character or dimensions of the
matter.
90 Canadian Federation of Agriculture v. A.-G. Que., [1951] A.C. 179.

01 Id.at 197.
92 Johanesson v.

Rural Municipality of West St. Paul, [1952] 1 S.C.R. 292.

08, [1946] A.C. 193 at 205.
( 4 Munro v. National Capital Commission, [1966] S.C.R. 663. In the Munro case,
however, the Federal Government came to Court able to show that it had been unable
to achieve its purpose by inter-governmental co-operation.
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In the result, the formulation of the test for application of the general
power in the CanadaTemperance case is no more than what was said by Lord
Watson in the LocalProhibitioncase, without the special emphasis on a cautious
or restrained application of it in the interests of provincial autonomy. But the
logic of that caution or restraint, which appealed to Duff and found expression
in his judgments in the Insurance Reference and Board of Commerce cases,
remains. What the Supreme Court has said, however, at least by implication,
in adopting the Canada Temperance test is that the restraint is not to be necessarily guided by the criterion of emergency or exceptional necessity. But apart
from the clear case of emergency or other overriding national necessity, of
which Parliament will generally be allowed to be the judge, the Court is likely
to continue to be influenced by the danger which Watson, Duff and Haldane,
among others, perceived in the notion that as matters inevitably grow to become
subjects of national importance and concern, they may pass from provincial
to federal jurisdiction until the distribution of power under the constitution is
fundamentally altered. Thus while Duffs summary of the law on the general
power in NaturalProductsMarketing can hardly be called the "locus classicus"
on the subject today, his general approach to the application of the general
power to matters which have been assumed to fall within provincial jurisdiction
may be expected to continue to exert influence because of the inherent soundness
of its concern for the general balance of power under the Constitution.
As reflected in the Munro case, the issue with respect to the general power,
where reliance cannot be placed on the notion of emergency, is to determine what
are to be considered to be single, indivisible matters of national interest and
concern lying outside the specific heads of jurisdiction in sections 91 and 92.
It is possible to invent such matters by applying new names to old legislative
purposes. There is an increasing tendency to sum up a wide variety of legislative
purposes in single, comprehensive designations. Control of inflation, environmental protection, and preservation of the national identity or independence
are examples.
Many matters within provincial jurisdiction can be transformed by being
treated as part of a larger subject or concept for which no place can be found
within that jurisdiction. This perspective has a close affinity to the notion that
there must be a single, plenary power to deal effectively and completely with
any problem. The future of the general power, in the absence of emergency, will
depend very much on the approach that the courts adopt to this issue of
characterization.
5. The Trade and Commerce Power
As we have seen, the basic approach to the distribution of the power to
regulate trade and commerce had been laid down by the Judicial Committee
in the Parsonscase in 1881, about a quarter of a century before Duff came to
the Supreme Court. He worked within the framework of this approach, but he
added his own touches and emphasis to the definition of the distribution, and in
the course of his career worked out the implications of its various aspects. In a
way his personal contribution to thinking about the trade and commerce power
was more evident than in the case of the general power. Again, it was the
Natural ProductsMarketing case in which he summed up the distribution of
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the trade and commerce power in terms that received the highest commendation
from the Judicial Committee and have been repeatedly referred to since. A
passage from Duff's judgment in the Natural Products Marketing case was
adopted by the Judicial Committee as the ground of its own judgment with
reference to the trade and commerce power in that case, with the statement:
"Their Lordships agree with this, and find it unnecessary to add anything. '95
In the Margarine case, 96 the Judicial Committee, with reference to the regulation of trade and commerce, spoke of the "masterly judgment of Duff C.J., in
the NaturalProducts Marketing case."
In the Montreal Street Railway case Duff did not refer to the trade and
commerce power but concentrated rather on the issue of ancillary or necessarily
incidental power in relation to federal jurisdiction with respect to railway
undertakings. The Judicial Committee in that case, however, made a reference
to the trade and commerce power to which Duff appeared to attach some
importance in subsequent cases. In a general statement concerning the distribution of jurisdiction under sections 91 and 92 of the B.N.A. Act, Lord Atkinson
summed up the considerations governing the general power laid down by Lord
Watson in the Local Prohibitioncase, and observed that in the opinion of the
Judicial Committee they applied equally to the federal trade and commerce
power. In other words, this power was not to be treated like other specific heads
of jurisdiction in section 91 but as a general power of its own, which was not
to justify legislation "applicable to the whole Dominion in relation to matters
which in each province are substantially of local or private interest." This was
the perspective that Duff constantly kept in mind.
In the InsuranceReference case in 1913 Duff dismissed the federal trade
and commerce power briefly as a possible basis for regulation of the insurance
business. He did not even bother to cite the Parsons case. He held that the
business of insurance was not trade or commerce but rather an "occupation".
It must be admitted that this part of his judgment is rather obscure. The omission
of any reference to the Parsonscase, on which he laid great stress in subsequent
decisions, is curious. Perhaps he was embarrased by the assumption, for
purposes of argument in the Parsonscase, of the validity of the existing federal
legislation with respect to insurance.
In suggesting the outline of the federal trade and commerce power in the
Parsonscase the Judicial Committee had said that the words of section 91(2)
"would include political arrangements in regard to trade requiring the sanction
of parliament, regulation of trade in matters of interprovincial concern, and
it may be that they would include general regulation of trade affecting the whole
dominion." 97 The elements that Duff included in his definition of the federal
power were international trade and commerce, interprovincial trade and commerce, and matters or powers that were ancillary or necessarily incidental to
the effective exercise of jurisdiction over the first two; although, as we stated, he
rarely, if ever, applied necessarily incidental power in favour of federal legisla05, [1937] A.C. 377 at 387.
o0, [1951] A.C. 179 at 193.
97 (1881-82), 7 A.C. 96 at 113.
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,ion. With the notion of "general regulation of trade affecting the whole
Dominion" in Sir Montague Smith's dictum in the Parsons case Duff had
considerable difficulty. The Judicial Committee had suggested in the John
Deere Plow98 case the example of general trade regulations applicable to
federally incorporated companies, but Duff himself never really found any
application for the concept, except possibly in the case of the Alberta Social
Credit legislation, where he held that the attempt to replace bank credit by
another system of credit dealt with a matter within the regulation of trade and
commerce under section 91(2) of the B.N.A. Act. 99
An opportunity for application of the concept of "general regulation of
trade affecting the whole Dominion" was presented to the Supreme Court in the
Boardof Commerce case. Under the Board of Commerce Act and the Combines
and FairPrices Act of 1919 the Board of Commerce was empowered to take
action against combines and against the hoarding and disposal at unfair prices
of necessaries of life. It was this second aspect of the legislation that was brought
in issue before the courts. It was brought forward on a fairly narrow basis in
the form of a stated case involving the validity of an order of the Board specifying
what would be fair profits for certain retail clothing dealers in the City of Ottawa.
Thus, while the concern of the legislation was a general one with combines
throughout Canada and the exploitation of post-war scarcity in necessities of
life the case was brought on in a very local focus and this was much emphasized
by those who held the legislation to be invalid. The issue had originally been
put before the Supreme Court in the form of general questions concerning the
validity of the Act but the Court held this to be an attempt to bring a reference
under the guise of a stated case, and that a true stated case based on an actual
factual situation should be presented. It was in this way that the issue was
focused in a manner that tended to emphasize the local character of the regulation. The Supreme Court of Canada divided three to three, with Davies C.J.,
and Anglin and Mignault JJ. in favour of validity, and Idington, Duff and
Brodeur JJ. against. The effect of this division, of course, was that the legislation
was deemed to be valid.
In his opinion on behalf of those who favoured validity, Anglin based
himself on both the general power and the trade and commerce power. He
referred to profiteering as "an evil so prevalent and so insidious that in the
opinion of many persons it threatens to-day the moral and social well-being
of the Dominion,"' 0 0 but he based the case for the general power, not so much
on the existence of an emergency as on the inability of provincial legislation
to deal effectively with the problem. It was again the notion that fully effective
jurisdiction to deal with a particular problem must exist at one legislative level
or another-a notion, as we have seen, that Duff repeatedly rejected. Anglin
expressed some reservation, however, about resting validity entirely on the
general power, having regard to the caution expressed by Lord Watson in the
Local Prohibitioncase and perhaps also his own rejection of the general power
as a basis for validity in the Insurance Reference case. He said he preferred
98

John Deere Plow Co. v. Wharton, [1915] A.C. 330.

99 Reference re Alberta Statutes, [1938] S.C.R. 100.
100 (1920), 60 S.C.R. 456 at 467.
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to rest the case for validity on the federal trade and commerce power. In this
he invoked the concept of "general regulation of trade", suggested as one of
the aspects of federal power in the Parsons case. The matter of unfair profits
on necessaries of life was one of nation-wide concern but effective action in
relation to it required decisions on a case-by-case basis at the local level.
Anglin said that this administrative necessity did not detract from the general
nature of the regulation. It was the only way in which effective regulation of
this particular problem could be carried out.
This was the case that Duff had to meet. There can be no doubt that there
was a problem of national concern and that it related to trade generally in a
large number of commodities. Duff chose to turn the telescope around and to
suggest, on the basis of the stated case, that the legislation had a very local
focus. Indeed, he denied that there was any general regulation at all. On this
point he observed: 101
... It is thus left to the Board to make orders affecting individual holders or traders,
to fix the terms upon which they are required to dispose of articles withheld from
disposition or held for disposition, and such terms the Board is not required to fix by
any general regulation, but may, and in the normal course would, fix them with
reference to the circumstances of a particular case. The fixing of the terms of disposition by reference to the prohibition against unfair profits might well result in great
disparity between the prices charged for the same article by different traders. The
creation of an authority endowed with such powers of fixing the terms of contracts
in relation to specific articles appears to involve an interpretation of the words,
"regulation of trade and commerce," much more comprehensive than anything
contemplated by the decisions and judgments referred to above ....

Thus it was that Duff sought to take from this legislation of nation-wide
concern any general character that would qualify it for inclusion in the expression "general regulation of trade affecting the whole Dominion". In effect, what
he held was that regulation carried out at the local level according to the
circumstances of particular cases does not, even when it is being carried out
across the country, become "general regulation" within the meaning of the
expression. It is still the regulation of particular trades within a province. In
other words, the regulation of a local or provincial matter does not become
"general regulation of trade affecting the whole Dominion" merely because it
is carried out under federal legislation in every province.
Apart from the rather special case in which Duff appeared to apply the
concept of general regulation of trade against the Alberta attempt to change
the system of credit, it is impossible to discern what he would have considered
to be an example of such regulation. He rejected the concept as a basis for the
Dominion Trade and Industry Act which was concerned with undue competition
and the establishment of a national trade mark, although in this he was reversed
by the Judicial Committee.1 0 2 His own uncertainty on the question is expressed
in the following passage from his judgment in the Board of Commerce case: 103
1o1 Id. at 502-503.
10
2 In The Matter of a Reference as to Whether the Parliament of Canada ha4
Legislative Jurisdiction to Enact the Dominion Trade and Industry Commission Ac
1935, [1936] S.C.R. 379 reversed sub nom. A.-G. Ont. v. A.-G. Can., [1937] A.C. 405

(P.C.).
103 (1920), 60 S.C.R. 456 at 498-99.
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• . . It is not easy to ascribe a precise meaning to the words "general trade and
commerce" but the passage seems to imply that the words "trade and commerce" are
to be read conjunctively or at all events that the word "trade" takes on a special
colour and significance from its association with the word "commerce"; and whatever
be the precise significance of the word "general" we are at least able to affirm in
consequence of the decisions already mentioned that it excludes regulations such as
those which were in question in Hodge's Case... in the McCarthy Act reference,
in Parson's Case .... and in the Montreal Street Railway case ....
To borrow a
phrase used arguendo on the Liquor License appeal, Attorney General of Ontariov.
Attorney General for Canada,"general" in this passage means 'general not as including all particulars but general as distinguished from some particulars.'

As was observed in connection with the discussion of the general power,
all general regulation must necessarily have local impact, and may, indeed, be
considered simply as an agglomeration or collection of such local impacts.
The general cannot be separated from the local or particular. It is in fact carried
out by a series of local applications. Here Anglin would appear to have had the
better of the argument. What would seem to have been general in the Board of
Commerce case is that the matter was one of concern to trade and commerce
as a whole. It was a general issue as opposed to one affecting a particular trade
or industry. It was concerned with trade in a great range of commodities. The
combines aspect of the legislation was directed even more generally to trade.
There was no concern with a particular trade as such, as in the Parsons case,
or in the McCarthy Act case. The legislation was concerned with a pervasive
question of trade-the handling of necessaries of life in such a way as to obtain
unfair or unreasonable profits. There was also concern for the deprivation that
might be brought about by hoarding. Legislation directed at the prevention of
combines and unfair profits on necessaries of life would appear to be a prime
example of a general trade regulation concern. It is impossible to escape the
conclusion that Duff did not consider it advisable to attempt to give real content
to that aspect of the federal commerce power suggested by the words "general
regulation of trade affecting the whole Dominion" in the Parsons case. When
he made his famous summation on the federal trade and commerce power in the
Natural ProductsMarketing case he made reference to this expression almost
as an afterthought. It was clearly not a central part of the definition. The
illustration he gave was the rather special one suggested by Lord Haldane in
the John Deere Plow case-general trade regulations applied to federally
incorporated companies. In the Natural Products Marketing case he observed
that the contemplated regulations were directed to the dealing "in particular
commodities and classes of commodities" and that they were "not general
regulations of trade as a whole or regulations of general trade and commerce
within the sense of the judgment in Parson's case". 104 Having rejected the
concept of "general regulation of trade affecting the whole Dominion" as a
basis for validity in the Board of Commerce case Duff was not likely to find a
more plausible or attractive example. Although he continued to pay lip service
to the concept in his review of the law from time to time, he made it clear in the
Board of Commerce case that he would not apply it to anything that could
be viewed simply as local regulation carried on throughout the Dominion.
Neither the fact that it was carried out in every province nor even that it might
be uniform in its application would in his view justify it being characterized as
104, [19361 S.C.R. 398 at 412.
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general so as to bring it within federal jurisdiction. Clearly, the expression
"general regulation of trade affecting the whole Dominion" was not to be applied
so as to destroy the effect of the express exclusion from federal power, in the
Parsons case, of the regulation of particular trades in the province. In Duff's
view, as the passage quoted above indicates, the two were very difficult to
reconcile.
Apart from this virtual rejection of the concept of "general regulation of
trade" as a basis for federal jurisdiction, Duff's main contribution to the shape
of the commerce power was the scope which he was prepared to concede, or
not concede, in the three main elements of jurisdiction, as he defined it in the
Natural Products Marketing case: "the regulation of external trade and the
regulation of interprovincial trade and such ancillary legislation as may be
necessarily incidental to the exercise of such powers." In the Eastern Terminal
and Natural Products Marketing cases he refused to concede that where trade
in particular commodities was predominately extra-provincial it should be
regarded as having an extra-provincial character as a whole. He insisted on
maintaining the division of jurisdiction with respect to its extra-provincial and
intra-provincial aspects. Nor, as we have seen, would he permit essentially the
same result to be achieved by an extended and liberal application of the doctrine
of ancillary or necessarily incidental power. He dealt with both of these closely
related issues in the EasternTerminal case, in which he held that federal power
trade did not include power to carry out a local regulation
to regulate the grain
10 5
of grain elevators:
There are two lurking fallacies in the argument advanced on behalf of the Crown;
first, that, because in large part the grain trade is an export trade, you can regulate it
locally in order to give effect to your policy in relation to the regulation of that part
of it which is export. Obviously that is not a principle the application of which can
be ruled by percentages. If it is operative when the export trade is seventy per cent
of the whole, it must be equally operative when the percentage is only thirty; and such
a principle in truth must postulate authority in the Dominion to assume the regulation of almost any trade in the country, provided it does so by setting up a scheme
embracing the local, as well as the external and interprovincial trade; and regulation
of trade, according to the conception of it which governs this legislation, includes the
regulation in the provinces of the occupations of those engaged in the trade, and of
the local establishments in which it is carried on.

He went on, in the part of this passage which has been quoted earlier, to
reject the argument "that the Dominion has such power because no single
provinces acting together, could put into effect
province, nor, indeed, all10the
6
scheme."
sweeping
a
such
The above approach was made the basis for a similar conclusion in the
NaturalProducts Marketing case, with reference to federal legislation that was
directed on its face to natural products marketing generally without distinction
as to extra-provincial and intra-provincial aspects. In that case he expressed
his conclusion as follows: 10 7
The enactments in question, therefore, in so far as they relate to matters which are
in substance local and provincial are beyond the jurisdiction of Parliament. Parlia105, [1925] S.C.R. 434 at 447-448.

100 Id. at 448.
107, [1936] S.C.R. 398 at 412.
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ment cannot acquire jurisdiction to deal in the sweeping way in which these enactments operate with such local and provincial matters by legislating at the same time
respecting external and interprovincial trade and committing the regulation of
external and interprovincial and the regulation of trade which is exclusively local
...to the same authority. (King v. Eastern Terminal Elevators ... )

It was this passage which the Judicial Committee adopted as its own,
thereby affirming the authority of Duff's judgment in the Eastern Terminal case.
There was one particularly curious aspect of Duff's approach to the trade
and commerce power, and that was his treatment of Lord Haldane's attempt
in the Snider case to reduce this power to an ancillary or auxiliary status.
Haldane had said:108
... It is, in their Lordships' opinion, now clear that, excepting so far as the power
can be invoked in aid of capacity conferred independently under other words in s. 91,
the power to regulate trade and commerce cannot be relied on as enabling the
Dominion Parliament to regulate civil rights in the Provinces.
This conception of the trade and commerce power was questioned by
Anglin C.J., in the EasternTerminal case, in another example of his candour and
independence with respect to the judgments of the Judicial Committee: and it
was disavowed by the Judicial Committee itself in the second combines case.
Duff, however, continued to quote this passage as late as the Natural Products
Marketing case. Finally, in 1938 in the Alberta Statutes case he acknowledged
that this view had been set aside but he indicated that it had influenced thei
opinion of the Supreme Court to some extent in the NaturalProductsMarketing

case. He said: 10 9

,It is difficult, no doubt, to reconcile this view with the concluding paragraph of
section 91 already discussed; nevertheless, in a judgment delivered in Re the Natural
ProductsMarketing Act... we unanimously expressed the opinion, and our judgment proceeded in part, at least, upon the hypothesis, that we were bound by this
pronouncement in the judgment in Snider's case... and by similar pronouncements
in the Board of Commerce case. . . , as expressing the ratio decidendi of those
decisions. It is clear now, however, from the reasons for judgment in A.-G. for
Ontario v. A.-G. for Canada ... that the Regulation of Trade and Commerce must
be treated as having full independent status as one of the enumerated heads of
section 91.

It is difficult to know what significance to attach to this admission in the
context of the Natural ProductsMarketing case. It is impossible to conclude
that the decision might have gone otherwise had Duff and the other members
of the Court proceeded on a different assumption concerning the authority of
this dictum in the Snider case. At most, it was a further consideration reinforcing
the conclusion that the federal trade and commerce power could not be extended
on any basis-whether characterization of the activity as a whole, general
convenience of a single plenary jurisdiction, or the application of ancillary
or necessarily incidental power-to encompass the whole of the intra-provincial
trade and commerce in particular commodities.
The subsequent reference to this matter in the Alberta Statutes case is
particularly curious because in 1930 in the Lawson case,110 which was decided
108, [1925] A.C. 396 at 410.
109 Reference re Alberta Statutes, [1938] S.C.R. 100 at 121.
:10 Lmvson v. Interior Tree Fruit and Vegetable Committee of Direction and The
A.-G. of Can., [1931] S.C.R. 357.
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soon after the second combines case was argued in the Judicial Committee, Duff
had clearly indicated that he did not think the auxiliary concept of the federal
trade and commerce power applied in the case of international and interprovincial trade and commerce, which was tantamount to a repudiation of the
concept for all practical purposes. He was quite explicit on this: 1
...
It seems hardly necessary to observe that, here, there is nothing pointing to the
conclusion that the regulative authority in respect of Trade and Commerce, in its
application to matters which, in themselves, are involved in interprovincial or
foreign trade, can only be invoked in aid of the execution of some power which the
Dominion possesses independently of that head. Lord Haldane's proposition is
strictly limited to matters which, in themselves, and independently of their connection with a Dominion trading company, would be of local concern only.

What Duff seemed to be saying then, was that the auxiliary notion of the
trade and commerce power was not a limitation on the power with respect to
international and interprovincial trade and commerce, but that it might permit
Parliament to deal with matters of local trade and commerce in aid of some
other head of jurisdiction.
It was Duff who included in the definition of the federal trade and commerce power a reference to the doctrine of ancillary or necessarily incidental
power-a doctrine that could give the federal commerce power additional
scope and reach-much as the Shreveport112 doctrine has done with respect to
the commerce power in the United States; but, as we have already noted, Duff
would not admit the application of this doctrine to permit the assumption of
the other half of a divided jurisdiction. This view is clearly reflected in the
following conclusion in the NaturalProducts Marketing case.113
. Legislation necessarily incidental to the exercise of the undoubted powers of the
Dominion in respect of the regulations of trade and commerce is competent although
such legislation may trench upon subjects reserved to the provinces by section 92,
but it cannot, we think, be seriously contended that sweeping regulation in respect of
local trade, such as we find in this enactment, is, in the proper sense, necessarily
incidental to the regulation of external trade or interprovincial trade or both
combined.

Duff adopted the same strict approach to provincial jurisdiction with

respect to trade and commerce. In the Lawson case 14 he held a provincial
marketing scheme that was directed to extra-provincial as well as intraprovincial movement to be invalid on the ground that "the regulation of the
trade with other provinces is no mere incident of a scheme for controlling local
trade; it is of the essence of the statute and of the object and character of the
Committee's activities." Although this passage could be said to reflect the
distinction between matters to which the legislation relates and matters which
are merely incidentally affected by it, it may also be seen as a rejection in this
111Id. at 370.
112 See B. Schwartz, A Commentary on the Constitution of the United States
(New York: MacMillan Co., 1963) Part 1 at 192: "Under the Shreveport doctrine, the
reach of the commerce power includes the regulation of any intrastate transactions that
have become so interwoven with interstate commerce that their regulation may be
deemed necessary or proper for the effective control of interstate commerce."
11a, [1936] S.C.R. 398 at 414.
114, [1931] S.C.R. 357 at 365.
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case of ancillary or necessarily incidental power as a basis for extending provincial jurisdiction to the extra-provincial aspects of trade and commerce.
What has been the fate of Duff's definition of the trade and commerce
power? On the whole, it has stood up better than his summation on the general
power. It has continued to be treated with respect, and has turned out to be
much more of a "locus classicus" than his statement of the law concerning
the general power. There have, however, been suggestions of new departures.
In the Ontario Farm Products Marketing case,115 which concerned the
validity of provincial marketing legislation, the Court was required by the
reference to assume that the statute was directed to intra-provincial transactions
only. It was necessary, however, for the Court to indicate what this assumption
implied concerning the nature of the transactions covered by the Act. The
question was whether a transaction that took place wholly within a province
was always and necessarily one within provincial jurisdiction to regulate intraprovincial trade and commerce. Four of the seven judges who addressed themselves to this question appeared to proceed on the assumption that to fall
within provincial jurisdiction the transaction must involve products to be consumed in the province. There were varying expressions of when a product,
although the subject of a transaction that takes place wholly within the province,
may nevertheless be considered to be part of extra-provincial trade and commerce. They appeared to conclude that the place of ultimate consumption of
the product, whether in original or processed form, determined whether it fell
within intra-provincial or extra-provincial trade. Kerwin C.J. spoke of a product
entering the "flow" of extra-provincial trade and commerce in the following
terms:
...Once an article enters into the flow of interprovincial or external trade, the subjectmatter and all its attendant circumstances cease to be a mere matter of local
concern. 116

Rand J., after acknowledging the authority of Duff's definition of the
distribution of the trade and commerce power in the Natural Products
Marketing case and the Judicial Committee's approval of his judgment in the
Eastern Terminal case to the "effect that Dominion regulation cannot embrace
local trade merely because in undifferentiated subject-matter the external
interest is dominant", expressed the following opinion, also suggestive of the
11 7
"flow" of trade concept:
... if in a trade activity, including manufacture or production, there is involved a
matter of extra-provincial interest or concern its regulation thereafter in the aspect
of trade is by that fact put beyond Provincial power.

Locke J., with whom Nolan I. concurred, indicated that it was a necessary
assumption of his conclusion in favour of validity that the Act did not extend
to "sales of produce where the producer himself ships his product to other
Provinces or countries for sale by any means of transport, or sells his product
.15 Reference re Tife Farm Products Marketing Act, R.S.O. 1950, c. 131, as
amended, [1957] S.C.R. 198.
116
Id. at 205.
"1 Id.at 210.
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to a person who purchases the same for export."'

8

He would also exclude

products which were processed before export from the province. He assumed
for purposes of validity that intra-provincial transactions consisted of "purchases and sales of the controlled product, whether hogs, fruit or vegetables
in their natural form, for consumption in the Province, and sales to processors,
manufacturers or dealers proposing to sell such products, either in their natural
form or after they have been processed by canning, preserving or otherwise
treating them, for consumption within the Province."' 119
The other three members of the Court who discussed this question,
Taschereau, Fauteux and Abbott J.J., rejected the notion that the ultimate
destination of a product for purposes of consumption, whether in original or
processed form, should determine whether it falls within intra-provincial or

extra-provincial trade and commerce.
20
Fauteux J.expressed himself on this point as follows:'
The suggestion that to be intra-provincial a transaction must be completed within
the Province, in the sense that the product, object of the transaction, must be ultimately and exclusively consumed or sold for delivery therein for such consumption,
is one which would, if carried to its logical conclusion, strip from a Province its
recognized power to provide for the regulation of marketing within such Province....
...

2
And Abbott J. said:' '

The power to regulate the sale within a Province of specific products, is not, in my
opinion, affected by reason of the fact that some, or all, of such products may subse-

quently, in the same or in an altered form, be exported from that Province, unless it
be shown, of course, that such regulation is merely a colourable device for assuming
control of extraprovincial trade.

Neither Kerwin C.J., nor Rand J., were very precise as to when they
thought a product should be deemed to be in the flow or current of extraprovincial trade. While the language used by them suggested a more flexible
or dynamic approach to the distinction between intra-provincial and extraprovincial trade and commerce it has never been made the basis of an actual
determination by the Supreme Court of Canada. There is much to suggest they
were merely concerned to emphasize that a transaction within the province
might involve an object of extra-provincial trade. The reference by Rand J. to
the Lawson case, as exemplifying the principle he was affirming, suggests that
what he chiefly had in mind were transactions within the province which contemplated export. But both Kerwin C.J. and Rand J. emphasized the difficulties
of determining where jurisdiction should lie to regulate operations affecting
products of which some are destined for intra-provincial and some for extra22
provincial trade. The difficulties were summed up by Rand J.as follows :1
It follows that trade regulation by a Province or the Dominion, acting alone, related

to local or external trade respectively, before the segregation of products or manufactures of each class is reached, is impracticable, with the only effective means
18 Id. at 231.
119 Id.

12lId. at 256.
121 Id. at 264.

122 Id.at 214.
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open, apart from conditional regulation, being that of co-operative action; this, as in
some situations already in effect, may take the form of a single board to administer
regulations of both on agreed measures.

In effect, this was the conclusion to which Duff had come.
The test of ultimate destination for use appeared to receive a check in the
Carnation23 case, in which it was held that a provincial marketing scheme which
fixed the price of milk to a condensed milk producer who sent most of it out of
the province for processing was not a regulation of extra-provincial trade and
commerce. The court based itself on the distinction which Duff had emphasized
in the Gold Seal case124 between legislation in relation to a matter and legislation
affecting a matter. The legislation was directed to fixing the price of the sale of
milk for delivery within the province. The effect of such price-fixing on the
extra-provincial trade in the processed product of such milk was merely an
incidental effect. The ultimate destination or "flow" concept could conceivably
have been applied to this case to invalidate the provincial legislation, since the
milk was known to be purchased with the intention of export, but it
would have prevented the realization of a highly desirable provincial legislative purpose - the protection of farmers from exploitation by a large customer.
The Carnationcase must be held to be an affirmation that the test is the
extent of the movement contemplated by the transaction of sale, and
not the ultimate destination of the product. This becomes the basis for
provincial jurisdiction. That jurisdiction is not affected by the incidental or
consequential effects which the provincial regulation may have on the flow or
current of extra-provincial trade and commerce into which that product, or
some by-product thereof, may ultimately pass as a result of subsequent transactions or operations. Leaving the character of a particular transaction operation or movement in goods to be determined by ultimate destination or the
significance of ultimate effects on the extra-provincial market in such goods
would leave provincial jurisdiction with a wholly uncertain basis. Consideration
of the effects on extra-provincial trade and commerce is relevant in attempting
to determine whether the provincial legislation intends or is aimed at such
effects, but such effects cannot by themselves, regardless of legislative purpose,
be allowed to give the legislation its essential character for purposes of jurisdiction. It may be argued that legislative purpose or object should be of little
consequence, that it is effects that matter, and that the constitution should be
regarded as permitting certain results to be achieved by provincial legislation
and certain results by federal legislation. But the constitution is not really
concerned with specific legislative results except insofar as they reflect general
legislative concerns or purposes. It is concerned with the distribution of jurisdiction to pursue a variety of legislative purposes in broad areas of constitutional
responsibility. Except insofar as effect may throw light on the area of legislative
concern that is truly in contemplation it only becomes material in the case of
operational conflict with valid federal legislation. No matter how great the
effect, if it be incidental or consequential, it cannot give the legislation its
character for purposes of jurisdiction. If it be the immediate, direct and intended
123 CarnationCo. v. Quebec Agricultural Marketing Board, [1968] S.C.R. 238.
324 Gold Seal Ltd. v. Dominion Express Co. and A.-G. Alta. (1921), 62 S.C.R. 424.
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effect of the legislation, then it is certainly an important, and often the most
important, factor in determining that character. The concept of ultimate destination, of ultimate relationship to the flow or current of extra-provincial trade as
the criterion of distinction, would make provincial jurisdiction in the field of
trade and commerce a wholly precarious and vulnerable one. The concept of
the movement contemplated by the transaction or operation which is the object
of the regulation, although not free from practical difficulties in some cases,
gives provincial jurisdiction some reasonable basis on which to fasten.
This view, which is affirmed in the Carnationcase, is not inconsistent with
the later decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada in the Manitoba Egg and
Poultry2 5 and Burns Food12 6 cases, in which provincial marketing legislation
was held to be invalid on the ground that it was aimed at interference with the
transactions by which products were to be imported into a province. Neither
of these decisions suggested that provincial regulation could not validly deal
with subsequent transactions in such products on the ground that once in the
extra-provincial flow or current of trade they could not be dealt with thereafter
as articles of intra-provincial trade. But it is a clear implication of the decisions
that they could not be dealt with in respect of subsequent transactions within the
province in such a manner as to have an intended effect, adverse or otherwise,
on extra-provincial trade and commerce.
Much significance seems to have been attached by commentators to the
decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in the Murphy 27 case, as suggesting
a more favourable judicial attitude to the federal trade and commerce power.
I confess to being unable to perceive its special significance in this regard. The
legislation in question-the Canadian Wheat Board Act12 8-was expressly
directed to the regulation of the extra-provincial trade in grain, and this was
sufficient to support its validity. The decision in favour of its valid application
to a particular transaction-a shipment by an individual in the poultry business
of grain from one province to another for use in his business-did not depend
on the application of the doctrine of ancillary or necessarily incidental power or
on the view that the grain trade as a whole must be considered to be extraprovincial. The most that might be said is that it suggested the Court was prepared to take a fairly broad view of what would constitute an inter-provincial
shipment coming under the regulation of the Act. The decision held that the
regulation imposed by the Act was not in violation of section 121 of the B.N.A.
Act requiring that trade between the provinces be free of impediments in the
nature of inter-provincial tariff barriers. There were also dicta implying the
general validity of the legislative scheme as a whole, including regulation of the
delivery to elevators and mills of grain, some of which might be for intraprovincial consumption. The regulation of the elevators and mills, although not
in issue in the case was presumed to rest, insofar as my inference is to be drawn
on this aspect from the dicta, on their having been brought under exclusive
125 A.-G. Man. v. Manitoba Egg and Poultry Association (1971),

19 D.L.R. (3d)

169.
12 Burns Food Limited v. A.-G. Man. (1974), 40 D.L.R. (3d) 731 (S.C.C.).
127 Murphy v. C.P.R. and A.-G. Can., [1958] S.C.R. 626.
128, R.S.C. 1952, c. 44.
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federal jurisdiction by a declaration that they were works for the general
advantage of Canada, in accordance with the suggestion that Duff had made in
the Eastern Terminal case.
Perhaps the general significance of the decision in the Murphy case for
those who have looked for an enlargement of the federal trade and commerce
power is in its apparent contrast with the decision in the Eastern Terminal
case. Whereas the Eastern Terminal case raised serious questions about Parliament's power to deal effectively with the grain trade, the Murphy case suggested
that all such doubts had been removed. The difference lay not in a change of
doctrine in the ensuing years concerning the scope of the federal trade and
commerce power but in the consequences that flowed, in effective power to
regulate transactions that might otherwise have been considered within provincial jurisdiction, from the declaration that all elevators and mills involved
in the grain trade were works for the general advantage of Canada. The Murphy
case did not hold or imply, contrary to Eastern Terminal, that the intraprovincial aspects of trade in which there was a substantial or dominant extraprovincial interest might on that ground alone be brought under federal jurisdiction. In fact there was no reference to the Eastern Terminal case.
On the other hand, the Klassen 29 case, a decision of the Manitoba Court
of Appeal shortly after Murphy, did represent an important departure, if not in
the formulation of doctrine, at least in its application to the federal trade and
commerce power. The issue in the Klassen case was whether the regulations
under the CanadianWheat Board Act respecting delivery of grain to a feedmill
validly applied to the delivery of grain to be used entirely for intra-provincial
consumption. The Court held that they did, not on the basis of the declaration
that the feed mill was a work for the general advantage of Canada (the validity
of which the Court declined to pronounce on), but on the basis of ancillary or
necessarily incidental power. This doctrine was applied with a considerable
touch of irony, since the Court invoked the words "and such ancillary legislation
as may be necessarily incidental to the exercise of such powers" included by
Duff in his definition of the federal trade and commerce power in the Natural
Products Marketing case, but without reference to the Eastern Terminal
decision.
Although in the Klassen case the Court need not have relied on the doctrine
of ancillary or necessarily incidental power, in view of the declaration that feed
mills were works for the general advantage of Canada, its application to the
facts of that case appears to have been an eminently logical and reasonable one,
and in retrospect the decision of Duff in the Eastern Terminal case appears to
have been misguided. The queuing system, which, as Rand J. pointed out in the
Murphy case, is an essential element of the regulation of the grain trade, cannot
work effectively unless all producers who are using the facilities for storage
and movement of grain are required to submit to it. This necessarily involves
regulation of the movement of intra-provincial trade in grain so long as it uses
facilities that are necessary to the movement of the extra-provincial trade. Such
regulation is truly ancillary; it is not directed to the regulation of intra-provincial
129R. v. Klassen, (1959) 20 D.L.R. (2d) 406; 29 W.W.R. 369 (Man. C.A.).
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trade in and for itself, but solely to the extent necessary to make federal regulation of the extra-provincial trade effective. But as Duff perceived in the Eastern
Terminal case, what is necessarily involved is the assumption of a substantial
jurisdiction to regulate intra-provincial trade. This is precisely because of the
difficulty, in the marketing of natural products, of segregating products in intraprovincial trade from those in extra-provincial trade. The logic of the facts, as
expressed in the doctrine of ancillary or necessarily incidental power, is to
attempt to extend the jurisdiction over the whole field. On the basis of necessity,
a claim can be made for plenary jurisdiction. It was Duff's perception of these
implications that led him to decline to allow the doctrine of ancillary or necessarily incidental power as the solution to the problems of divided jurisdiction.
This view seems to be reflected in the decision of the Supreme Court of
Canada in the Burns Foodcase. There the issue was whether a province, as part
of a marketing scheme designed to maximize the returns to hog producers from
sales to meat packers for processing, could validly require that shipments of
hogs into the province should submit to the scheme. The legislation provided
that hogs could not be slaughtered for processing unless they had been purchased
through the provincial marketing board, and the issue was whether this provision
could be validly applied in respect of hogs that had been imported from another
province. The Manitoba trial court and Court of Appeal 130 held that the legislation could validly have such application on the ground that the effect on the
extra-provincial trade in hogs was purely an incidental one, and that the legislation was not aimed at a regulation of such trade. The Manitoba Courts did not
attempt to rest validity on the notion of ancillary or necessarily incidental power,
but rather on the distinction between a matter in relation to which the legislation
is enacted and a matter which is merely incidentally affected by it.
There is a distinction between the concept of necessarily incidental power
and incidental effect, although the two are sometimes confused in practice. In
the case of an exercise of necessarily incidental power the legislation is aimed
at the matter or result which is the object of the exercise of such power.
Incidental is used here as synonymous with ancillary to express the relationship
of a subsidiary or auxiliary basis of jurisdiction to the main power. It is not
used, as in the distinction between a matter to which legislation relates and a
matter which is incidentally affected by it, to indicate something which is not
an intended object of the legislation but merely an unavoidable result of the
exercise of power. In one case we are speaking of incidental power; in the other
of incidental effect. In one case we are asking whether there is jurisdiction to
pursue a particular legislative purpose on the ground that it is necessary to the
effective exercise of the main jurisdiction. In the other case, we are asking
whether a particular effect reflects the true legislative purpose, or whether it is
merely an extraneous but unavoidable consequence of the pursuit of that
purpose.
In the Burns Food case the Supreme Court concluded, with Ritchie J.
dissenting, that the provincial regulation was aimed at requiring all sales by
which hogs were brought into the province for processing to pass through the
130
The Trial Court judgment is reported at 33 D.L.R. (3d) 207 and that of the
Manitoba Court of Appeal at 35 D.L.R. (3d) 581.
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Board, that this was the necessary effect of the provision requiring that hogs
could not be slaughtered for processing unless they had been purchased through
the Board, and that this effect was not an incidental one, but was rather a direct
object of the regulation. It had been contended that the provincial scheme could
not work effectively to protect producers in the province if shipments from outside the province could circumvent it. But what this contention amounted to is
that, if necessary, the province would have to extend its regulation to all extraprovincial trade in hogs for processing in order to make the provincial scheme
work. This was the argument which Duff had rejected since its ultimate result
would be to transform divided jurisdiction into plenary jurisdiction, and in the
Burns Food case the Supreme Court of Canada followed Duff's view, quoting
the passage of his judgment (which was adopted by the Judicial Committee)
in the NaturalProductsMarketing case.

The problems with which provincial policy was concerned in the Manitoba
Egg & Poultry and the Burns Food cases are to be solved not by judicial extension of provincial jurisdiction but by federal-provincial co-operation, and where
necessary or appropriate, by the kind of federal delegation of administrative
power to provincial marketing agencies permitted under the formula approved
in the Potato Board and Coughlin cases.
In the field of trade and commerce, the Duff adherence to the essential
lines and necessary consequences of divided jurisdiction appears to have prevailed. Today the problems have been placed in a new context of urgency by
the energy crisis. The issue is how development and marketing policy is to be
determined with respect to natural resources on which the whole nation
depends. The difficulties are only partially reflected in constitutional issues, and
it remains to be seen how far the federal and provincial governments will choose
to test the limits of their respective jurisdictions as part of the process of
negotiation and adjustment. But to the extent they do, the courts may be called
on to consider the relationship between the power inherent in the public ownership of natural resources and the federal responsibility for the regulation of
extra-provincial trade and commerce. The issue is whether there are any
limitations on the conditions which a province can impose on the use of its
natural resources in the exercise of its rights as owner, or whether certain results
achieved in this manner may be held to be an invalid interference with extraprovincial trade and commerce such as, for example, conditions in provincial
leases determining quantities, destinations and prices of exports.
A more convenient constitutional arrangement than the present one with
respect to trade and commerce would undoubtedly be a plenary federal power
that would be concurrent or overlapping with a provincial power to regulate
intra-provincial trade and commerce. The Federal Government could then
intervene in the regulation of intra-provincial trade and commerce with paramountcy in the case of conflict, to the extent necessary to make its regulation
of extra-provincial trade and commerce effective. This construction of the
distribution of the trade and commerce power was open to the courts at the
time of the Parsonscase; but it was not one for which they felt they had constitutional warrant, given their historical perception of the importance to be
attached to provincial jurisdiction. Duff remained faithful to this perception.
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As suggested by his reference to the declaratory power as a solution to specific
problems, he would presumably have said that it was for the people to indicate
that they desired a change.
6. The CriminalLaw Power
Because of the limitations placed by judicial decision on the general power
and the trade and commerce power, the federal government has attempted from
time to time to find a constitutional basis for essentially regulatory purposes in
the criminal law power. In some cases it has been successful, in others not. It has
been a question of what the courts have been prepared to recognize as a valid
criminal law purpose and a bona fide exercise of the criminal law power. The
only limitation on the federal criminal law power is what may be referred to
as the doctrine of colourability. The form of the criminal law must not be used
as a disguised or colourable attempt to usurp an area of provincial jurisdiction.
Whether or not the exercise of the criminal law power is to be deemed a
bona fide one is to be judged by reference to whether the purpose or object of
the legislation discloses a genuine criminal law concern. Duff applied a firm
check to the colourable use of the criminal law power to supply the deficiencies
of federal jurisdiction in the Reciprocal Insurers case, 131 in which he delivered
the judgment of the Judicial Committee holding that an amendment to the
Criminal Code making it an offence to carry on the business of insurance
without a federal licence was an invalid attempt by means of the criminal law
power to effect a regulatory purpose lying outside federal jurisdiction. Where
Parliament has jurisdiction with respect to a particular regulatory purpose it
has ancillary power to enforce its legislation by penal provisions. It does not
have to rely on the criminal law power for such purpose. But it had been held
in the InsuranceReference case that the regulatory purpose-the regulation of
the business of insurance within a province-lay beyond federal jurisdiction.
In effect, what Duff held in the ReciprocalInsurers case was that the amendment
to the Criminal Code was not a bona fide attempt to create the crime of carrying
on the business of insurance without a federal licence. Inferentially, this could
be taken as a holding that such conduct could not be validly made a crime. It was
excluding such conduct from the category of valid criminal law concerns. Duff
did not suggest the criterion or hallmark of a valid criminal law concern. In the
Board of Commerce case Viscount Haldane had found it necessary, in rejecting
the criminal law power as a basis for legislation directed against combines and
the hoarding and sale at unfair profits of necessaries of life, to put forward the
astonishing proposition that the categories of crime were closed and that, for
an exercise of the criminal law power to be valid, it had to relate to conduct
which was inherently criminal, or in his words, "which by its very nature belongs
to the domain of criminal jurisprudence". (The example of inherently criminal
conduct which he gave was incest.) This view, which was later repudiated by
the Judicial Committee in the ProprietaryArticles1 32 case, did not apparently
appeal to Duff. He did not, at least, avail himself of it in the ReciprocalInsurers
131

A.-G. Ont. v. Reciprocal Insurers, [1924] A.C. 328.

1132 ProprietaryArticles Trade Association v. A.-G. Can., [1931] A.C. 310.
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case. Much later, in the Egan case, he was to affirm that the criminal law is
"necessarily an expanding field".1 33
On the whole, he seems to have taken a broad view of the power of
Parliament to create new crimes, subject to the reservation against a clearly
colourable exercise of such power. The opinion of the Judicial Committee had
been too unqualified in the ProprietaryArticles case in suggesting that the only
test of a valid exercise of the criminal law power was whether there was a
prohibition of conduct with penal consequences. In the Reference re Section
498A of the Criminal Code,3 4 Duff had apparently been influenced by this
dictum to speak in similarly unqualified terms of the federal power. At one
point he said: "The jurisdiction in relation to the criminal law is plenary; and
enactments passed within the scope of that jurisdiction are not subject to review
by the courts." 135 This statement was apparently a slip, and it was seized on in
the dissenting judgment of Crocket J. In fact, Duff appears to have merely been
observing that there were no limits in theory to the kinds of conduct Parliament
could declare to be criminal in a bona fide exercise of its criminal law power.
That he was not overlooking the doctrine of colourability is indicated by a later
passage in his judgment:"1 6
It is also well settled that the Parliament of Canada cannot acquire jurisdiction
over a subject which belongs exclusively to the provinces by attaching penal sanctions
to legislation which in its pith and substance is legislation in relation to that subject
in its provincial aspects alone. (In re Insurance Act of Canada)...
...

In the Judicial Committee the dictum in the ProprietaryArticles case was
given its necessary qualification with reference to the rule against a colourable
use of the criminal law power.
Because of his failure to suggest the relationship between the search for true
legislative purpose and the nature of the prohibited conduct, Duff's judgment in
the ReciprocalInsurers case, although it is generally cited as a leading authority,
is not as helpful on the doctrine of colourability as Rand's judgment in the Margarinecase.' 3 7 There it was held by the Supreme Court of Canada and the Judicial Committee that a prohibition with penal consequences of the manufacture
and sale of margarine within a province was an attempt to interfere with intraprovincial trade and commerce (the protection of dairy farmers from the competition of butter substitutes) rather than a bona fide exercise of the criminal law
power. While referring to the common criminal law concerns in terms which
were not intended to be limitative - "Public peace, order, security, health, morality: these are the ordinary though not exclusive ends served by that law ... "138
-Rand emphasized that in determining whether legislation that is in criminal
law form has a bona fide criminal law purpose one must look at the supposed
"evil' to which it is directed. The conclusion against validity in the Margarine
133 ProvincialSecretary of P.E.L v. Egan, [1941] S.C.R. 396 at 401.
134, [1936] S.C.R. 363.

1851d. at 366.
186 Id. at 367.

137 Reference as to the Validity of Section 5(a) of the Dairy Industry Act, [1949]
S.C.R. 1.
138 Id. at 50.
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case was based on a combination of two factors: margarine was admitted not to
constitute a hazard to health, and the legislation was clearly concerned with the
protection of dairy farmers from competition. Thus, in the final analysis, as Duff
perceived in the Reciprocal Insurers case, the issue is not whether particular
conduct is appropriate for criminal law prohibition, but whether the criminal law
form is being used to pursue an ultra vires legislative purpose. At the same time,
as Rand emphasized in the Margarinecase, the nature of the prohibited conduct
is necessarily an important consideration in reaching a conclusion on this issue.
Duff also had something significant to say with respect to provincialpower
to prohibit conduct with penal consequences. There is much to suggest that he
regarded the criminal law power in Canada as essentially a concurrent one.
While provincial jurisdiction under section 92(15) of the B.N.A. Act to impose
punishment in the form of imprisonment, fine and other penalty for the enforcement of otherwise valid legislation is an ancillary one, the scope of the regulatory jurisdiction under the other heads in section 92 - particularly head 13
with respect to property and civil rights - is such as to give the provinces a very
large sphere for the prohibition of conduct with penal consequences. The prohibition itself must rest on some head of jurisdiction other than 92(15), which
merely provides for the imposition of penalties, but the human activity covered
by the other heads of jurisdiction in section 92 encompasses a very substantial
amount of what can also be brought within the scope of the federal criminal law.
Duff emphasized this reality of concurrent or overlapping criminal law powers
139
in Reference re Section 498A of the CriminalCode in the following passage:
...
When it is said that "criminal law" in section 91(27) is criminal law in its widest
sense, it is not meant that by force of section 92, including subdivision 15 of that
section, the provinces have no power to pass enactments which would fall within the
scope of the "criminal law", as that phrase would ordinarily be understood as applied
to the enactments of a legislature possessing a general competence in relation to
criminal law. People in Canada are familiar with a network of prohibitions and
regulations, the violation of which is punishable by fine, and sometimes by imprisonment, under municipal bylaws passed under the authority of provincial legislative
measures. It has been held in many cases that prohibitions enforceable by fine and
imprisonment enacted by the provincial legislatures may be valid enactments under
section 92. Notable instances are the prohibitions enacted under the local option law

of Ontario which was in question in A.G. for Ont. v. A.G. for Dominion... and the

conditional and qualified prohibitions enforceable in the same way which were
upheld in Hodge v. The Queen... . Then there are the groups of provincial statutes
passed under the authority of section 92(1) dealing with the disqualification of voters;
the disqualification of persons elected to sit and vote as members of the provincial
legislatures; in which offences are created punishable by fine and imprisonment
These enactments which, in part at least, have the purpose of securing public order,
and protecting the integrity of the representative system in the provinces, would, as I
have said, fall within almost any definition of criminal law.

The question is what, if any, are the important limitations on provincial
penal jurisdiction resulting from the existence of the federal criminal law power.
The most important areas that have been placed by judicial decision beyond
provincial reach have been prohibitions in the interests of public morality and
prohibitions restricting fundamental freedoms, notably freedom of speech.
Because of the important differences in local or regional attitudes on the
180, [1936] S.C.R. 363 at 366-367.
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various matters that make up the field of public morality, these matters might
well have been recognized as appropriate for determination by provincial law
on the basis of "local option". Indeed, the principle of "local option" is reflected
in federal legislation with respect to liquor prohibition and Sunday observance.
There is, however, no general basis in section 92 of the B.N.A. Act for provincial legislation with respect to public morality. "Civil rights", interpreted in a
large enough sense to encompass freedom generally, would extend too far and
give the provinces power to determine the scope of political freedoms, on which
national and not local attitudes and values must prevail.
In the case of Bedard v. Dawson,140 in which it was held that a province
could validly provide for the closing of a disorderly house following conviction
under the Criminal Code, Duff suggested a broad basis for provincial penal
jurisdiction in this area in the notion of power to suppress conditions conducive
to crime. His entire opinion in this case was as follows: 141
The legislation impugned seems to be aimed at suppressing conditions calculated to
favour the development of crime rather than at the punishment of crime. This is an
aspect of the subject in respect of which the provinces seem to be free to legislate.
I think the legislation is not invalid.

This notion appears to have some affinity to the concept of "police regulations",

which was suggested as a basis for the provincial liquor legislation in the Hodge
case 42 and which was invoked by Cartwright J. (as he then was) in the Saumur
case. 143 The weight of opinion has not rallied to these ideas as a basis for provincial penal jurisdiction. The notion of a provincial power to suppress conditions
conducive to crime has encountered the observation that the federal criminal
law power also has a preventive as well as a remedial aspect. The idea of a provincial police power has never been clearly defined in relation to the criminal
law power.
Attempts, invoking Bedard v. Dawson, to support provincial legislation
relating to gambling and obscenity on the basis of a regulation of property have
failed. 144 The rationale of Bedard v. Dawson which has emerged from subsequent judicial commentary is that it was a true exercise of provincial jurisdiction
to protect the property interests of neighbouring owners. This bona fide provincial legislative concern was none the less valid because the legislation also served
an interest of public morality. What has survived from Bedard v. Dawson is the
idea of suppression of nuisance for the protection of the enjoyment of property.
It was in its encounter with the value of free speech that the case was
reduced to these proportions by the Supreme Court of Canada. Bedard v. Dawson was unsuccessfully invoked in the Switzman case 45 to support the validity
of the Quebec "Padlock Act", which provided for the closing of property used
14 0 Bedard v. Dawson and A.-G. Que., [1923] S.C.R. 681.
14 1 Id. at 684.

142 Hodge v. The Queen (1883-84), 9 A.C. 117 at 131 and 133.
143 Saumur v. Quebec and A.-G. Que., [1953] 2 S.C.R. 299 at 381 and 388.

144 See Johnson v. A.-G. Alta., [1954] S.C.R. 127 and R. v. Board of Cinema
Censors of Province of Quebec, Ex parte Montreal Newsdealers Supply Co., [1968] 69
D.L.R. (2d) 512 (Que. Superior Ct.)
145 Switzman v. Elbling and A.-G. Que., [1957] S.C.R. 285.
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for communist propaganda. Taschereau J. (as he then was), dissenting, relied
on Duffs idea of a provincial power to suppress conditions conducive to crime,
but the majority of the court allowed it to drop into limbo. In quoting from the
judgments in Bedard v. Dawson to support the conclusion that the Court was
there concerned with a public nuisance in "its repugnant or prejudicial effect
upon the neighbouring inhabitants and properties", Rand J. made no reference
to or commentary upon Duffs notion of the suppression of conditions conducive
to crime, although in the earlier Johnson case, 146 concerning provincial legislation to suppress slot-machines he had made a brief allusion to it in the following
terms: ".... that it [the province] may deal with conditions that conduce to
the development of crime where what is proposed is in fact legislation of that
character and infringes no legislative field beyond its jurisdiction though undoubted is not in question here." It is fair to say that this notion, as an independent basis for provincial penal legislation, has gradually been laid to rest.
In any event, whatever scope Duff may have been prepared to concede to
provincial penal jurisdiction in the field of public morality, it is clear that he
would have drawn the line at interference with the political freedoms necessary
to the operation of the federal electoral and parliamentary system. This is the
necessary conclusion from his famous judgment in the Alberta Press case, which
is the subject of commentary in the next section.
One of the most important developments in Canadian constitutional law
in the last twenty-five years or so has been the increasing recognition of the valid
co-existence and concurrent operation of provincial penal provisions which have
a solid basis in regulatory jurisdiction with similar or overlapping criminal law
prohibitions. This development has been most marked in the field of highway
traffic offences, although it has not been confined to this field. What has been
involved is the extent to which the existence and exercise of the federal criminal
law power may inhibit provincial regulatory jurisdiction by rendering invalid or
inoperative provincial prohibitions with penal consequences or other restrictive
measures, such as licence suspension, deemed necessary for the enforcement
of provincial laws. The question was considered by Duff in the Egan case, 147
where the issue was the relationship between a provision of the Criminal Code
empowering a court of justice to prohibit a person from driving a motor vehicle
anywhere in Canada for a period up to three years upon a conviction for driving
while intoxicated and a provision in a provincial Highway Traffic Act for automatic cancellation of a person's driving licence upon such a conviction for a
period of twelve months in the case of a first offence. The court held that there
was no question that the province had authority to enact such a provision in the
exercise of its jurisdiction to regulate highway traffic, and that such automatic
suspension of a driver's licence upon conviction under the Criminal Code was
not an additional criminal law penalty but a valid condition of the right to enjoy
a provincial licence. It was characterized (with allusion to Bedard v. Dawson)
as a "civil disability arising out of a conviction for a criminal offence". 148
14 0

olohnson v. A.-G. Alta., [1954] S.C.R. 127 at 138.

147 Provincial Secretary

S.C.R. 396.
148 Id. at 414.

of the Province of Prince Edward Island v. Egan, [1941]
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The difficult question was whether the federal Parliament, in enacting its
own provision for prohibition of the right to drive following conviction, must
be deemed to have dealt completely with this consequence, to the exclusion of provincial legislation. For example, a court or justice might decide that
a prohibition to drive anywhere in Canada for a period of three months was a
sufficient additional penalty. Should that prevent the application of a provincial provision for automatic suspension of the driver's licence for a longer period
in the exercise of its jurisdiction to regulate the use of the highways in the province? The aspect doctrine takes care of the validity of the provincial and
federal provisions, but the real question is whether there is such conflict or
repugnancy that the rule of paramountcy must be applied in favour of the federal
legislation to render the provincial provision inoperative. The Supreme Court
of Canada held in the Egan case that there was not repugnancy and the provincial provision was not suspended. On the difficult question of what is to constitute repugnancy in such situations Chief Justice Duff said:149
We are here on rather delicate ground. We have to consider the effect of legislation by the Dominion creating a crime and imposing punishment for it in effecting
the suspension of provincial legislative authority in relation to matters prima facie
within the provincial jurisdiction. I say we are on delicate ground because the subject
of criminal law entrusted to the Parliament of Canada is necessarily an expanding
field by reason of the authority of the Parliament to create crimes, impose punishment for such crimes, and to deal with criminal procedure. If there is a conflict
between Dominion legislation and Provincial legislation, then nobody doubts that
the Dominion legislation prevails. But even where there is no actual conflict, the
question often arises as to the effect of Dominion legislation in excluding matters
from provincial jurisdiction which would otherwise fall within it. I doubt if any test
can be stated with accuracy in general terms for the resolution of such questions.
It is important to remember that matters which, from one point of view and for one
purpose, fall exclusively within the Dominion authority, may, nevertheless, be proper
subjects for legislation by the Province from a different point of view, although this
is a principle that must be "applied only with great caution." (Attorney-Generalfor
Canada v. Attorney-Generalfor Alberta...).

And again: 150
In every case where a dispute arises, the precise question must be whether or not the
matter of the provincial legislation that is challenged is so related to the substance
of the Dominion criminal legislation as to be brought within the scope of criminal
law in the sense of section 91. If there is repugnancy between the provincial enactment and the Dominion enactment, the provincial enactment is, of course, inoperative. It would be most unwise, I think, to attempt to lay down any rules for determining repugnancy in this sense. The task of applying the general principles is not made
less difficult by reason of the jurisdiction of the provincial legislatures under the
fifteenth paragraph of section 92 to create penal offences which may be truly
criminal in their essential character. (The King v. Nat. Ball Liquors Ltd.... and
'Nadanv. The King.... )

What is suggested here is a theory of the pre-emptive effect of an exercise
of the criminal law power in relation to provincial penal provisions that would
otherwise be valid. This was the theory advanced by Cartwright J. (as he then
was) in his dissent in O'Gradyv. Sparling'51 as follows:

In my opinion when Parliament has expressed in an Act its decision that a certain
149 Id. at 401.

150 Id. at 402.
151 O'Grady v. Sparling, [1960] S.C.R. 804 at 820-21.
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kind or degree of negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle shall be punishable as
a crime against the state it follows that it has decided that no less culpable kind or
degree of negligence in such operation shall be so punishable. By necessary implication the Act says not only what kinds or degrees of negligence shall be punishable
but also what kinds or degrees shall not.

The majority of the Court held that the provincial offence of careless
driving could validly co-exist with the federal offence of criminal negligence in
the operation of a motor vehicle for not only were they enacted from different
aspects but they were not co-extensive in effect. As Judson J., who delivered
the judgment of the majority, put it:152 "... the two pieces of legislation differed
both in legislative purpose and legal and practical effect, the provincial Act
imposing a duty to serve bona fide provincial ends not otherwise secured and in
no way conflicting with s. 221 (2) of the CriminalCode."
This approach to conflict or repugnancy was applied again in the somewhat similar case of Mann v. The Queen,153 in which it was held that the provincial careless driving provision could validly co-exist with the federal offence of
dangerous driving. In this case, Cartwright J. (as he then was) abandoned the
pre-emptive approach and ruled in favour of the valid operation of the provincial
provision. He found an important difference between the two provisions in the
requirement of criminal intent for the federal offence. What this case suggested
is that in the interests of a full and uninhibited penal power in the exercise of
provincial regulatory jurisdiction with respect to highway traffic the Court would
be prepared, if necessary, to recognize the valid co-existence of virtually identical
provisions. The problem of double jeopardy was to be left to the good sense of
the provincial administration of justice which is responsible for enforcement of
the Criminal Code as well as provincial highway traffic legislation.
Perhaps in anticipation of the ultimate development of operational concurrency in the relationship between provincial regulatory jurisdiction and the
federal criminal law power, Martland J., in the earlier Smith case,15 4 had formulated a narrower test of repugnancy that would permit the valid co-existence of
what had been said by Duff
identical penal provisions. It was a test derived from155
in the Egan case, as the following passage indicates:
,the test to be applied in cases of this kind is that which was stated by Duff CJ., in
The ProvincialSecretary of the Province of PrinceEdward Island v. Egan .. .:
In every case where a dispute arises, the precise question must be whether or
not the matter of the provincial legislation that is challenged is so related to the
substance of the Dominion criminal legislation as to be brought within the
scope of criminal law in the sense of section 91. If there is repugnancy between
the provincial enactment and the Dominion enactment, the provincial enactment is, of course, inoperative.
For the reasons already given, I do not think that the matter of the provincial legislation in question here is so related in substance to s. 343 of the Criminal Code as to
be brought within the scope of criminal law in the sense of s. 91 of the British North
America Act. I do not think there is repugnancy between s. 63 (1) (d) and (e) of The
Securities Act and s. 343 of the Criminal Code. The fact that both provisions prohibit
152

Id.at 812.

153 Mann v. The Queen, [1966] S.C.R. 238.

154 Smith v. The Queen, [1960] S.C.R. 776.

155 Id. at 800.
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certain acts with penal consequences does not constitute a conflict. It may happen
that some acts might be punishable under both provisions and in this sense that
these provisions overlap. However, even in such cases, there is no conflict in the
sense that compliance with one law involves breach of the other. It would appear,
therefore, that they can operate concurrently.

Thus Martland J.derived from Duff's test for repugnancy in the Egan case

"so related to the substance of the Dominion criminal legislation as to be
brought within the scope of the criminal law in the sense section 91" -the idea
of nullification rather than pre-emption. This narrower test of repugnancy has
not yet been adopted by a majority of the Court, although the Mann case would
suggest that the Court has been moving inevitably towards it.
The issue of nullification came squarely before the Court in the Ross and
Bell cases, 156 and the decisions suggest that operational concurrency in the highway traffic field has been conceded to the extent of a virtual suspension of the
rule of paramountcy. In these cases the issue was the relationship between provincial legislation providing for the automatic suspension for a continuousperiod
of a driver's licence in the event of conviction for a driving offence under the
Criminal Code and a provision of the Criminal Code empowering a court or
justice in a case of such conviction to prohibit the offender from driving a motor
vehicle "at all times or at such times and places as may be specified in the
order"' 57 - or in other words permitting the suspension of the right to drive
for an intermittentperiod. The purpose of giving a court or justice this discretion
is to permit the suspension of the right to drive without preventing the offender
from earning his livelihood. The issue in the cases was whether this purpose of
the federal legislation was frustrated or nullified by the automatic suspension
for a continuous period under provincial law. The majority of the Court held
that there was no repugnancy between the federal and provincial provisions.
Pigeon J., who delivered the judgment of the majority, relied on the Egan case,
which he referred to as having dealt with "a substantially similar question." 158
It is true that in that case the automatic suspension under provincial law could
have been for a longer period than the prohibition to drive imposed in a sentence
under the Criminal Code; but the provincial suspension would not have nullified
the operation of the latter. The difficulty in assimilating the situation in the
Ross and Bell cases to that in the Egan case is reflected in the following passage
from the judgment of Pigeon J.in the Ross case: 159
-

. ..In terms, the CriminalCode merely provides for the making of prohibitory orders
limited as to time and place. If such an order is made in respect of a period of time
during which a provincial licence suspension is in effect, there is, strictly speaking,
no repugnancy. Both legislations can fully operate simultaneously. It is true that this
means that as long as the provincial licence suspension is in effect, the person concerned gets no benefit from the indulgence granted under the federal legislation.
But, is the situation any different in law from that which was considered in the Egan
case, namely, that due to the provincial legislation, the right to drive was lost by

156 Ross v. The Registrar of Motor Vehicles and A.-G. Ont. (1974), 1 N.R. 9;

42 D.L.R. (3d) 68 (S.C.C.); Bell v. A.-G. P.E.L and A.-G. Ont. (1974), 1 N.R. 27;
42 D.L.R. (3d) 82.

157 Criminal Code, R.S.C. c. C-34, s. 238 (1), as amended by S.C. 1972, c. 13, s. 18.
158 (1974), 42 D.L.R. (3d) 68 at 77; 1 N.R. 9 at 13.

159 (1974), 42 D.L.R. (3d) 68 at 79-80; 1 N.R. 9 at 17.
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reason of the conviction, although the convicting magistrate had made no prohibitory
order whatsoever?

The answer of the majority opinion was, of course, no, but it did not deal
directly and explicitly with the issue of whether provincial law should be permitted to frustrate the realization of the federal purpose, namely, that the consequences of a criminal conviction for a driving offence should not, where the
convicting court or justice thinks fit, so remove the right to drive as to prevent
the offender from earning his livelihood. What the court held in effect is that the
right to drive, in relation to the right to earn a livelihood, is an overriding provincial concern: in other words, that this is a legislative purpose to which the rule
of paramountcy in favour of federal legislation does not apply. The majority
decision suggests that not only has the application of the aspect doctrine in the
field of highway traffic offences converted mutual exclusivity into operating concurrency, but it has attenuated, if not suspended, the rule of paramountcy itself.
The minority, consisting of Judson and Spence JJ., held that there was
repugnancy rendering the provincial provision inoperative in the Ross case but
not in Bell. In the Ross case there had been a prohibitory order under the Criminal Code permitting intermittent driving. In the opinion of the minority, the
automatic suspension of the driving licence for a continuous period under provincial law had to give way. In the Bell case there had been no order at all under
the Criminal Code prohibiting the offender from driving. Such a case, the
minority held, was governed by the Egan decision; there was no repugnancy.
In other words, the provincial provision is only suspended in its operation to
the extent that it actually comes into conflict with the exercise of the discretion
given by the Criminal Code to permit intermittent driving. It is operational conflict or repugnancy and not possible conflict on the face of the statute book that
is the test. There are other exercises of the discretion to make an order prohibiting an offender from driving a motor vehicle in Canada "at all times or at such
times and places as may be specified in the order" with which the provincial
provision would not be in conflict. Thus, even the minority opinion reflects how
far the courts are prepared to go to sustain the concurrent operation of provincial penal provisions which are closely related to matters that are dealt with by
the criminal law.
Compliance with the provincial provision did not involve violation of the
federal provision, or of a prohibitory order permitting intermittent driving under
it, within the meaning of the test suggested by Martland J. in the Smith case.
The question, however, was whether the provincial provision nullified a purpose
of the federal provision - namely, to permit intermittent driving in a case in
which some prohibition was considered desirable. Such a notion of nullification
is closely related to, if not indistinguishable, from the idea of a pre-emptive
exercise of the Criminal law power: that Parliament may not only indicate what
conduct is to be prohibited with penal consequences, but what conduct is to be
permitted and thus may not be prohibited. This is the notion which the Court as
a whole appeared to put aside in the O'Grady and Mann cases, with Cartwright
J., its chief exponent eventually abandoning it himself. It is a view that ignores
the difference in aspect between federal criminal law and provincial penal provisions, and regards the field of criminal law as essentially a concurrent field,
subject to federal paramountcy. The dissenting opinion in the Ross case must
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be regarded as a revival of the pre-emptive notion at the level of operational
conflict. It appealed, in the opinion of Spence J., to the larger concept of nullification expressed by Rand J. in the Johnson case,160 which involved conflict between federal and provincial provisions concerning slot-machines:
From this it is seen that the Code has dealt comprehensively with the subject matter
of the provincial statute. An additional process of forfeiture by the province would
both duplicate the sanctions of the Code and introduce an interference with the
administration of its provisions. Criminality is primarily personal and sanctions are
intended not only to serve as deterrents but to mark a personal delinquency. The
enforcement of criminal law is vital to the peace and order of the community. The
obvious conflict of administrative action in prosecutions under the Code and proceedings under the statute, considering the more direct and less complicated action
of the latter, could lend itself to a virtual nullification of enforcement under the Code
and in effect displace the Code so far by the statute. But the criminal law has been
Penacted to be carried into effect against violations, and any local legislation of a
supplementary nature that would tend to weaken or confuse that enforcement would
be an interference with the exclusive power of Parliament.

This broad notion of nullification - including possible administrative embarrassment arising out of the choice between overlapping provisions involving
different degrees of penalty - would also appear to have been set aside in the
O'Grady and Mann cases. (It must be observed that in the Johnson case three
members of the Court rested their case against the provincial provision on the
ground it was invalid as an invasion of criminal law and not merely rendered
inoperative by conflict with the federal provision, and Rand J., while content to
rest his opinion on the basis of repugnancy, clearly indicated that he would also
have found the provision ultravires, if necessary).
It is surprising that in neither the majority nor the minority opinions in the
Ross and Bell cases is there any reference to the decision of the Supreme Court
of Canada in the Breathalyzer case, 161 where the issue of nullification was in
certain respects a closer analogy than the one in the Egan case. In the Breathalyzer case the issue was whether provincial legislation providing for the suspension of a driver's licence when, being suspected of driving while under the
influence of intoxicating liquor, he refused to give a sample of his breath, was
repugnant to a provision of the Criminal Code that a person was not required
to give a sample of his breath, and the fact of his refusal to do so was not to be
used in evidence against him. In this case the federal provision that certain
conduct was to be permitted - that is, refusal to give a sample of breath - was
express and not merely implied. The provincial provision attached the consequence of suspension of a driver's licence to such refusal when it occurred in
the course of enforcement of the Criminal Code. However, the federal provision
declared that a person was not required to give a sample of his breath "for the
purposes of this act", and these words were emphasized by the majority of the
Court (for whom Fauteux J., as he then was, delivered the principal opinion) in
holding that there was a clear intention not to limit the operation of provincial
law.
The majority contended further that the provincial provision did not create
an obligation to give a sample of breath, in direct conflict with the federal pro160 Johnson v. A.-G. Alta., [1954] S.C.R. 127 at 138.
161 Validity of Section 92(4) of The Vehicles Act, 1957 (Sask.), [1958] S.C.R. 608.
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vision, but merely attached the consequences of suspension of a driver's licence
to the failure to do so. The minority, consisting of Locke, Cartwright and Martland J3., held that the direct effect of the provincial provision was to nullify
throughout the province of Saskatchewan the federal provision that a person
was not required to give a sample of his breath when requested to do so in the
course of enforcement of the Criminal Code. The consequence of suspension
of a driver's licence under the provincial provision was regarded as a statutory
compulsion amounting to a requirement to give a sample of breath. As Cartwright J., (as he then was) put it: "I am of opinion that a statute declaring that
a person who refuses to do an act shall be liable to suffer a serious and permanent economic disadvantage does 'require' the doing of the act. With deference
to those who hold a contrary view, it appears to me to be playing with words to
say that a person who is made liable to a penalty (whether economic, pecuniary,
corporal or, I suppose, capital) if he fails to do an act is not required to do the
act because he is free to choose to suffer the penalty instead!" 162 Martland J.,
who agreed with Cartwright J., emphasized, like him, that the federal and provincial provisions contemplated the same circumstances: a person suspected of
driving while intoxicated or driving while impaired, contrary to the Criminal
Code, is requested to give a sample of his breath but refuses to do so. The
federal provision says that he is not required or obliged to do so, and his
refusal to do so cannot be used in evidence against him. The provincial
provision says that if he refuses to do so his driver's licence may be
suspended. It was Martland J.'s conclusion that "The two legislations therefore
meet and the provisions of the Criminal Code must prevail." 163 This was not a
case, to use the words of Martland J. in the Smith case, of compliance with the
provincial law involving violation of the federal provision. It was, if anything,
the reverse. Conduct that complied with the federal law could involve violation
of what amounted to a provincial prohibition of refusal to give a sample of
breath, upon pain of losing one's driver's licence. Martland J., distinguished the
Egan case on the ground that "the statutory provision in question in the Egan
case only became applicable after there had been a conviction under the Criminal Code."1 64 The implication is that it did not conflict with the application and
operation of the CriminalCode provision. There was not in the federal provision
which applied in the Egan case any suggestion that Parliament had some purpose
that might be defeated by an automatic suspension of the driver's licence for a
continuous period under the provincial law. At most there might be an overlapping of periods covered by a prohibition to drive under the Criminal Code and an
automatic suspension of a driver's licence within the province. It would require
an application of the pure pre-emptive theory - that Parliament must be
deemed to have intended that the right to drive should not be prohibited as a
consequence of criminal conviction beyond the limits set by a sentence under
the Criminal Code - in order to find conflict or repugnancy. While the language
used by Duff in the Egan case - "But even where there is no actual conflict, the
question often arises as to the effect of Dominion legislation in excluding matters
from provincial jurisdiction which would otherwise fall within it" and "whether
1O2 Jd. at 622.
103 id. at 624.
1 4 Id.
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or not the matter of the provincial legislation that is challenged is so related to
the substance of the Dominion criminal legislation as to be brought within the
scope of the criminal law in the sense of section 91" - left room for application
of the pre-emptive theory, he allowed the issue to be ruled by the aspect doctrine.
The extent of the operational concurrency that has been permitted in the
relationship between federal criminal law and provincial penal provisions reflects
what is probably the fullest application of this doctrine in constitutional
interpretation.
There can be little doubt that Duff, with characteristic vision, forsaw the
necessity of this development if the exercise of the criminal law power was not
to render provincial regulatory jurisdiction uncertain and capable of stultification. It is implied in his words, "I say we are on delicate ground because the
subject of criminal law entrusted to the Parliament of Canada is necessarily an
expanding field ... ." The result of this development, now brought to its farthest
point by the majority decision in the Ross and Bell cases, is that only operational
nullification in a very narrow sense - as, for example, where the requirements
of provincial law compel an act that constitutes a violation of a federal provision
is likely to be found to be a repugnancy. An exercise of the criminal law
power will not be construed as limiting the extent to which a provincial legislature may attach regulatory consequences to a criminal law conviction, since
this would be to confuse federal and provincial aspects. The Egan case, like so
many others, reflects Duff's concern with viable working relationships between
the two spheres of jurisdiction.
7. The Protectionof FundamentalFreedoms
Probably Duff's most celebrated judicial statement was his elaboration, in
Re Alberta Statutes 65 of what has come to be known as the "implied bill of
rights". It is the concept that the federal parliamentary system depends for its
effective operation on the existence and expression of certain political freedoms,
such as freedom of the press and freedom of public discussion, and that provincial legislatures cannot validly interfere with these freedoms in such a manner as
to impair the operation of the federal parliamentary system. It is an idea derived
from the assumption implicit in the preamble and various provisions of the
B.N.A. Act that the basis of the Canadian political system is to be a democratically elected parliamentary government operating in a climate of free public
discussion. The provincial legislation in issue in Re Alberta Statutes provided for
a control and management of the press in the interests of a favourable treatment
of social credit policy. Duff held that the bill was ultra vires because it fell as an
ancillary part of the main social credit legislation; but he also suggested that it
might be held to be invalid as an interference with the political freedoms essential to the federal parliamentary system. (He did not actually hold it to be ultra
vires on this ground.) It should be observed that Duff was not the only member
of the Court to give expression to this idea; there is an equally quotable passage
to similar effect in the judgment of Cannon J. The concept, however, has generally been attributed to Duff, and it is his opinion, as a general rule, that has been
quoted in subsequent cases. The passage in which he finds an implied bill of
165 Reference re Alberta Statutes, [1938] S.C.R. 100.
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rights in the Constitution, operating as a limitation on provincial legislative
power, is as follows: 166
Under the constitution established by The British North America Act, legislative
power for Canada is vested in one Parliament consisting of the Sovereign, an upper
house styled the Senate, and the House of Commons. Without entering in detail upon
an examination of the enactments of the Act relating to the House of Commons, it
can be said that these provisions manifestly contemplate a House of Commons which
is to be, as the name itself implies, a representative body; constituted, that is to say,
'by members elected by such of the population of the united provinces as may be
qualified to vote. The preamble of the statute, moreover, shows plainly enough that
-the constitution of the Dominion is to be similar in principle to that of the United
Kingdom. The statute contemplates a parliament working under the influence of
public opinion and public discussion. There can be no controversy that such institutions derive their efficacy from the free public discussion of affairs, from criticism
and answer and counter-criticism, from attack upon policy and administration and
defence and counter-attack; from the freest and fullest analysis and examination
from every point of view of political proposals.

The validity of a provincial interference with freedom of public discussion,
operating within an admitted sphere of provincial regulatory jurisdiction, is to
be measured by its effect on the federal parliamentary system. It is not any
restriction that is to be invalid but that which "effects such a curtailment of the
exercise of the right of public discussion as substantially to interfere with the
working of the parliamentary institutions of Canada as contemplated by the
provisions of The British North America Act and the statutes of the Dominion
of Canada.' 0 7
Although this concept has been invoked from time to time by particular
judges against the validity of provincial legislation, it has never been the ground
of a majority opinion in the Supreme Court of Canada. The reason probably
lies not in misgivings about the concept but in the fact that the federal criminal
law power has been a sufficient limitation upon provincial authority to interfere
effectively with fundamental freedoms. Such interference will usually take the
form of a prohibition of conduct with penal consequences, and where that prohibition cannot be reasonably related to provincial regulatory jurisdiction in
some field, it will be held to be invalid as an attempt to enact criminal law.
The implied bill of rights was invoked by Rand and Kellock JJ., in the
Saumur case, 168 where the issue was whether a by-law of the City of Quebec
could validly prevent the Jehovah Witnesses from distributing their literature in
the streets of the city. There were other grounds for holding that the by-law could
not validly have this effect, in particular, conflict with a pre-Confederation provincial statute affirming freedom of religion. But the implied bill of rights concept
was also applied by these judges to the by-law in so far as it interfered with freedom of speech. (The implied bill of rights is necessarily limited to those political
freedoms which are essential to the effective operation of the parliamentary
system, and would presumably not cover freedom of religion, as such, except to
the extent that freedom of speech is necessary for its expression and enjoyment.)
While recognizing that the doctrine, as formulated by Duff, contemplated that
160 Id. at 132-133.

167 Id.at 134-135.
168 Saumur v. City of Quebec and A.-G. for Que., [1953] 2 S.C.R. 299.
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these political freedoms might necessarily be affected to some extent in the valid
exercise of a provincial regulatory jurisdiction, and that the test in such case was
the degree of actual interference with them and its consequences for the parliamentary system, Rand J. held that where the provincial interest or concern was
not sufficiently identified in the terms of the legislation (or by-law) the provision as a whole must fall. Thus, in Rand's opinion, a by-law conferring a general
and unqualified discretion to prohibit the circulation of literature did not
sufficiently disclose the relationship between such power and the bona fide provincial regulatory concern with the use of streets to give it any basis of validity
whatever. As he put it: 169
Conceding, as in The Alberta Reference, that aspects of the activities of religion and
free speech may be affected by provincial legislation, such legislation, as in all other
fields, must be sufficiently definite and precise to indicate its subject matter. In our
political organization, as in federal structures generally, that is the condition of
legislation by any authority within it: the courts must be able from its language and
its relevant circumstances, to attribute an enactment to a matter in relation to which
the legislature acting has been empowered to make laws. That principle inheres in the
nature of federalism; otherwise, authority, in broad and general terms, could be
conferred which would end the division of powers. Where the language is sufficiently
specific and can fairly be interpreted as applying only to matter within the enacting
jurisdiction, that attribution will be made; and where the requisite elements are
present, there is the rule of severability. But to authorize action which may be related
indifferently to a variety of incompatible matters by means of the device of a discretionary licence cannot be brought within either of these mechanisms; and the
Court is powerless, under general language that overlaps exclusive jurisdictions, to
delineate and preserve valid power in a segregated form. If the purpose is street
regulation, taxation, registration or other local object, the language must, with sufficient precision, define the matter and mode of administration; and by no expedient
which ignores that requirement can constitutional limitations be circumvented.

In the Saumur case, four of the judges held the by-law to be valid; four of
them expressed the opinion that it was ultra vires; but the judgment of the court,
based on the opinion of the ninth member, Kerwin J. (as he then was) took the
form of a declaration that the by-law could not validly apply to prevent Jehovah's
Witnesses from distributing their literature in the streets of Quebec, and an
injunction was issued to restrain the City from interfering with such distribution. Thus, in the view of Kerwin J., contrary to the opinion expressed by Rand
I. above, the by-law could be given an intra vires construction and application.
Kerwin J. expressed disagreement, moveover, with the concept of an implied
bill of rights. Thus the majority judgment in the Saumur case did not turn on this
concept but rather on conflict with the pre-Confederation provincial Freedom
of Worship Act which, if not within provincial legislative jurisdiction, remained
in force by virtue of section 129 of the B.N.A. Act.
The implied bill of rights was again invoked by Rand and Kellock JJ. in
the Switzman case,170 which set aside the Quebec "Padlock Act". They were
joined by Abbott J. The concept was re-stated by Rand 1. in unqualified terms
that placed freedom of speech, because of its relationship to the Canadian demo16 9 Id. at 333.

17o Switzman v. Elbling and A.-G. Que., [1957] S.C.R. 285.
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cratic system, as a single, indivisible matter lying outside provincial jurisdiction
17
and consequently falling as a whole within federal competence. He said: '
Indicated by the opening words of the preamble in the Act of 1867, reciting the
desire of the four Provinces to be united in a federal union with a constitution
"similar in principle to that of the United Kingdom", the political theory which the
Act embodies is that of parliamentary government, with all its social implications,
and the provisions of the statute elaborate that principle in the institutional apparatus
which they create or contemplate. Whatever the deficiencies in its workings, Canadian government is in substance the will of the majority expressed directly or
indirectly through popular assemblies. This means ultimately government by the
free public opinion of an open society, the effectiveness of which, as events have not
infrequently demonstrated, is undoubted.
But public opinion, in order to meet such a responsibility, demands the condition of
a virtually unobstructed access to and diffusion of ideas. Parliamentary government
postulates a capacity in men, acting freely and under self-restraints, to govern themselves; and that advance is best served in the degree achieved of individual liberation
from subjective as well as objective shackles. Under that government, the freedom of
discussion in Canada as a subject-matter of legislation, has a unity of interest and
significance extending equally to every part of the Dominion. With such dimensions
it is ipso facto excluded from head 16 as a local matter.
This constitutional fact is the political expression of the primary condition of social
life, thought and its communication by language. Liberty in this is little less vital to
man's mind and spirit than breathing is to his physical existence. As such an inherence in the individual it is embodied in his status of citizenship....
Prohibition of any part of this activity as an evil would be within the scope of the
criminal law, as ss. 60, 61 and 62 of the Criminal Code dealing with sedition exemplify. Bearing in mind that the endowment of parliamentary institutions is one and
entire for the Dominion, that Legislatures and Parliament are permanent features of
our constitutional structure, and that the body of discussion is indivisible, apart from
the incidence of criminal law and civil rights, and incidental effects of legislation in
relation to other matters, the degree and nature of its regulation must await future
consideration; for the purpose here it is sufficient to say that it is not a matter within
the regulation of a Province.

It was in the Winner case, 7 2 concerning the distribution of jurisdiction with
respect to highway transport undertakings, that Rand J. had suggested the
concept of rights inhering in the status of Canadian citizenship (such as the
right of free movement between the provinces), with which provincial legislation could not validly interfere. This concept, however, does not appear to have
received subsequent judicial application, perhaps because of its potential scope
and the fact that its limitations are not easily perceived. In Switzman, Abbott J.
extended the concept of the implied bill of rights even further indicating that,
in his opinion, it was 7a3 limitation on federal, as well as provincial, legislative
competence. He said:'
Although it is not necessary, of course, to determine this question for the purposes of
the present appeal, the Canadian constitution being declared to be similar in principle
to that of the United Kingdom, I am also of opinion that as our constitutional Act
now stands, Parliament itself could not abrogate this right of discussion and debate.
The power of Parliament to limit it is, in my view, restricted to such powers as may
be exercised under its exclusive legislative jurisdiction with respect to criminal law
and to make laws for the peace, order and good government of the nation.

171 Id. at 306-307.

Winner v. S.M.T. (Eastern) Ltd. and A.-G. Can., [19511 S.C.R. 887 at 919.
173, [1957] S.C.R. 285 at 328.
172

1974]

Duff and the Constitution

This would place freedom of public discussion on a higher constitutional
plane than it enjoys under the Canadian Bill of Rights,17 4 which merely protects
it as a matter of statutory interpretation, subject to the right of Parliament to
declare in particular cases that the protection of the Bill shall not apply. (Of
course, the political reality is that the government might often find it difficult to
obtain approval for an express exclusion of the Bill of Rights, so that to the
extent a court is prepared to find conflict with the Bill of Rights rendering a
federal legislative provision inoperative, the political embarrassment or difficulty of obtaining an express declaration excluding the operation of the Bill
may give it the same force and effect from a practical point of view as if it were
entrenched.)
The implied bill of rights concept was given further consideration by members of the Supreme Court of Canada in the Oil, Chemicaland Atomic Workers
case'7 5 and the McKay case 176 . In the first of these cases the issue was whether
a provision in a provincial Labour Relations Act prohibiting a union from
making any contribution from union dues for the support of a political party or
candidate was invalid as an interference with the federal political process within
the notion of the implied bill of rights. The Court held, in a four to three
judgment, that the provision was bona fide labour relations legislation, not
directed to interference with the federal electoral system as such, but rather to
the kinds of disposition or application that a union could make of funds collected from its members as union dues. It was characterized by the majority
as legislation for the protection of certain civil rights in the province - that is,
the right of a union member not to have his union dues which he can be compelled to pay under the collective bargaining system applied to the support of a
political party or candidate whom he does not personally favour. But that did
not end the inquiry, given the test formulated by Duff in Re Alberta Statutes.
Assuming primafacie validity, the issue, as acknowledged by Martland J., who
spoke for the majority, was "whether the legislation effects such a curtailment
of the exercise of the right of public discussion as substantially to interfere with
the working of the parliamentary institutions of Canada." He concluded that the
provincial provision did not effect such a curtailment:1 77
The legislation, however, does not affect the right of any individual to engage in any
form of political activity which he may desire. It does not prevent a trade union from
engaging in political activities. It does not prevent it from soliciting funds from its
members for political purposes, or limit, in any way, the expenditure of funds so
raised. It does prevent the use of funds, which are obtained in particular ways, from
being used for political purposes.

The minority, consisting of Cartwright, Abbott and Judson JJ., held that
the provision was not bona fide labour relations legislation but was directed to
the political activity of unions, including participation in federal elections. The
minority did not, therefore, deal with the question whether, on an assumption
of prima facie validity, the interference with the federal electoral process would
174, S.C. 1960, c. 44.

175 Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union v. Imperial Oil Limited
and A.-G. B.C., [1963] S.C.R. 584.

176 McKay v. The Queen, [1965] S.C.R. 798.
177, [19631 S.C.R. 584 at 594.
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be a substantial one within the meaning of the Duff test. The clear implication
of their observations, however, was that even if the legislation could be considered to have a valid provincial aspect, the curtailment of the freedom to
engage in the political activity necessary to effective operation of the federal
parliamentary system would in this case be considered to be a substantial one.
In the McKay case, the issue was whether a municipal by-law which prohibited the maintenance on residential property of all signs other than a limited
number of specified kinds should be interpreted as prohibiting a sign urging
persons to vote for a particular candidate in a federal election. The appellants
McKay were convicted of violating the by-law by posting a sign on their property
which read "Vote for David Middleton, New Democratic Party". The appellants
did not challenge the constitutional validity of the by-law but contended that it
should not be interpreted so as to prohibit a sign posted for federal election
purposes. The majority of the Supreme Court of Canada, for whom Cartwright
J. (as he then was) delivered judgment, agreed with this contention. They held
that if the by-law were interpreted so as to prohibit such a sign it would be a
law in relation to federal elections, a matter within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the federal Parliament. As such it would be ultra vires, regardless of the presence
of federal legislation in the field and regardless of the relative seriousness of its
impact on the federal electoral process. The majority then disposed of the matter
in a manner similar to that of the decisive vote of Kerwin C. J. in the Saumur
case. Since the by-law related to a matter within provincial legislative jurisdiction (which, in fact, had been conceded) and was not directed expressly to
signs for the support of candidates in federal elections, it could be given an intra
vires interpretation and application, and it was sufficient to hold that it could
not validly apply to such signs.
The approach of the majority was based on legislative jurisdiction with
respect to federal elections rather than on the notion of an implied bill of
rights which may render otherwise valid provincial legislation invalid or inoperative because of its effect on a fundamental freedom on which the federal parliamentary system depends. The latter is the true bill of rights approach. There is
prima facie legislative jurisdiction but the legislation is rendered invalid or inoperative because of its effect on a fundamental right. It was this approach that
was implicit in Duff's acknowledgment in Reference re Alberta Statutes that
there was some provincial jurisdiction to regulate the press but that the permissible limits of such jurisdiction would be exceeded where it was exercised in a
manner to effect a substantial interference with the operation of the federal
parliamentary system.
Martland J., who delivered the judgment of the minority, adopted much
the same approach as he had when speaking for the majority in the Oil, Chemical
and Atomic Workers case. If the by-law were interpreted so as to apply to
federal election signs such as the one in question, it would not be a law which
related to federal election signs but merely one which had an incidental effect
on them. In other words, in such an application the by-law would still have a
valid provincial aspect as directed to the regulation of the use of property from
a point of view of provincial concern, and only an incidental effect on a matter
within federal jurisdiction. Then turning to the Duff test in Reference re Alberta
Statutes, which he did not expressly concede, but assumed for purposes of
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analysis, to be "a sound proposition of constitutional law", Martland J. said
that he was not prepared to hold "that, because a by-law of general application
incidentally prevented a particular form of political propaganda from being
used in a particular area, this constituted a substantial interference with the
178
working of the parliamentary institutions of Canada".
If any curtailment of freedom of speech or the other political freedoms
necessary to the effective operation of the federal parliamentary system is not
to be invalid or inoperative, but only that which effects a substantial interference
with the system, the courts are left with considerable discretion and the application of the implied bill of rights becomes rather uncertain. It is perhaps for this
reason that where the federal criminal law power has not been available as an
obstacle to provincial legislation, some judges have preferred to seek a basis
for limitation of provincial power in the notion that, at least insofar as the
federal parliamentary and electoral processes are concerned, these freedoms
constitute a separate constitutional value that lies wholly within federal jurisdiction, and in characterizing offensive provincial legislation as directed to interference with such freedoms rather than as merely incidentally affecting them. It
is submitted, however, that Duff's approach in Reference re Alberta Statutes
reflect§ a truer recognition of the extent to which such rights must necessarily be
affected from time to time by the exercise of provincial regulatory jurisdiction
and of the necessary application of the aspect doctrine, if provincial jurisdiction
is to have adequate scope. It is an approach that attaches final importance to the
degree of effect, thereby permitting a more flexible accommodation between
provincial power and fundamental values of the federal system.
8. The Powerof JudicialAppointment
Another example of Duff's emphasis on the necessity of flexible relations
between federal and provincial powers was his opinion in Reference re Adoption 79 concerning the distribution of the power of judicial appointment. The
general issue in this area of the constitution is the extent to which the exclusive
federal power under section 96180 of the B.N.A. Act to appoint the judges of
the superior, district and county courts in the provinces is to inhibit the provincial power to re-distribute judicial business among the provincial courts in the
interests of a more efficient administration of justice (for which the provinces
have the primary responsibility under the constitution)18' or to assign it to
specialized tribunals for particular regulatory purposes. In Reference re Adoption, the specific issue was whether certain judges had the authority, having
[1965] S.C.R. 798 at 816-817.
179 Reference re Authority to Perform Functions Vested by the Adoption Act, the
Children's Protection Act, the Children of Unmarried ParentsAct, the Deserted Wives'
and Children's Maintenance Act, of Ontario, [1938] S.C.P. 398.
180 Section 96 reads: "The Governor General shall appoint the Judges of the
Superior, District, and County Courts in each Province, except those of the Courts of
Probate in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick."
181 y Virtue of section 92(14) of the BNA Act, which confers on the provinces
exclusive jurisdiction to make laws in relation to matters falling within the class of
subjects described as "The Administration of Justice in the Province, including the
178,
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regard to the requirements of section 96, to perform the functions vested in them
by certain pieces of provincial legislation dealing with the adoption, child protection and the maintenance of illegitimate children and deserted wives and children. The issue was whether the jurisdiction conferred on them was of the kind
exercised by courts within the contemplation of section 96. Duff, in delivering
the unanimous opinion of the Supreme Court of Canada, held that it was not;
that it was jurisdiction of a summary nature that had traditionally been exercised
by courts or judges -more specifically, magistrates and justices of the peace outside the scope of section 96. In coming to this conclusion Duff made a
thorough review of earlier and conflicting governmental and judicial assertions
as to the scope of section 96 and the existence, if any, of a provincial power of
judicial appointment. It was a judgment that clarified the whole question and
placed the federal appointment power in some reasonable perspective in relation to the primary provincial responsibility for the administration of justice.
Acknowledging that the federal power of appointment to the more important
courts had traditionally been regarded as an important aspect of the group of
constitutional provisions designed to assure and safeguard the independence of
the judiciary, Duff, at the same time, stressed the importance, from the practical
point of view, of the jurisdiction exercised by inferior courts in the provinces,
and observed that the provinces must be credited with the will and capacity to
take necessary measures for maintaining the integrity of the judiciary appointed
by them. It was a commentary that tended to deflate some of the more extravagant rhetoric that had been applied in the past to the provisions in sections 96
and following of the B.N.A. Act, such as the characterization of them in Toronto
Corporation v. York Corporation as the "principal pillars in the temple of
jtstice".182
The important emphasis in Reference re Adoption, however, and the one
that has influenced judicial consideration of the implications of section 96, is
that the section must be so interpreted and applied as to give reasonable scope
to the necessary provincial power to re-distribute or re-assign judicial business.
In particular, the jurisdiction of section 96 and non-section 96 courts is not to
be considered as "fixed forever as it stood at the date of Confederation"; the
provinces must be able to make reasonable changes in the jurisdiction of both
kinds of courts, including changes in monetary limits which would have the
effect of decreasing the jurisdiction of section 96 courts and increasing that of
non-section 96 courts, without being in conflict with section 96; but the effect
of such changes must not be such as to so change the fundamental character of a
court as to create a court of the class contemplated by section 96. At the same
time, in considering the significance of a particular change or transfer of jurisdiction, the court is not to be influenced by the possibility that by a succession of
such changes the provincial legislature may eventually create a court of the kind
contemplated by section 96. Each change is to be considered on its own merits.
The test suggested by Duff was whether challenged elements of jurisdiction
"broadly conform" to those exercised by section 96 courts.
Duff's judgment in Reference re Adoption received very high praise from
182

Toronto Corporation v. York Corporation,[1938] A.C. 415 at 426.
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the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in the John East Iron case 183, where
it was referred to as a judgment "so exhaustive and penetrating, both in historical
retrospect and in analysis of this topic, that their Lordships would respectfully
adopt it as their own, so far as it is relevant to the present appeal". In the John
East Iron case the issue was whether a provincial labour relations board was,
in the exercise of the jurisdiction conferred on it by its governing statute,
analogous to a section 96 court. The particular aspect of the Board's jurisdiction
that gave rise to the challenge was the power to grant relief to an employee
illegally dismissed for union activity. What we see emerge in this case is a
question that was left somewhat unclear by Reference re Adoption: the extent
to which particular elements of jurisdiction are to be measured against section
96 and the extent to which the character and powers of a tribunal are to be
looked at as a whole. The issue, where there are several elements or aspects of
jurisdiction, is whether we are to talk about section 96 type tribunals or section
96 type jurisdiction. A possible inference from Duff's analysis is that it is the
effect of particular changes on the character and jurisdiction of a tribunal as a
whole that is to be the test. This might appear to be suggested by the following
184
statements in his judgment:
... a province is not empowered to usurp the authority vested exclusively in the
Dominion in respect of the appointment of judges who, by the true intendment of
the section, fall within the ambit of s. 96, or to enact legislation repugnant to that
section; and it is too plain for discussion that a province is not competent to do that
indirectly by altering the character of existing courts outside that section in such a
manner as to bring them within the intendment of it while retaining control of the
appointment of the judges presiding over such courts. That, in effect, would not be
distinguishable from constituting a new court as, for example, a Superior Court,
within the scope of section 96 and assuming power to appoint the judge of it. In
principle, I do not think it is possible to support any stricter limitation upon the
authority of the provinces ....
One further point made against this feature of the statute is that there is no pecuniary
limit. This again I regard as of small importance. The jurisdiction is not without
limit: it is necessarily limited by the purpose for which the order is made.
In Clubinev. Clubine the Court of Appeal for Ontario, following the judgment of the
Court of Appeal for Alberta in Kazakewich v. Kazakewich, held that section 1 (1) of
the DesertedWives and Children'sMaintenanceAct is ultra vires on the ground that
it is beyond the powers of a provincial legislature to invest a court of summary jurisdiction, such as a magistrate's court, with a jurisdiction theretofore exclusively
exercised by a Superior Court of the province. I have given my reasons for thinking
that the proposition in that sweeping form cannot be sustained...

Yet the legislation in question in Reference re Adoption conferred single
elements of jurisdiction for specific legislative purposes, and the test applied
by Duff, as most favourable to the case against the legislation, referred to a type
of jurisdiction rather than a type of tribunal:18 5
...does the jurisdiction conferred upon magistrates under these statutes broadly
conform to a type of jurisdiction generally exercisable by courts of summary juris.
diction rather than the jurisdiction exercised by courts within the purview of s. 96?
83

Labour Relations Board of Saskatchewan v. John East Iron Works, Limited,
[1949] A.C. 134 at 152.
184 [1938] S.C.R. 398 at 414 and 420.
185 Id. at 421.
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Section 96 is obviously concerned with courts of a certain over-all relative
importance. Yet, the importance of these courts for the individual lies in the
particular element or aspect of jurisdiction that they exercise at any given time.
The issue, therefore, in the final analysis must be whether a particular element
of jurisdiction should be exercised by judges appointed by the federal government and enjoying the constitutionally guaranteed conditions of judicial
independence. Where a single element of jurisdiction has been conferred on a
provincially appointed official, section 96 could have no application if the test
was whether the provincial authority constituted a tribunal of an over-all
relative importance comparable to that of a section 96 court. This would be the
case with provincial administrative tribunals. Such a test could only have
meaning if applied to a provincial court having a comprehensive jurisdiction
of several strands or elements. But even here, section 96 could have little
meaning if it were only to apply when successive accretions of jurisdiction had
given a court not merely the entire jurisdiction in one or more specific areas
of a section 96 court but the over-all character of such a court.
In the John East Iron case the Judicial Committee re-formulated the test,
suggested by Duff, expressing it as follows: "Does the jurisdiction conferred by
the Act on the appellant board broadly conform to the type of jurisdiction
exercised by the superior district or county courts?"' 186 It said that there were
two issues involved: whether the Board was exercising power of a judicial
nature, and if so, whether in the exercise of such power it was a tribunal
analogous to a section 96 court. The Judicial Committee did not answer the
first question, although its observations upon the characteristics of judicial
power suggest that it had in mind a rather more narrow and strict concept of
such power than that which might serve to justify the application of certiorari
or prohibition and the rules of natural justice in administrative law. On a review
of the whole legislative scheme administered by the Board, including the
particular power which gave rise to the challenge, the Judicial Committee
concluded that whether or not that particular power might be considered to
be judicial, the scheme as a whole was unlike anything ever applied by a
section 96 court. The particular power that had provoked the challenge was a
necessary part of the over-all scheme and drew validity from it, but the Judicial
Committee also emphasized certain characteristics of it that distinguished it
from relief in the regular courts, such as the right of persons other than the
party aggrieved to invoke it. Thus, even assuming that the power could be
characterized as judicial for some purposes, it was not a power that broadly
conformed to any that had been exercised by a section 96 court. At the same
time, the Committee observed that it should not be assumed that any judicial
power that might be conferred upon an administrative tribunal would necessarily
derive validity from being ancillary to an administrative scheme that in its
over-all features was unlike section 96 court jurisdiction. Some kinds of power

180 [1949] A.C. 134 at 154.
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might be held to be ultra vires and severable from the scheme as a whole. On
this point the Judicial Committee said:187
- It is relevant, too, to consider the alleged judicial function of the board under
see. 5(e) of the Act in relation to its other duties. It is not impossible, as Toronto
Corporationv. York Corporationillustrates, for a body to be validly established for
administrative purposes and yet to be unconstitutionally clothed with a judicial
power. It is not, therefore, conclusive of the constitutionality of the board that in the
main it is an administrative instrument and that its judicial function is designed to
implement administrative policy. But, once more seeking an analogy with the courts
mentioned in s. 96, their Lordships must observe that the feature of the board's
constitution, which is conspicuously shown in the power vested in it by s. 10, sub - s. 3,
of the Act to appeal in its own name from any judgment of any court affecting any
of its orders or decisions, emphasizes the dissimilarity of those courts.

The general approach of Reference re Adoption to the reasonable adjustments required for the more efficient distribution of judicial business among
provincial courts was reaffirmed by the Supreme Court of Canada in the
Magistrate'sCourt case.188 The issue in that case was whether the provincially
appointed judges of the Quebec Magistrate's Court (now the Provincial Court)
were competent to exercise the jurisdiction which the provincial legislature
had transferred from the Superior Court by increasing the monetary limits of
the jurisdiction of the Magistrate's Court from $200 to $500. It was obviously
the kind of adjustment that Duff had affirmed in Reference re Adoption as
necessarily permitted by section 96. This approach clearly contemplates the
validity of successive increases from time to time in the monetary limits of the
jurisdiction of inferior provincial courts without any sense of the necessity,
as yet, to attempt to define the point, unlikely to arise, at which the accumulative
transfer of jurisdiction from section 96 courts might be so substantial as to call
for the application of that section. In the Magistrate'sCourt case reference was
made to the decrease in the real value of the dollar as justifying the proposed
increase in the monetary limits of jurisdiction, but it would not appear that there
was an intention to suggest this as a criterion for the validity of future increases.
Even in the current state of inflation such a criterion could be a serious qualification of the necessary flexibility contemplated in Reference re Adoption and
might well not justify the increases in monetary limits that might be required
from time to time to relieve pressure on section 96 courts and to provide for a
more expeditious and less costly disposition of cases of a certain relative
importance.
The decision in the Magistrate'sCourt case was noteworthy for more than
a fairly obvious application of the principles affirmed in Reference re Adoption.
It rejected the notion that by conferring on a court presided over by provincially

17

Id. at 151.

re an Act Respecting the Jurisdiction of the Magistrate's Court
(Quebec) (1965), 55 D.L.R. (2d) 701; [1965] S.C.R. 772.
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appointed judges elements of jurisdiction which such judges are not competent
to exercise by virtue of section 96 a provincial legislature thereby changes the
character of the court in such a manner as to disqualify its judges from exercising
any of its jurisdiction at all. This notion of a kind of section 96 virus had in
fact been applied by the provincial Court of Appeal, to which the reference had
been made in the first instance. Although they had been asked to consider the
specific piece of legislation increasing the monetary limits of the jurisdiction of
the Magistrate's Court in certain areas, they had reviewed all the jurisdiction
that had been conferred on the Court since it was established, including elements of supervisory jurisdiction, and had come to the conclusion that the
Court as a whole had become a court within the contemplation of section 96.
Their conclusion was that the judges of the court were not competent to exercise
any of its jurisdiction, including the additional jurisdiction that had been conferred by the specific piece of legislation referred to them. Apart from the fact
that the Court had gone beyond the terms of the reference, this obviously could
not be a workable approach to the application of section 96. It was sufficient
for the Supreme Court of Canada to hold that the Court must confine itself to
the restricted terms of the reference but it also observed that where a non-section
96 court is involved the issue concerning accretions of jurisdiction is not whether
a particular aspect or element of jurisdiction has changed the character of the
court as a whole but whether that aspect or element of jurisdiction can be validly
exercised by provincially appointed judges. In other words, the issue is not
whether the court as a whole has become a section 96 type court but whether
the particular aspect or element of jurisdiction that is challenged is a section 96
court type of jurisdiction. That is the meaning of the question as to whether in
the exercise of particular jurisdiction a tribunal is analogous to one within the
scope of section 96. Each aspect or element of jurisdiction must be considered
on its own merits in the light of section 96.
The obverse of this, in the administrative tribunal cases, is that the over-all
administrative character of such tribunals will not necessarily impart validity
to any kind of judicial power that may be conferred upon them. In the Tremblay
case, 189 the Supreme Court of Canada held, following the approach in JohnEast
Iron, that the power given to a Labour Relations Board to dissolve a companydominated union was not jurisdiction that could only be exercisedby a section 96
court. It was held to be "purely incidental to the accomplishment of one of the
primary purposes for which the association was granted corporate status, namely
the maintenance of industrial peace" and not to be part of the general power
of the Superior Court to dissolve corporations on such grounds as "usurpation
of corporate rights, or fraud and mistake in obtaining letters patent.'19 0 Here
then was an entirely new power to dissolve an incorporated body, fashioned
for labour relations purposes and never exercised by the superior courts.
180 Tremblay v. Quebec Labour Relations Board (1967), 64 D.L.R. (2d) 484.
100 Id. at 487.
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The case would appear to be different where, as under the new British
Columbia Labour Code,191 superior court jurisdiction with respect to labour
injunctions is conferred upon the Labour Relations Board. Labour injunctions
are obviously closely related to the successful operation of labour relations
legislation, and a persuasive case on grounds of policy can no doubt be made
for vesting the power to grant them in alabour relations board on the assumption
that it is better able than the courts to weigh the interests involved and to assess
the implications of such injunctions for relations between the parties. On the
other hand, unlike the jurisdiction considered in the John East Iron and
Tremblay cases, labour injunction has incontestably been superior court jurisdiction and labour relations boards have operated for many years without it.
Nor would it appear that the nature of the jurisdiction has been so transformed
under the new legislation as to make it essentially different from that which has
been exercised by section 96 courts. Thus the British Columbia Labour Code
presents a distinctly new type of section 96 challenge in the administrative law
field. The issue is not whether it may be appropriate for a number of reasons
to confer jurisdiction that has hitherto been exercised by a section 96 court
191

Labour Code of British Columbia Act, S.B.C. 1973, c. 122, assented to Nov.

7, 1973.
See particularly sections 28, 31 and 32. Section 28 confers power on the Labour
Relations Board to hear a complaint that there has been a contravention of the Act
or regulations and "to order an employer, trade-union, and their officers, officials or
agents, or any other person, to do anything for the purpose of complying with this Act
or the regulations, or refrain from doing anything in contravention of this Act or the
regulations". Sections 31 and 32 read as follows:
"31. (1) Except as otherwise provided in this Act, the board has and shall
exercise jurisdiction to hear and determine a complaint under section 28 and to
make any order required to be made under that section, and, without limiting the
generality of the foregoing, it has and shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction in
respect of
(a) any matter in respect of which the board has jurisdiction under this
Act or the regulations; or
(b) any application for the restraint or prohibition of any person or group
of persons from
(i) ceasing, or refusing, to perform work, or to remain in a relationship of
employment; or
(ii) picketing, striking, or locking out; or
(iii) communicating information or opinion in a labour dispute by speech,
writing, or any other means of communication.
(2) Except as provided in subsection (3), no court has or shall exercise any
jurisdiction in respect of a matter that is, or may be, the subject of a complaint
under section 28 or a matter referred to in subsection (1), and, without restricting
the generality of the foregoing, no court shall make an order enjoining or prohibiting any act or thing in respect thereof, or make an offer enjoining or prohibiting any such act or thing in support of a claim for damages.
(3) Nothing in this section shall be construed to restrict or limit the jurisdiction of a court, or deprive a court of jurisdiction, to make any form of order the
court may make in the proper exercise of its jurisdiction where the court is of
opinion that, unless the court makes an order, an immediate and serious danger
to life or health is likely to occur or is continuing to occur.
32. Notwithstanding anything in this or any other Act, no court shall order
an injunction to restrain a person from striking, locking out, or picketing, or from
doing any act or thing in respect of a strike, lockout, dispute, or a difference
arising out of or relating to a collective agreement, upon an ex part application."
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on a provincially appointed administrative tribunal. The issue is whether it is
in fact jurisdiction that broadly conforms to that of a section 96 court.
Section 96 may be given a reasonable application in relation to the provincial need to be able to create new regulatory and social welfare jurisdictions
but it cannot be read out of the constitution. For example, it can not be seriously
contended that, however appropriate it might appear to be, a province could
establish a specialized court staffed by provincial appointees to exercise the
supervisory jurisdiction over administrative authorities that has traditionally
been exercised by section 96 courts. There have already been decisions indicating that portions of that jurisdiction may not be validly transferred to
provincially appointed judges or officials. 192
It would not appear to be an argument in favour of the British Columbia
Labour Code that the legislation only purports to confer a portion of the jurisdiction in respect of injunction upon the Labour Relations Board. There would
not appear to be an analogy here between such a case and an adjustment in
the monetary limits of jurisdiction. What has been conferred is the whole of
the jurisdiction in respect of injunction for certain limited purposes. The issue,
as suggested in the Display Service case,19 3 is whether the whole of a section 96
court's jurisdiction in a certain area, however limited, has been transferred to
provincially appointed officials. A change in monetary limits does not confer
the jurisdiction of a superior court on a provincially appointed tribunal since
such jurisdiction is not characterized by its lower limits but rather by the fact
that it has no upper limits.
On the whole, section 96 has not up to now created many serious problems
for provincial regulatory jurisdiction. This is mainly attributable to the general
approach adopted by the Judicial Committee in the John East Iron case and
to the influence which the general perspective on section 96 expressed by Duff
in Reference re Adoption may be presumed to have had upon their thinking.
This general perspective is that section 96 may be conceded to be an important
provision of the constitution but it must not be permitted to stultify provincial
power to redistribute judicial business and to create new judicial functions.
Workmen's compensation, labour relations, and other forms of provincial
administrative jurisdiction have all survived challenge on the basis of section
96.194 The major exception has been in the area of municipal assessment, in
which a line of cases flowing out of the emphasis in Toronto v. York have held
that a province cannot validly confer power on its own assessment tribunals to
determine the question of liability to assessment because this is a question that
has been traditionally determined by section 96 courts. 195 In these cases it was
192 Seminary of Chicoutini v.

A.-G. and Minister of Justice of Quebec (1972), 27
D.L.R. (3d) 356 (S.C.C.). Cf. also Re Howard Investments and South of St. James
Town Tenants Association (1973), 30 D.L.R. (3d) 148.
193 A.-G. and Display Service Co. Ltd. v. Victoria Bldg. Ltd., [1960] S.C.R. 32.
104
See, supra, note 14, at 789-90.
105 Quance v. Thomas A. Ivey and Sons Ltd., [1950] 3 D.L.R. 656, (1950) O.R.
397; City of Toronto v. Olympia Edward Recreation Club Ltd., [1955] S.C.R. 454. For
a trenchant analysis of these cases see Laskin, Municipal Tax Assessment and Section
96 of the British North American Act: The Olympia Bowling Alleys Case (1955), 33
Can. Bar Rev. 993, and also Laskin, Id. at 784-788.
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not too clear whether what was objectionable was the attempt to confer final
and exclusive power to determine this question, or whether the courts objected
to the conferring of this power on provincial administrative tribunals to any
extent and for any purposes at all. One possible inference is that concern for
the section 96 issue was confused to some extent with concern for the power
of superior courts to review the question of liability to assessment in the exercise
of their supervisory jurisdiction.19 6 The traditional judicial approach to privative
clauses would be sufficient to preserve the power to review such a question since
it can so plausibly be characterized as a jurisdictional one. To safeguard this
right it is not necessary to deny jurisdiction to provincial assessment tribunals
to determine the question of liability to assessment in first instance or on
administrative appeal as a necessary incident of their administration of the
legislation. The assumption on which the provincial legislature 197 proceeded
in attempting to remove the uncertainty left in the wake of these decisions was
based on the minority opinion of Rand J. in the Olympia Bowling case that
section 96 of the B.N.A. Act does not prevent the province from conferring
power on its assessment tribunals to determine liability to assessment as a
necessary incident of the administration of the assessment legislation so long
as it does not purport to make their determination final and exclusive of superior
court jurisdiction. This view reflects the emphasis in John East Iron on functional
necessity in relation to the over-all character of a tribunal, rather than the
emphasis in Toronto v. York on the characterization of specific powers or
elements of jurisdiction on their own merits in the light of the doctrine of
severability.
Both emphases have their place and must be reconciled in some measure.
Traditional superior court questions of right and liability may be transformed
in their essential nature and basis and validly removed from the superior courts
and transferred to provincially appointed administrative tribunals under new
regulatory schemes. Such was the case when compensation without fault
replaced the former liability of employers for injury to workmen, and when
labour relations legislation recognizing collective bargaining supplanted to a
considerable extent the common law of employer-employee relations. Such
would presumably be the case if the liability for damage caused by automobile
accidents was placed on an essentially different legal basis and assigned to
administrative tribunals. But once such tribunals have been validly constituted
and endowed with all the power deemed to be reasonably required for the
satisfactory administration of the legislation, there may be a temptation to add
further powers from time to time in an attempt to insulate the area of regulation
as much as possible from the impact of the regular judicial process-in other
196 This was certainly the case in R. v. Ontario Labour Relations Board, ex p.
Ontario Food Terminal, [1963] 38 D.L.R. (2d) 540, where it was suggested that because of section 96 a provincial administrative tribunal cannot even consider (as part

of its administrative functions and subject to judicial review) a collateral question of
law of a kind traditionally determined by a section 96 court. Cf. Laskin's comment on

this case in (1963), 41 Can. Bar Rev. 446. This notion appears to have been rejected:

R. v. Ontario Labour Relations Board, ex p. Taylor (1964), 41 D.L.R. (2d) 456; [1964]
1 O.R. 173; Re Armstrong Transport and Ontario Relations Board (1964), 42 D.L..
(2d) 217; [19641 O.R. 358.
191
The Assessment Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 32, s. 65(3).
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words, to create a legal system touching the essential interests in the area of
regulation that is as self-contained and self-sufficient as possible. This appears
to be the tendency discernible in the new British Columbia Labour Code.
It is reinforced by the attempt to formulate a fool-proof privative clause1 98 that
the courts will be unable to dispose of on the traditional approaches of statutory
interpretation, namely, that the legislature cannot have intended to exclude
review for jurisdictional error, or that an administrative authority cannot claim
the protection of the privative clause when it places itself outside the ambit of
its governing statute. The intention to exclude judicial review where there has
been an absence or excess of jurisdiction has been made unmistakably explicit
and clear.
This raises the question again as to whether the courts may be obliged
finally to fall back on the contention that there is a constitutional guarantee of
judicial review. It has generally been assumed that section 96 of the B.N.A. Act
does not prevent a provincial legislature from removing jurisdiction from section
96 courts but merely prevents it from conferring such jurisdiction on provincially appointed judges or administrative authorities. In the John East Iron case
the Judicial Committee held that the privative clause did not make the Labour
Relations Board a tribunal within the meaning of section 96, but in rejecting
the argument that the privative clause had a bearing on the section 96 issue
the Judicial Committee was proceeding on the assumption that such a clause
"would not avail the tribunal if it purported to exercise a jurisdiction wider
than that specifically entrusted to it by the Act". 199 From time to time judges
have suggested that judicial review would, if necessary, be held to be guaranteed
by the constitution, 20 0 but in the Farrell case201 Judson J., delivering the
judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada, expressed the opinion that there
could be no constitutional objection to privative clauses on the basis of section
96 or otherwise. An argument against the jurisdiction of the Workmen's Compensation Board based on section 96 had been abandoned by counsel in the
1 8

See Sections 33 and 34 of the Labour Code of British Columbia, supra, note

191.

Section 33 provides: "The board, in respect of matters under sections 16, 28, 31,
34, 38, and 90, has and shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction to determine the extent of
its jurisdiction under those sections, or to determine any fact or question of law that is
necessary to establish its jurisdiction." Section 34 provides in part as follows:
"34. (1) Except as otherwise provided in this Act, the board has exclusive
jurisdiction to decide for all purposes of this Act any question, including, without
restricting the generality of the foregoing, any question as to whether [and then
there follows a long list of specific questions many of which in the light of the
existing judicial approach might be characterized as going to jurisdiction] ....
(2) A decision, order or ruling of the board made under this Act in respect
of any matter in which jurisdiction is conferred by this Act, or is determined
under section 33 to be conferred by this Act, is final and conclusive and is not
open to question or review in any court, and no proceedings by or before the
board shall be restrained by injunction, prohibition, or any other process or proceeding in any court, or be removable by certiorari or otherwise into any court."
100, [1949] A.C. 134 at 152.
200 See, for example, Rinfret CJ. in L'Alliance des professeurs catholiques de

Montreal v. Labour Relations Board of Quebec and The Montreal Catholic School
Commission, [1953] 2 S.C.R. 140 at 155.
201 Farrellv. Workmen's Compensation Board, [1962] S.C.R. 48.
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Supreme Court, but the general constitutional challenge to the privative clause
formulated in the following terms---"That the Legislature has no jurisdiction
to prevent a review by the Courts of a decision of the Board upon questions of
law since that deprives the subject of his right of access to the Courts"-apparently remained before the Court. It was disposed of by Judson 3. in the
following terms:202
If an argument based upon s. 96 of the British North America Act is untenable, the
other argument based upon right of access to the courts falls with it. Its rejection as
far as this Board is concerned is implicit in the judgments in the Dominion Canners
case and in the Alcyon case. The restriction on the legislative power of the province
to confer jurisdiction on boards must be derived by implication from the provisions of
s. 96 of the British North America Act. Short of an infringement of this section, if the
legislation is otherwise within the provincial power, there is no constitutional rule
against the enactment of s. 76(1).

Once again, however, this conclusion was drawn against a background

of judicial decisions refusing to give any effect to privative clauses other than
the exclusion of review for non-jurisdictional error of law on the face of the
record. 20 3 The question is whether this consideration of the issue exhausts the
possibility of section 96 as the basis of a constitutional objection to a provincial
legislative provision which expressly confers on an administrative tribunal a
final and exclusive power to determine the limits of its own jurisdiction in terms
which the courts are unable to avoid by the traditional approach of statutory
interpretation. While this is not the power of judicial review it is a characteristic
of the superior courts which might be reasonably presumed to be one of the
aspects of their over-all power and relative importance, justifying the special
provision for them in the constitution. Looked at from another perspective, it
would indeed be ironic if the much-vaunted section 96 proved in the end powerless to prevent the effective suppression by provincial legislatures, to the extent
they see fit within the scope of their regulatory jurisdiction, of the power of
judicial review, which is the power that characterizes superior courts above all
others. It may be safely assumed, of course, that the courts would never permit
a privative clause to exclude judicial review of a question of constitutional
validity. 20 4 Judicial review to this extent is considered to be an essential aspect
of a federal constitution. But beyond that, as part of our constitutional system
in a more general sense, is the protection traditionally afforded by the superior
courts against abuses of administrative power. However views may differ as to
the vigour or self-restraint with which this power should be exercised in the
general run of cases, it seems to be incontestable that it must be maintained at
the very least for the clear and blatant abuse of power which no one would
pretend to justify as a necessary price of administrative autonomy. If in the
face of stronger and more explicit privative clauses the courts are unable to
find a constitutional basis for this power of judicial review then responsibility
will have to pass back to the legislatures to find a clearer mandate for such a
result. If the tendency discernible in a certain judicial outlook on privative
202 Id. at 52.
203 Re Ontario Labour Relations Board, Bradley v. Canadian General Electric Co.
(1957), 8 D.L.R. (2d) 65; [1957] O.R. 316.
204 Ottawa Valley Power Co. v. A.-G. Ont., [19361 4 D.L.R. 594 at 603; LO.F. v.
Bd. Trustees Lethbridge Nor. Inv. Dist., [1937] 2 D.L.R. 109.
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clauses gains ascendency, 205 as it may well do, it is likely that legislatures would
have to consider their withdrawal or at least their modification in a way that
would effect some compromise between objectionable judicial interference with
the administrative process on what often approximates to an appellate review
and no judicial control at all.
It is interesting to speculate as to what Duff's response might have been
to this new form of legislative challenge to the power of judicial control. It is
tempting to surmise that notwithstanding his concern for the implications of
section 96 for provincial jurisdiction he would be led on this issue to follow
the kind of reasoning that he applied in Reference re Alberta Statutes and to
find that, just as the constitution necessarily contemplates a system of parliamentary democracy, so it necessarily contemplates the existence
of superior
2°6
courts with an effective and operative power of judicial control
9. In Conclusion
It has not been possible to comment on all the important facets of the
constitutional work of Duff. I have tried to concentrate on a number of areas
in which his thought appears to have had a significant influence on the shape
which judicial decision has imparted to the relationships between federal and
provincial power. In this process of selection I have necessarily omitted reference
to many cases. Duff participated in some 115 constitutional decisions 2O7 during
his career of almost thirty-eight years on the Supreme Court of Canada. For
virtually the whole of this period he played a dominant role, expressing for
the most part the view of the whole court or a majority thereof. He delivered
the judgment of the Court in about 13% of these cases, a majority opinion in
about 62%, a concurrence in a majority opinion in about 18% ,208 and a
dissent in about 7%. There were only about a dozen constitutional cases in
the Court during this period in which he did not participate. These cases, taken
as a whole, touch almost every aspect of the constitution and exhibit the wide
range of Duff's profound understanding of the principles not only of federalism,
but also of what may be called the unitary aspects of the constitution which
we have inherited from Great Britain. A considerable proportion of the constitutional decisions in which Duff participated involved questions of public
property and the provincial power of taxation, including succession duty. I have
not referred to these because, important as they were for the particular interests
involved, they do not appear to be particularly significant for an assessment of
205 See, for example, Pringlev. Fraser (1972), 26 D.L.R. (3d) 28 (S.C.C.); Executors of Woodward Estate v. Minister of Finance (1972), 27 D.L.R. (3d) 608.
206 Indeed, an approach of this kind was suggested by Professor Lederman in
The Independence of the Judiciary (1956), 34 Can. Bar Rev. 1139 at 1158 et seq. See
also LeDain The Supervisory Jurisdiction in Quebec, (1957) 35 Can. Bar Rev. 788 at
825 et seq.
207 1 am indebted to my colleague Professor Sidney Peck for providing me with a
computer print-out of the list of the constitutional cases in which Duff participated in
the Supreme Court of Canada, which is the basis for the statistical information I have
provided in the text.
208 The words "majority opinion" do not necessarily imply that there were dissenting judgments in these cases. They are used to distinguish the cases in which Duff
did not render the judgment of the court nor dissent.
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his influence on the general shape of the constitution. They do, however,
reflect in a very vivid manner his quite remarkable powers of legal analysis
and exposition. Indeed, many of them probably exhibit to a greater degree
than some of the passages of general discussion on which I have focused his
capacity for close and subtle reasoning based on a consummate mastery of
underlying institutions and rules.
Perhaps a further observation should be made on Duff's opinion in two
cases which place in a more balanced perspective the general tendency of his
decisions to tilt the balance of the constitution in favour of provincial power.
Duff ruled in favour of federal jurisdiction in two of the most important of
the "Bennett New Dear' cases-the Unemployment Insurance and the Labour
Conventions references. As we have seen, he rejected the general power as a
basis of federal jurisdiction in these cases, but in the Unemployment Insurance
reference he based validity on the federal power to tax and to spend, and in
the Labour Conventions case on a plenary federal power of treaty implementation. A federal power to tax and to spend for purposes which do not fall within
federal regulatory jurisdiction is now firmly established and conceded (despite
complaint from time to time) by constitutional practice. In fact, it is largely
this power that has made the constitution workable by making it possible to
compensate for many of the difficulties created by the division of powers and
by geography. There may be some question concerning the merits of Duff's
characterization of the obligation of employers and employees to contribute
to the unemployment insurance fund as taxation that did not involve an attempt
to regulate employer-employee relations within the province, but his opinion
contains what is probably the strongest and most elaborate judicial statement
of the essentially unlimited scope of the federal power to tax and to spend for
public purposes..
In the Labour Conventions case, Duff interpreted the judgment of the
Judicial Committee in the Radio case as affirming a plenary federal jurisdiction
based on the general power to implement international agreements falling
outside the scope of section 132 of the B.N.A. Act. Although the Judicial
Committee disagreed with him, it is submitted that Duff did not misread the
judgment in the Radio case on this point. What seems to have happened is that
the Judicial Committee reconsidered what it had suggested concerning treaty
implementation power, in the context of legislation for which there was clearly
another basis of federal jurisdiction, when it was confronted with the implications of a plenary federal power of treaty implementation in relation to matters
within provincial jurisdiction. Certainly, a plenary federal power of treaty
implementation would have gone far to supply the deficiencies of federal legislative jurisdiction, as judicially determined. It would have significantly enlarged
the power of the federal government to increase its jurisdiction by its own
initiative in the international sphere. This was essentially the reason that the
Judicial Committee denied the power.
The Unemployment Insurance and Labour Conventions references also
place in a more balanced perspective the question of Duff's influence on the
Judicial Committee. They were perhaps the two most important cases in which
the Committee disagreed with him. They illustrate how strong was the persis-
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tence of the Judicial Committee in its concern for provincial jurisdiction,
despite the great respect for his opinions. They suggest an answer to the highly
speculative question that was posed earlier as to whether the tendency of the
Judicial Committee's decisions might have been significantly different had Duff
thrown the weight of his intellectual authority on the side of federal power in
some of the important cases. Duff was of great assistance to the Judicial Committee in the elaboration of the general perspective which they brought to the
interpretation of the constitution, but, great as he was, it is doubtful if he could
have changed the result by an essentially different emphasis in his own work.

